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ABSTRACT 
Joke-Making Jews /  Jokes Making Jews: 
Essays on Humor and Identity 
in American Jewish Fiction
by
Jason Paul Steed
Dr. Joe McCullough, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of English 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Beginning from the premise that humor plays a prominent role in the 
construction of group and individual identities, as a social phenomenon and a 
simultaneously alienating and assimilating force, these essays explore and examine 
hum or and its construction of American Jewish identity within the context of various 
works of American Jewish fiction. Though organized as "chapters," the essays do not 
build upon one another progressively, nor do they center on a unified thesis; rather, 
each is written to stand alone; however, each approaches the general subject of humor 
and identity in American Jewish fiction, and as a collection it is intended that the whole 
equal more than the sum of its parts.
Following the Introduction, chapter two examines Abraham Cahan's Yekl and 
the relationship between humor and identity for the Jewish immigrant at the turn of the 
20* century. Attention is also paid to the absences of humor, and how these are likewise 
capable of constructing identity.
Ill
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Chapter three raises questions regarding the ethics of humor, particularly when
dealing w ith the Holocaust. It examines Saul Bellow's The Bellarosa Connection under 
the guiding question of "What is to be gained by reading this novella?"—with specific 
attention being given to the connective function of the novella's humor.
Bernard M alamud's God's Grace is examined in chapter four, which seeks to 
read the novel as a retelling of an old Jewish joke, in the form of the story of Abraham 
and Isaac; M alamud's reversal of the story, and his use of absurdist humor, is read as an 
affirmation of humanism and Jewish identity.
Chapter five examines the humor of Philip Roth and Woody Allen, as 
representatives of second-generation anxieties about Jewish identity in America.
Then, chapters six and seven explore two possible responses to these anxieties. 
Chapter six looks at the works of the Coen brothers and asserts that Jewishness has been 
deliberately absented from their narratives; chapter seven looks at the works of Allegra 
Goodman and Nathan Englander and asserts that, in their fiction, a new, anxiety-free 
Jewish Self is being constructed, with humor playing a prominent role in this 
postassimüationism.
IV
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
I. Humor
In his 1979 film, Manhattan, Woody AUen plays the part of Isaac Davis, a writer 
for a popular television sitcom who despises the triviality of his work. At one point, in a 
fit of complaint, he decries the worthlessness of a particular episode by responding to 
co-workers' criticisms with, "It's worse than not insightful; it's n ot funnyV
The beauty of this exclamation is that it is itself both humorous and insightful. 
Allen manages to create humor by playing on our expectations: we typically think of 
insight as above humor in our hierarchy of values, but here it is repositioned below— 
apparently far below—the value of humor, and thus the juxtaposition of this statement 
with our previously held assumptions creates an incongruity that we respond to 
humorously. But the statement also provides insight as, upon examination, we realize 
that perhaps humor can, in fact, be more valuable than insight. After all, the statement 
itself illustrates this possibility—for not only does it provide this insight, but with it the 
pleasure of a humorous experience, and the likelihood that the insight will be more 
readily received, and perhaps even more readily retained. Hum or thus becomes better 
than insight because it includes insight; it is insight and then something more.
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Those who study humor analytically recognize this truth. John Morreall, for 
example, as the editor of a book on The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, claims that 
In both philosophy and humor we shift mental gears and look at things in 
new ways. And this departing from well-worn paths of thought brings a 
certain mental liberation, which has long been counted as among the 
chief values of philosophy and of humor. (2)
Louis D. Rubin, Jr., writes that American comedy and humorous writing provide "a 
valuable insight into the understanding of American society" (4). Says Lawrence E. 
Mintz, "American hum or has been, from its very beginning, used to preach and to teach, 
on just about every issue that has concerned us as a people" (vii). And William Bedford 
Clark and W. Craig Turner, in their introduction to Critical Essays on American Humor, 
state that American hum or is "so valuable a tool for understanding the American 
character" (2), and call it "an outgrowth of and index to the collective American mind" 
(3),
The philosophical study of humor has evolved into three major theoretical 
camps, which have been classified as Superiority Theory, Relief Theory, and Incongruity 
Theory. What follows is a brief look at each.
Superiority Theory
Much malice mingles with a little wit.
—John Dryden
Led by philosophers ranging from Aristotle to Thomas Hobbes, to Henri 
Bergson, and dominating the field of thought on hum or for over 2,000 years, superiority
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
theory states basically that humor is produced when one observes an incident (i.e. 
behavior, act, statement, etc.) to which one feels superior in some way, and that all 
laughter is mixed with scorn or ridicule. A simplistic example illustrating this 
understanding of hum or is the crowd of kids in the high school hallway who laugh at 
the girl who has worn a unique hat to class that day. If their laughter (i.e. if the hum or 
they are deriving from the incident) involves ridicule or mockery, then it fits w ithin the 
framework constructed by superiority theorists.
In his Poetics. Aristotle calls comedy "an imitation of people who are worse than 
the average," and the ridiculous "a species of the ugly." In his Nichomachean Ethics, he 
claims that "a joke is a kind of abuse."i Centuries later this notion persists, as Bergson 
notes "the absence of feeling which usually accompanies laughter" (emphasis Bergson's). 
Bergson goes on to argue that all humor is the result of our perception of a certain 
rigidity of character in other persons or situations, and that our laughter is "its 
corrective" —which is to say that we laugh in ridicule at that which we wish to correct, 
that which is undesirable or inferior.^
Clearly this way of understanding hum or does have some merit, and is readily 
applicable to our example of the students in the hallway. But superiority theory 
dominated thinking about humor for over 2,000 years most likely because of the ethos of 
those, such as Plato and Aristotle, who first established it, and not because of its wide- 
ranging applicability to real-life humorous situations. After all, a moment's
 ^See Morreall, 14-15. 
z Ibid., 117-125.
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contemplation reveals that there are many, many incidents of humor that do not involve 
ridicule.
Relief Theory
I force myself to laugh at everything, for 
fear of being compelled to weep.
—Pierre-Augustin 
de Beaumarchais
Relief theory's most prominent proponent is Sigmund Freud, who saw humor 
"as an outlet for psychic or nervous energy," or as involving "a repudiation of 
suffering."^ In other words, for Freud, hum or is a means of negotiating pain or anxiety. 
This usually occurs as tensions mount; the tension (or anxiety) itself must result in a 
response of either fear or laughter, and when the result is laughter, the laughter relieves 
that tension. Thus humor is seen as a psychological coping mechanism.
Returning to our example of the kids in the high school hallway, if the girl in the 
funny hat laughs along with those who are laughing at h er—and the hum or she 
experiences is fraught with anxiety, and her laughter is in effect a coping mechanism for 
that anxiety—then it fits within the framework of relief theories of humor.
Relief theory gained some prominence in the early 20* century, but again it 
seems that this might be due more to Freud's ethos than to the theory's wide-ranging 
applicability. Again, it takes only a moment's contemplation to tell us that there are 
many, many incidents of humor that are not fraught with anxiety.
' These are John Morreall's words. See Morreall, 111.
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Incongruity Theory
Impropriety is the soul of wit.
—W. Sommer set 
Maugham
Presently, the most widely accepted, most inclusive theory of hum or is 
incongruity theory; whereas some incidents of humor may be explained by superiority 
theory but not by relief theory, or vice versa, virtually all incidents can be reconciled 
with some version of incongruity theory, which has its roots in the philosophies of 
figures such as Kant, Kierkegaard, and Schopenhauer. In essence, incongruity theory 
states that hum or is derived from (or created by) the juxtaposition of two incongruous 
elements—usually generating some small amount of surprise in, or at, the juxtaposition. 
Kierkegaard, for example, states that "wherever there is contradiction, the comical is 
present," and goes on to claim that both the tragic and the comic are based on 
contradiction, the comical being the "painless contradiction."^ And Schopenhauer, in his 
The World as Will and Idea, speaks of laughter as the result of the "incongruity of 
sensuous and abstract knowledge,"® which is to say the incongruity of our sensory 
perception of things and our abstract understanding of things. In applying 
Schopenhauer's theory to Woody Allen's remark in Manhattan, for example, we might 
say that our abstract understanding classifies hum or as inferior to insight, and thus runs
* Ibid., 83. 
5 Ibid., 51.
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incongruous to the remark (perceived through the senses) in which insight is made 
inferior to humor.
Returning once again to the high school hallway, we might explain the group's 
laughter as deriving from the incongruity of the girl's unique hat—and, notably, to do so 
we don 't have to classify their laughter as ridicule, as in the application of superiority 
theory. Whether their laughter is antagonistic or amiable, it can be traced to the presence 
of incongruity. Likewise, the girl's laughter need not be classified as anxiety-laden, as in 
the application of relief theory; whether she laughs comfortably or uncomfortably, we 
can trace the humor to the incongruity she observes in her expectations (which 
presumably did not include being laughed at) juxtaposed with reality (i.e. being laughed 
at).
This particular incongruity—identified as the juxtaposition of expectations (or 
ideals) with reality—is perhaps the most common source of humor, at least within the 
context of American culture and w hat we might identify as American humor. As Rubin 
puts it, American hum or relies heavily upon "the interplay of the ornamental and the 
elemental, the language of culture and the language of sweat, the democratic ideal and 
the mulishness of fallen hum an nature," all of which creates what Rubin calls "the Great 
American Joke" (15). Indeed, w hat nation is better suited for this kind of hum or than 
one built on a foundation of lofty ideals such as freedom, equality, and democracy? 
Ideals by nature are unobtainable, and consequently American culture—which clings so 
tightly to its ideals—becomes a fertile soil for a hum or that relies on the incongruity of 
the ideal and the real.
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The Function of Humor
A rich man's joke is always funny.
—T. E. Brown
In undertaking my own study of humor, what I have found most interesting is 
not these overarching theories and their attempts to locate the source or nature of humor 
(i.e. where it comes from, how it comes about). Rather, I have become most interested in 
what humor accomplishes. Some theorists do touch on the function of humor. Bergson, 
for example, claims that hum or's function, via ridicule, is to correct hum an "rigidity." 
And indeed the ridiculing aspect of humor as it is explained by superiority theory is 
(and serves) a kind function. Likewise, Freud's relief theory incorporates a kind of 
function: laughter is not merely produced by the presence of anxiety, but is a release of 
that anxiety, and becomes a means of coping with it. But for most theorists, the function 
of hum or—if it is touched upon at all—is treated secondarily, or implicitly, and is not of 
primary concern.®
In this study, the function of hum or is the sole concern. In the essays that follow, 
very few references are m ade to superiority theory or relief theory, and most of the 
references to incongruity theory are made as a means of explicating the humor in the 
fiction for the purpose of examining its function. These essays represent the germination 
and evolution of my own theory of humor that speaks to hum or's primary function as a
® Bergson and Freud are perhaps the most prominent exceptions to this claim, in fact. 
Both devote substantial attention to hum or's function, and indeed my interest in, and 
ideas on, the function of hum or and its relationship to group and individual identity 
owe a great deal to my readings of Bergson and Freud.
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means of alienation and assimilation. In other words, it is my assessment that humor 
functions to simultaneously alienate and assimilate—people, ideas, values, 
environments, situations, etc.—and thus it becomes a prominent, perhaps even 
fundamental means of negotiating one's place in the world. Or, more precisely, it 
becomes (and always already is) a prominent, perhaps even fundamental means of 
negotiating identity.
II. Humor and Identity 
To the layperson—which is to say, the person who is not engaged in the critical 
analysis or philosophy of hum or—the connection between hum or and identity is 
nevertheless understood, though it usually remains unarticulated. Our 
conceptualization of a person's identity includes our conceptualization of his or her 
"sense of humor," and the degree to which we identify with others is often in proportion 
to the degree to which we identify w ith their sense of humor. In fact, when asked what 
we find most attractive in someone with whom we are considering a romantic 
relationship, we often cite a "good sense of humor" at or near the top of our list. In other 
words, humor is a communal, and thus community-building, thing; it brings people 
together and, with equal effectiveness, can drive them apart. The fact that we form our 
communities and our relationships w ith humor playing so regular and prominent a role 
in those formations illustrates our (albeit largely unexamined) understanding of 
humor's relationship to identity. And it also illustrates the essentially 
alienating/assimilating function that humor serves.
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By way of further illustration, let us return, once again, to our example of the 
kids in the high school hallway. Regardless of whether we attempt to explain the humor 
that is derived from the girl's unique hat via superiority, relief, or incongruity theory, 
the fact remains that in this instance a social negotiation is taking place, with regard to 
individual and group identities. The group that laughs at the girl and her hat is involved 
in a complex act of assimilation and alienation. Assuming their laughter is, in fact, the 
laughter of ridicule, then clearly we can say that the members are, through their humor, 
actively alienating the girl from their social group—and thus they are constructing the 
girl's individual identity as "not one of us," and the group's identity as "one that does 
not include that girl" (or, implicitly, others like her). The members of the group are also 
simultaneously assimilating one with another; that is, their humor also works to bind 
the group members more closely together. This is most readily noticeable in the fringe 
members of the group, who are able to solidify their membership by joining in the 
laughter and thereby benefiting from its assimilating function. Inherent in, and a key 
aspect of, this assimilation process is the assimilation of a value system, implicit in the 
ridiculing of the girl and her hat; it is in part the joint acceptance of and participation in 
this value system that results in the coagulation of the group. Thus, the group members, 
via this humor, construct an identity for themselves that includes a value system and a 
(seemingly) clear demarcation of who is in and who is out of the group.
Meanwhile, the girl's laughter, whether it is self-secure or anxiety-laden, is 
likewise simultaneously alienating and assimilating. Assuming her laughter is anxiety­
laden, then her laughter is, as relief theory would have it, a coping mechanism—a means
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of negotiating the incongruity with which she is faced. She did not expect to be laughed 
at, but is being laughed at, so her own laughter becomes a means of assimilating this 
new identity (as "one who is laughed at"). (According to Freud, her other option is to 
respond w ith fear or despair—to run to the bathroom in tears.) Depending on the subtle 
nuances of her laughter, she might be, like the group members, assimilating (at least 
temporarily) the value system inherent in their ridicule, in which case she is self- 
deprecatory in her humor. Or, she might be laughing along in a kind of ridicule all her 
own, designed to diffuse the group's ridicule, in which case she asserts her own identity 
and deftly rejects or alienates that of the group. Either way, the girl, too, constructs an 
identity via assimilation and alienation—or, namely, via humor.
III. Jewish Humor and Identity
While it is possible to say that these constructions of group and individual 
identities are occurring always and everywhere, in all instances and occurrences of 
humor, it is easier—for the sake of close examination—if we focus on a particular group 
identity comprising particular individual identities. For this study, I have chosen to 
focus specifically on Jewish-American identity, and by extension Jewish-American humor, 
as they are explored and employed and constructed in Jewish-American fiction.
My reason for this focus is essentially twofold; 1.) the Jews have a long history 
and a weU-established tradition of hum or that can be identified as "Jewish"; and 2.) the 
Jews have a long history and a well-established tradition that entails a prominent 
preoccupation with identity, dating back thousands of years to Abraham and the
10
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beginnings of the notion of "a Chosen People/' and continuing through centuries of 
diaspora, Zionism, and anti-Semitism.
This preoccupation with identity has intensified for the Jews in America. Jewish 
immigrants, for example, faced a more difficult transition than most other immigrants, 
for two major reasons. First, Jewish immigrants came from a variety of nations (e.g. 
Poland, Russia, England, France, Italy) and thus had no unified "homeland" to hold 
them together as a group in the New Land. They spoke different languages and came 
from different cultural backgrounds, so their sense of group identity relied heavily on 
their shared Jewishness, which in turn relied heavily on their shared Judaism. But this 
Judaism was, in fact, the second reason that Jewish immigrants had it harder than most 
others—because most other immigrants were Christians, and thus able to more readily 
assimilate themselves into an American culture that was itself predominantly Christian. 
Jewish immigrants, if they were to maintain a sense of group identity as Jews, had to 
hold fast to the one thing that would alienate them from a sense of group identity as 
Americans. And thus the question of identity was constantly at the forefront of the 
American Jew's life—arguably more so than in the lives of those around him/her.
As Jews increasingly made their homes in America, and as they increasingly 
chose to assimilate by abandoning their Judaism at least, if not their Jewish ethnicity 
altogether, numerous debates arose over the issue of identity. What made a Jew a Jew, if 
Judaism was abandoned? What bound a French Jew to a Polish Jew, to an English Jew, if 
not religion? Moreover, Judaism itself was undergoing transformations, reformations. 
That Jewish identity had become questionable, and that hum or was playing a consistent
11
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role throughout these constructions, deconstructions, and reconstructions of Jewish 
identity, is exemplified by one self-mocking definition of Jewishness which has it that "a 
Jew is anyone that another Jew says is a Jew."^ Joseph Dorinson and Joseph Boskin note 
that, especially in the 19*- and 20*-centuries, "where once religion reconciled [the Jews] 
to death, pain, and evil, now hum or—especially Jewish hum or—performs this vital 
function" (172).
Defining "Jewish humor," like defining "American humor," is difficult. It is not 
merely humor created by Jews, or about Jews, because a Jew can tell a joke that might 
have nothing to do w ith his or her Jewishness—a generic joke that easily could be told 
by an African-American or a Mormon and thus cannot be identified itself as "Jewish" — 
and because the anti-Semitic jokes told by Nazis, though about Jews, are likewise hardly 
the sort of humor we would characterize as "Jewish." Perhaps the best way to talk about 
"Jewish humor" is in terms of the sentiments, values, or issues expressed or examined in 
or by that humor. As Joseph Telushkin puts it, "Many of the most important issues that 
Jews think about, often obsessively, are expressed in Jewish humor" (16). In other words, 
"Jewish humor" is specifically concerned with Jewishness, and is thus inextricable from 
Jewish identity.
Allen Guttman, looking at Jewish humor historically, writes:
Although it may seem odd to say so, there really is no such thing as 
"Jewish humor." If the term refers to some form of humor which has been 
characteristic of Jews from the time of Moses to the day of Moshe Dayan,
 ^See Halio and Siegel, 18.
12
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then clearly the term has no referent at all. There is, on the other hand, a 
kind of hum or which is common to the great Yiddish writers of the 
nineteenth century and to many Jewish-American authors in the 
twentieth century. [...] This kind of humor is...the product of the social 
situation of East-European Jews as a minority which maintained a 
precarious existence within the larger culture of Christendom. (329) 
Again, in other words, "Jewish hum or"—if we can say there is such a thing—is 
concerned with, and is "the product of," concerns about or for Jewish identity. And 
much like "American humor," which often entails or results from the incongruity of the 
ideal and the real, Jewish humor too is "the result of a proud people acutely sensitive of 
their lowly social status," especially in 19*- and early 20*-century Europe and America 
(Guttman 330). Jews who came to America from Europe held the same ideals about 
America as other Americans—and they encountered the same harsh realities. But 
because of the unique situation of the Jewish immigrant, as discussed above, those 
incongruities were often heightened or exaggerated. Thus humor for the Jews was 
perhaps more necessary as a means of negotiating those incongruities—or, in effect, as a 
means of negotiating their identity.
Perhaps this accounts for why some 80% of America's foremost stand-up 
comedians are Jewish (Dorinson 168). And this use of and reliance upon hum or also 
becomes quickly evident in the fiction of Jewish-American writers, beginning most 
notably with Abraham Cahan, the prominent realist writer and humorist, and 
acquaintance of William Dean Howells, during the late 1800s and into the early 20*
13
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
century. There were others, too—other Jewish-American writers who openly explored 
Jewish themes and Jewishness in their fiction, often employing humor in the process, 
such as Anzia Yezierska and Michael Gold—but Jewish-American fiction and Jewish- 
American hum or in particular did not really flourish until after World War II. Perhaps 
this is because, following the War, American Jews felt more accepted and more 
comfortable in these open explorations. As Sarah Blacher Cohen puts it, "They had 
received sympathy from the Gentiles for the loss of their people in the Holocaust. They 
had been admired for helping create the state of Israel" (172). Now they could laugh 
openly about what it meant to be a Jew.
As a result, the 1950s were marked with a kind of renaissance of Jewish- 
American fiction, led by the trinity of Jewish-American novelists—Saul Bellow, Bernard 
Malamud, and Philip Roth—and written mostly in the comic mode. Whereas Cahan and 
his peers were predominantly first-generation immigrants, this new crew of writers 
comprised the second generation—the sons and daughters (or grandsons and 
granddaughters) of immigrants who faced a new world with new and different 
questions of identity, and who attempted to answer those questions with new and 
different humorous responses.
The second generation maintained its influence through the 1970s and into the 
1980s, through the trinity and others (e.g., Cynthia Ozick, Stanley Elkin, Woody Allen). 
But in the 1990s, and as we move into yet another new century, yet another generation 
has emerged, represented by authors such as Allegra Goodman and Nathan Englander. 
And with it comes yet another batch of humorous approaches to American Jewishness.
14
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Throughout the years and the generations, though, one thing has remained constant: 
namely, this crucial tie between Jewish humor and Jewish identity. The two are 
inseparable, and Jewish humor (like American humor to American identity) is 
invaluable to our understanding of Jewishness. In Telushkin's words:
Jewish humor reveals a great many truths about the Jews, but no one 
great truth. Indeed, 150 years of Jewish jokes, and 2,000 years of folklore 
and witticisms, have the uncanny ability to express truths that 
sociological or other academic studies usually miss. (15)
The purpose of this academic study, however, is not to seek after those truths 
about Jewish identity that are usually missed, according to Telushkin; rather, it is to 
examine this relationship between hum or and identity—to look closely at Jewish humor 
and how  it functions in myriad ways to construct that Jewish identity.
IV. The Essays
In short, the essays in this volume are intended to represent a multifaceted 
analysis of hum or and identity in American Jewish fiction. Though organized and 
labeled as "chapters," they do not build directly upon one another in procession, as true 
chapters would, but are presented instead merely in a rough chronological order 
(according to the dates of the author or authors examined). The hope is that the success 
of this collection, as a study of this broad subject, is greater than the sum of its parts, in 
that it makes possible the examination of a variety of works and issues, from a variety of 
angles, that might not be possible under a more unified but necessarily narrower thesis.
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The first essay, following the introduction and labeled "Chapter Two," examines 
Abraham Cahan's Yekl and the relationship between hum or and identity for the Jewish 
immigrant at the turn of the 20* century. Notably, special attention is paid in this essay 
to the conspicuous absences of humor, at moments when hum or might normally be 
present, and how these absences of humor are as capable of constructing identity as are 
its presences.
Chapter three moves into post-World War II America and raises questions 
regarding the ethics of humor, particularly when dealing with subjects such as the 
Holocaust. It examines Saul Bellow's The Bellarosa Connection under the guiding ethical 
question of "What is to be gained by reading this novella?"®—with specific attention 
being given to the function of the novella's hum or with regard to Jewish group identity.
Bernard Malamud's novel, God's Grace, is examined in chapter four, which 
seeks to read the novel as a retelling of an old Jewish joke, in the form of the story of 
Abraham and Isaac. Malamud's reversal of the story, and his use of absurdist humor, is 
read as an affirmation of humanism and an assertion of Jewish identity.
Chapter five then returns to the explicit issues of alienation and assimilation and 
examines the humor of Philip Roth and Woody Allen, as representatives of second- 
generation anxieties about Jewish identity in America. Chapters six and seven explore 
two possible third-generation responses to these anxieties.
For the first of these possible responses, we look to the works of Joel and Ethan 
Coen. Chapter six asserts that Jewishness has been deliberately absented from the
16
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Coens' narratives, utterly alienated via a hostile humor, and subsequently abandoned.
Chapter seven then examines another possible response to second-generation anxieties 
with a turn  to the works of Allegra Goodman and Nathan Englander. The chapter 
suggests that, in Goodman's and Englander's fiction, a new, anxiety-free Jewish Self is 
being constructed and asserted, with a revised Jewish hum or playing a prominent role 
in w hat might be called "postassimilationism," and that this might prove to be 
Goodman's and Englander's great accomplishment for Jewish humor and identity.
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CHAPTER 2
jABRAJTAJdCZATLAhrSTHüCL
Within any "minority" ethnic community there are two identity issues which, 
due to the incongruities inherent in them, can become sources of humor. The first is the 
issue of how the group member relates to others outside his or her group and of his or 
her attempts to assimilate into the majority. The second is the issue of how the group 
member relates to others within his or her own group and of his or her attempts to 
remain comfortably situated within the group after having successfully (or excessively) 
assimilated into the majority. In both cases, humor functions as a possible means of 
either assimilating or alienating the incongruity. In other words, the individual's 
assimilation into the majority, or his or her alienation from the minority, is itself an 
incongruity which is either assimilated or alienated by those who encounter it—and 
humor is a means by which this assimilation or alienation can be accomplished.
Take the following joke as an example:
American banker Otto Kahn, Jewish by birth but a 
convert to Christianity, was walking with a 
hunchbacked friend when they passed a synagogue.
"You know," said Otto, "I used to be a Jew."
"Yes," his companion replied. "And I used to
19
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be a hunchback."^
Here, an individual has attempted to assimilate into a majority group and has even gone 
so far as to assert that his identity as a member of the minority group has been 
abandoned. For an identity such as Jewishness, this assertion presents an incongruity, 
because Jewishness is not merely a matter of religion, it is also a matter of ethnicity and 
genealogy. This joke, then, uses humor as a means of assimilating or alienating that 
incongruity. One might make a case for the idea that the joke is assimilating, in that it is 
not violent and allows for individuals such as Otto to make a claim of assimilation, 
though the claim is the object of ridicule. But ultimately, I would argue that the joke 
disallows such claims because it undermines them. In other words, the incongruity of a 
Jew claiming he is no longer a Jew after his conversion to Christianity is effectively 
alienated by this joke, because the joke reasserts Otto's Jewish identity. Otto is no less 
Jewish than the hunchback is less hunchbacked. The point is that hum or can function, 
through the assimilation and/or alienation of incongruities, as an effective means of 
constructing a sense of identity.
It is possible that hum or may not necessarily function in this manner at all times; 
but because it can function this way, it is profitable to examine the uses of hum or with 
regard to issues of identity. As Paul Lewis points out in his Comic Effects (1989), the 
conspicuous absence of hum or in the face of such an incongruity can likewise be worthy 
of examination. Perhaps one of the most fruitful fields for such examination is American
This is my wording of the joke. It also appears in Telushkin, 125.
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Jewish literature, which often takes up issues such as alienation, assimilation, and
"Jewishness" as some of its major themes.
The first prominent example of such a work is Abraham Cahan's novella, Yekl. 
Published in 1898, no other major work of American Jewish literature precedes Yekl, and 
it deals w ith precisely those themes mentioned above. Cahan—himself a Russian Jewish 
im m igrant—had to deal with alienation and assimilation in his own life, and in Yekl he 
explores these through Jake Podkovnik's struggle for "Americanization" and his 
increasing inability to identify with his Jewishness. Considering the prevalence and 
prominence of these incongruities in the novella, it is not surprising that Cahan also 
creates and makes frequent use of humor.
That Cahan's humor was widely acknowledged and admired in his time is well- 
documented. Bernard G. Richards, in his introduction to Dover's 1970 edition of Yekl 
and The Imported Bridegroom, speaks of Cahan's "enlivening humor" (v) and his 
"rollicking humor" (vi) and quotes William Dean Howells's review of The Imported 
Bridegroom and Other Stories of the New York Ghetto (1898)—which appeared in the 
December 31, 1898, issue of Literature—in which Howells describes Cahan as "a 
humorist" whose "humor does not spare the sordid and uncouth aspects of the character 
whose pathos he so tenderly reveals." According to Howells, Cahan successfully "holds 
the reader between a laugh and a heartache" (qtd. in Richards, vii).
In Yekl, hum or abounds. There is joking among the characters themselves, there 
are humorous situations shared by the narrator w ith the reader (Sanford Marovitz notes 
"the sharp contrast" between the narrator's language and that of the characters as "the
21
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source of comic irony" [79]), and equally, if not most importantly, f/zgre are cZear
opportunities for humor from which humor is conspicuously absented. These "failures" of 
hum or are important because, as Paul Lewis explains,
the failure or collapse of humor often heralds an affective and intellectual 
intensification, an anti-comedic shift into terror, alienation or confusion .. 
. Like the use of humor, the unwillingness or inability to be amused 
confronts us with what is most essential about a given writer, character or 
work. (157-58)
The best example of this in Yekl is the chapter in which Jake meets Gitl at the train 
station. Before examining this scene, however, it is necessary to first examine Cahan's 
use of hum or up to this point.
Yekl opens in the cloak shop where Jake Podkovnik works, and we learn quickly 
that Jake (whose Russian name was Yekl) wants very much to consider himself an 
American. We learn this not only through the Americanization of his name and the 
narrator's description of him as "clean-shaven" and insistent on speaking a Yiddish 
"more copiously spiced with mutilated English" than the others, which he speaks "with 
w hat he considered a Yankee jerk of his head" (2), but we leam  it also through the 
humor that is present. The opening scene is one of joking: Jake, proud of his knowledge 
of American sports, speaks of boxers, and the result is a verbal sparring match between 
Jake and the other Jews who work at the shop. It begins with one of the men, responding 
to Jake's demonstrations of boxing techniques, saying, "Nice fun that! . .. Fighting—like 
drunken moujiks in Russia!":
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"Tarrarra-boom-de-ay!" was Jake's merry retort; and for an
exclamation mark he puffed up his cheeks into a balloon, and exploded it 
by a "pawnch" of his formidable fist.
"Look, I beg you, look at his dog's tricks!" the other said in 
disgust.
"Horse's head that you are!" Jake rejoined good-humoredly. "Do 
you mean to tell me that a moujik understands how to  fight?" (3)
This good-natured banter between the workers is the first appearance of humor 
in Yekl. and it accomplishes two things. First, it posits Jake as very much a part of the 
group that is present. As Lewis notes, in his preface to Comic Effects, "In context—that 
is, as a shared experience—hum or assumes and reveals social and psychological 
relations, cognitive processes, cultural norms, and value judgements" (ix). In other 
words, when we laugh with others, we assume and reveal shared values, identifying 
ourselves with one another as a social group. Because the group that is present here is 
identified as Jewish—they are speaking Yiddish, reading Yiddish newspapers, etc.— 
Jake, then, is identified initially—despite his desire to consider himself an American—as 
being comfortably situated within the Jewish community. Indeed, the fact that he wants 
so badly to see himself as an American only underlines the reader's initial identification 
of him as not-American, as a part of this identified group of Jewish immigrants.
But immediately following this shared hum or is the display of a more hostile 
humor, as Bernstein—a "rabbinical-looking man," and thus, presumably, identifiable as 
ultra-Jewish—becomes irritated with Jake, who has interrupted his reading. Jake scoffs
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at the mention of Russian moujiks who fight clumsily, claiming that "'here [in America] 
one must observe rulesh."'^ Bernstein, in response, and "with an air of assumed gravity," 
says, "America is an educated country, so they won't even break bones without 
grammar. They tear each other's sides according to 'right and left.'" In a footnote, Cahan 
makes it clear that this is "a thrust at Jake's right-handers and left-handers," and the fact 
that it is a joke is clear in that the others respond with an "outburst of laughter" (4). 
Cahan's footnote also provides a brief explanation of the joke: Bernstein's reference to 
"right and left" is a punning of Jake's boxing moves, his "right-handers and left­
handers," with the Hebrew equivalent of the letter s, "whose pronunciation depends 
upon the right or left position of a mark over it" (4).
The joke clearly functions as a "force in the exercise of power in social groups" 
(Lewis 36); Bernstein, a more educated man than Jake, makes a joke at Jake's expense, in 
which Bernstein's knowledge and Jewish literacy (he knows the sacred language, 
Hebrew, and we find out later that Jake can't even read Yiddish) is placed in a position 
of superiority over Jake's knowledge of American sports. As Bernstein and the others 
laugh at Jake (as opposed to with him) his identification with the group is underm ined— 
he is alienated, to some extent. As a result, we begin to see Jake as at once Jewish (part of 
the group) and not-Jewish (apart from the group); or, perhaps more appropriately, we 
begin to see him as both no-longer-Jewish ("his religious scruples had followed in the 
wake of his former first name" [11-12]) and not-yet-American ("He thinks that shaving
 ^Cahan explains that the characters are speaking in Yiddish, and that italicized words 
are in English, and he often has to clarify the butchered English words; here, in brackets.
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one's mustache makes a Yankee!" [6]). From the first chapter, then, the theme of 
alienation and assimilation is firmly established.
We also leam  in the first chapter that Jake has a wife and child in the Old World, 
but that this is not something he has shared w ith anyone, as the second chapter makes 
clear. Jake spends his free time at a dance hall, and it seems he has been somewhat 
intimate w ith at least two other women, by the names of Fanny and Mamie. "His 
resolution to send for his wife," notes Jules Chametzky, is "in the indefinite future" (59). 
But in chapter three Jake learns of his father's death and is forced to bring his wife, Gitl, 
and son, Yossele, to the New World. Until the news of his father's death, Jake had 
continued his pursuit of Americanization. Not telling others of Gitl and Yossele was a 
part of this, as he "carefully avoided all reference to his antecedents" (24), thereby 
cutting himself of from a Jewish history. Yet Jake cannot completely let go of his past:
During the three years since he had set foot on the so il. . .  he had lived so 
much more than three years . . .  that his Russian past appeared to him a 
dream and his wife and child, together with his former self, fellow 
characters in a charming tale, which he was neither willing to banish from 
his memory nor able to reconcile with the actualities of his American 
present. (25-26)
After learning of his father's death, which clearly signifies a substantial loss of 
his past and his former identity, Jake's "native home came back to him with a vividness 
which it had not had in his mind for some time" (29). Jake resolves to send for his family
we leam that 'rulesh' is 'rules'
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and to "begin a new life" (31). But it is too late; his Americanization has progressed too
far, as is evidenced by his reaction to Gitl's arrival in chapter four.
This is the above-mentioned scene in which the failure of hum or "heralds . . .  an 
anti-comedic shift into terror, alienation or confusion" (Lewis 157-58). The narrator's 
telling of the scene demonstrates clearly that it presents an opportunity for humor, but 
for Jake there is none:
All the way to the island [Jake] had been in a flurry of joyous anticipation. 
The prospect of meeting his dear wife and child, and, incidentally, of 
showing off his swell attire to her, had thrown him into a fever of 
impatience. But on entering the big shed he had caught a distant glimpse 
of Gitl and Yossele through the railing . . .  and his heart had sunk at the 
sight of his wife's uncouth and un-American appearance. She was 
slovenly dressed . . .  and her hair was concealed under a voluminous wig. 
(33-34)
The narrator, here, explains that Gitl actually had been "sprucing herself up for the great 
event," and this incongruity between her intent and the outcome is clearly a potential 
source of humor. The potential for hum or is then reiterated w hen the narrator remarks 
that Gitl was
aware neither of this [the ugliness of the wig] nor of the fact that in New 
York even a Jewess of her station and orthodox breeding is accustomed to 
blink at the wickedness of displaying her natural hair, and that none but
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an elderly matron may wear a wig without being the occasional target for 
snowballs or stones. (34)
To say that the humor of the scene fails may be a bit misleading, for clearly there 
is hum or here that is succeeding. Gitl is, after all, incongruity personified. Readers today 
will perhaps laugh naturally and unthreateningly at the scene, while the narrator seems 
to target Gitl in much the same way that Bernstein, earlier, targeted Jake—as an 
outsider, the object of a derisive, hostile humor which functions as an alienating force. 
Either way, the hum or is not merely potential but fully present. Moreover, we note that 
through derisive hum or the narrator constructs a set of values that are assumed to be 
shared by the reader, and it is interesting to note this as an instance in which Cahan (as 
narrator) might be accused of anti-Semitism. Chametzky, too, notes this tendency in the 
narrator when, after praising him  for "dispelling . . .  an implicit prejudice and ignorance 
in his audience," he admits that "he is capable also of an arch and condescending 
attitude towards his Jewish characters" (63).
But in effect, though derisive, the hum or is not violent nor is it ultimately 
alienating. That is, Gitl is not completely shunned by the group that includes the 
narrator and the reader (though Jake is another matter). While hostile hum or directed at 
its object of ridicule can have an alienating effect, the fact that this hostility is expressed 
through humor is evidence that the alienation is not complete, nor need it be. Freud 
argued that hum or was a safe means of venting hostility, and according to Lewis, "a 
character's use of humor [is] related to his or her capacity for cognitive, emotional and 
moral development" (75). In other words, the ability to recognize incongruity and to
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laugh at it demonstrates the ability to accept or assimilate that incongruity. Bernstein 
and the other Jews laugh at Jake in the cloak shop, but he is still acceptable to them — 
they do not ostracize him altogether. Likewise, as the narrator and the reader share a 
laugh at Gitl's expense, the value system that is shared which allows for that humor 
allows also for the presence of the incongruity which Gitl represents. Whether there is 
anti-Semitism present, in the end, depends on whether or not a space is made for Gitl's 
Jewishness (that which makes her incongruous)—whether or not her Jewishness is 
allowed to continue.
It is precisely this potential for not allowing the presence of incongruity to exist 
or to continue that, when realized, constitutes either true ridicule or the failure of humor 
altogether. It is this failure of hum or altogether—to which I referred previously—that is 
realized in Jake's reaction to Gitl's appearance at the station. Instead of joining in with 
the narrator and the reader and having a laugh at Gitl's expense, thereby accepting her 
incongruity and making space for it, Jake's new system of Americanized values—or, 
more precisely, Jake's version of American values—will not allow for that humor; 
instead, he recoils into anti-comedic terror and confusion:
[Hjis heart had sunk at the sight of his wife's uncouth and un-American 
appearance.. . .  [He] had no sooner caught sight of her than he had 
averted his face, as if loth [sic] to rest his eyes on her, in the presence of 
the surging crowd around him, before it was inevitable . . .  and he 
vaguely wished that her release were delayed indefinitely. (34)
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For Jake, who has been doing his best to assert his Americanness primarily 
through the suppression of his Jewishness, that Jewishness—to which he is still married, 
and with which he now comes face to face, as personified in Gitl—is unbearable, even 
unbelievable. "Here he was, Jake the Yankee, with this bonnetless, wigged, dowdyish 
little greenhorn by his side! That she was his wife, nay, that he was a married man at all, 
seemed incredible to him" (37). Jake is filled w ith "disgust and shame" (37), and quickly 
begins to see his wife and child "as one great obstacle dropped from heaven, as it were, 
in his way" (36). And it is with this last estimation that Jake's failed humor is revealed as 
anti-Semitic, a manifestation of self-hatred, for Jake sees Gitl's Jewishness, and thus his 
own Jewishness, as "one great obstacle" in his way to Americanization—an obstacle that 
must be removed or overcome. It must not be allowed to continue.
"When hum or fails," writes Lewis, "when a listener recoils in anger or 
discomfort, it is often because the listener and the teller have different values, a 
difference that manifests itself in an unwillingness or an inability to treat a particular 
subject lightly" (34). In this scene, Gitl is the joke—a joke told by the narrator and shared 
with the reader. Gitl is a text being read. Jake, as another reader of the text, however, 
does not share in the humor because he no longer shares the values that will allow him 
to treat the subject—Gitl's apparent, even flagrant Jewishness—lightly. For Jake, the joke 
is not funny, it is offensive. And he spends the rest of the novella alienating this 
incongruity.
This alienation is accomplished as Jake pursues his divorce from Gitl and his 
relationship with Mamie. Mamie is one of the dance hall girls with whom Jake has had
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some past intimacy, and she is furious over the revelation of Jake's marital status. As 
Mamie's character is developed we leam that she speaks an English that is "a much 
nearer approach to a justification of its name than the gibberish spoken by the men" 
(Cahan 19), and that she does so "with an overdone American accent" (49). Yiddish, of 
course, is representative of Jewish identity, and Marovitz notes that "the linguistic 
distinctions detailed in Y ekl. . .  add not simply to the local-color in terest. . .  but also to 
the definition of character and the assimilationist theme" (80). Thus, in an almost 
allegorical construction, Mamie—with her Americanized speech—comes to represent 
the Americanization that Jake is so desperately seeking, while Bernstein (with his 
Hebrew literacy) and Gitl, whose "backwardness in picking up American Yiddish" (41) 
is repeatedly emphasized, come to represent the Jewishness from which Jake wishes to 
escape.
In pursuing Mamie/Americanization, then, Jake must remove his "obstacle," 
Gitl/Jewishness. This move from Gitl to Mamie culminates in chapter eight, in the scene 
between Jake and Mamie on the rooftop, when the plans for Jake and Gitl's divorce and 
Jake and Mamie's subsequent union are finalized. The significance of the imagery in the 
scene is made explicit:
When they reached the top of the house they found it overhung w ith 
rows of half-dried linen . . . .  A lurid, exceedingly uncanny sort of idyl it 
was; and in the midst of it there was something extremely weird and 
gruesome in those stretches of wavering, fitfully silvered white, to Jake's
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overtaxed mind vaguely suggesting the burial clothes of the inmates of a 
Jewish graveyard. (75)
This association of the flapping laundry with a Jewish graveyard underscores the death 
of Jake's Jewishness. This metaphor is emphasized again as Mamie, playing hard to get, 
tells Jake to go back to his family; Jake begins to sense "the wrong he [is] doing," and we 
leam  that "moreover, while [Mamie] was speaking [Jake's] attention had been attracted 
to a loosened pillowcase ominously fluttering and flapping a yard or two off. The figure 
of his dead father, attired in burial linen, uprose in his mind" (77). Clearly Jake feels 
haunted by his past, by his Jewishness. At that climactic moment when Jake and Mamie 
kiss, "The pillowcase flapp[s] aloud, ever more sternly, wamingly, portentously," and 
Jake has "an impulse to w ithdraw his arms from the girl; but, instead, he [clings] to her 
all the faster, as if for shelter from the ghostlike thing" (78). Jake's identity as a Jew is at 
stake, and it is the surrendering of his Jewishness that agitates the ghost. Clinging fast to 
his Americanization provides at least the semblance of shelter from the hauntings of his 
past, so this is what he does. That this shift in identity is complete is evidenced by what 
follows: Mamie declares, "Now it is all settled," Jake refers to her as "my gold" (78) — 
recalling the notion of America as "the golden land" (52)—and the two continue their 
conversation in English, during which Mamie repeatedly demands that Jake pledge his 
"oath of allegiance" (79), as though she were America herself.
Through all of this—from Jake's reunion with Gitl on Ellis Island, to his pursuit 
of Mamie, and on to his eventual divorce and his projected future with M amie—Jake 
continues on, conspicuously humorless. Highlighting this humorlessness, by contrast.
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are scenes with Mrs. Kavarsky, Gitl's mentor and advisor and easily the most humorous 
character in the novella. Gitl, too, is able to make jokes and to laugh at herself as a 
"greenhorn." At one point, for example, Jake upbraids her for her poor English, saying, 
"Don't say varim ess,. . .  here it is called dinner.” To this, Gitl responds w ith "an 
irresistible pun"; "Dinner? And what if one becomes fatter?" Dinner, Cahan explains, is 
Yiddish for thinner (38). Jake's reaction to the joke is, characteristically, nonexistent. The 
pun relies on a knowledge of Yiddish, on Jewish identity. To acknowledge and share in 
Gitl's hum or would be to share in her Jewishness—precisely what Jake wishes to avoid.
Because of his humorlessness, which contrasts with the hum or of those around 
him, Jake m ight be described much in the same way that Lewis describes the protagonist 
of Nathaniel Hawthorne's "My Kinsman, Major Molineux"—as "the one serious person 
in a city of mirth" (91). Jake is surrounded by Jews and Jewishness, by immigrants trying 
to make a home in America; yet while those around him can acknowledge the 
incongruities inherent in their situations and can often laugh at them, Jake cannot. He is 
either unwilling or unable to treat his predicament lightly, and thus responds to it with 
that "anti-comedic shift into terror." This notion of "anti-comedic," of course, refers not 
only to hum or but also to genre. As Jake fails to find humor in incongruity—a humor 
that will allow for the existence of this incongruity, and thus the existence of his 
Jewishness—his story shifts from potential comedy into personal tragedy, the tragedy 
being the end of his marriage and the death of his Jewishness, as, with the completion of 
the divorce, "the bond between [Gitl] and Jake [is] now at last broken forever and 
beyond repair" (87).
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Gitl, on the other hand, as we see her at the end of the novella, has reaffirmed her 
Jewishness through her engagement to Bernstein (a man "fit to be a rabbi" [88]). Though 
we are told that she, too, has become somewhat Americanized, with new makeup and a 
new hat (84), we note that these are superficial changes—Americanizations in 
appearance only. Marovitz uses these, and the fact that "the rustic, 'greenhomlike' 
expression was completely gone from [Gitl's] face and manner, and . . .  there was 
noticeable about her a suggestion of that peculiar air of self-confidence w ith which a few 
months' life in America is sure to stamp the looks and bearing of every immigrant" 
(Cahan 83), as evidence of Gitl's own, more thorough Americanization. He romanticizes 
the novella, claiming that "both [Jake and Gitl] are the subjects and products of 
Americanization," Gitl's being the realization of "the intrinsic promise that 
Americanization can fulfill" (Marovitz 80-81).
But it is important to point out that Gitl's "air of self-confidence" is only an air; 
more precisely, it is merely the "suggestion" of an air. Really, we are told, she looks 
"bewildered and as if terror-stricken" (83). When she participates in "the culminating act 
of the dram a"—the divorce—"her cheeks [turn] ghastly pale" (85) and her arms shake 
"so that they [have] to be supported by Mrs. Kavarsky" (86). In truth, w hat little real 
confidence Gitl might have is provided by Mrs. Kavarsky, who curses Jake ("May no 
good Jew know him") and whose words have "an instantaneous effect," so that Gitl can 
compose herself (87). As Mrs. Kavarsky consoles her, and even scolds her for lamenting 
the loss of her husband, we leam that "at the bottom of her heart [Gitl] felt herself far 
from desolate, being conscious of the existence of a man who was to take care of her and
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her child, and even relishing the prospect of the new life in store for her" (88). The 
second source of Gitl's hope and confidence is Bernstein. Thus it is not America, or Gitl's 
version of Americanization, which has affected Gitl for the good, as Marovitz suggests, 
but rather her continued and reaffirmed sense of Jewishness. We are told that Gitl and 
Bernstein will be married by the rabbi (87), unlike Jake and Mamie, who are rushing off 
in a cable car "bound for the mayor's office" (89). It is also important to note that Gitl's 
hope and confidence are buried under "an exhibition of grief" and a "paroxysm of 
anguish" (89), and that her future—though she relishes her prospects—is by no means 
guaranteed. The fact that Gitl and Bernstein's future "seem[s] bright with joy" leads 
Marovitz to declare them "two new Americans in the Golden Land" (81). But this 
overlooks the fact that their future only seems this way to Jake (Cahan 89), whose grass- 
is-always-greener mentality now causes him, in his moment of supposed triumph as he 
races away with Mamie, to wonder whether he might still be able to "dash into Gitl's 
apartments and, declaring his authority as husband, father, and lord of the house, 
fiercely eject the strangers" (89).
By deromanticizing our reading of the novella in this w ay—by recognizing the 
dampened hope in Gitl and Bernstein's future and by denying Gitl the same 
Americanization attributed to Jake—we lend to it a greater power and authority as the 
"cautionary tale" that Chametzky suggests it to be. The novella illustrates the negative 
effects of not just one mode of Americanization (Jake's), but of Americanization and the 
immigrant's predicament in general. Again, Jake's failure at hum or underscores this, for, 
as Lewis notes, "fictions, especially those that focus on problems of adaptation, use
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hum or or the conspicuous lack of humor to raise questions about whether assimilating 
the incongruous is always the best or most noble response" (110). In other words, Jake's 
inability to find hum or in his own and others' incongruity disallows that incongruity's 
existence and forces an assimilation whose value is questionable. The only happy ending 
in the novella is in the story of Gitl and Bernstein, but whatever romance this might have 
had is undermined, because it is essentially a story of alienation; the two find happiness 
only by maintaining their identity as Jews, still separated to some extent from the 
dominant culture. Meanwhile, the story of assimilation—of Jake's desire to become a 
"Yankee," through and through—is the novella's tragedy.
This may be w hat Cahan refers to when he demands that writers show "real life, 
with its comedy and its tragedy mingled—giving us what in my Russian day we called 
the thrill of truth" (qtd. in Marovitz 65). The realism of this truth, at least in Cahan's 
novella, is the notion that even happy endings are touched w ith sadness, loss, alienation. 
Such is the case w ith Gitl and Bernstein. And the last words from the narrator of Yekl 
describe Jake's thoughts as he is swept away toward City Hall with Mamie. Jake's 
ending is supposed to be trium phant—he is getting what he wants, a divorce from Gitl, 
marriage to Mamie, his Americanization—yet he cannot shake the feeling "which was 
now gaining upon him, that, instead of a conqueror, he had emerged from the rabbi's 
house the victim of an ignominious defeat." We are told that
If he could now have seen Gitl in her paroxysm of anguish, his heart 
would perhaps have swelled w ith a sense of triumph, and Mamie would 
have appeared to him the embodiment of his future happiness. Instead of
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this he beheld her, Bernstein, Yosele, and Mrs. Kavarsky celebrating their 
victory and bandying jokes at his expense. (89)
This final reference to humor functions as a last mark of emphasis on the theme 
of alienation and assimilation. For Jake—whose values are such that incongruity cannot 
be tolerated and for whom there is no hum or—to feel triumphant, he must flaunt "a 
hilarious mood" (89), making Gitl the butt of his hilarity; he must see his ex-wife, the 
symbol of his Jewishness, in the "anguish" of utter alienation. But instead, Jake feels, "in 
his inmost heart" (89), himself alienated. In his thrust for Americanization he has lost his 
sense of identity, his future seems "impenetrable," as he knows he is not yet an 
American and no longer a Jew. The loss of his Jewishness is manifested in the perception 
in his m ind's eye of the others "bandying jokes at his expense." Here, the presence of 
hum or (though imagined) is used one last time, much in the same way that Bernstein 
uses it in the cloak shop, as a means of alienating Jake from the group. But unlike 
Bernstein's humor, which was real and which evidenced an ability to allow for Jake's 
incongruity, this humor is imagined by Jake himself in such a way as to alienate Jake 
completely. Thus it becomes a means of self-expulsion, expelling Jake from his 
Jewishness just as he has expelled Gitl from his Americanization. Jake feels this loss as 
he rides away, "the victim of an ignominious defeat," his new identity finally and 
effectively constructed by the humor that surrounds him, whether real or imagined.
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CHAPTER 3
SAUL BELLOW'S THE BELLAROSA CONNECTION
There is an old joke: A Jew survives the camps but loses all his family. He 
approaches the resettlement officer and asks to go to Australia.
"Australia?" says the officer. "But why?"
"Why not?" says the survivor. "It's as good a place as any."
"But it's so far," says the officer.
"Far?" replies the survivor. "From what is it far?''^
I. The Holocaust
The history of the debate over the appropriateness of dealing artistically with the 
Holocaust is long and layered. Cries for a doctrine of silence regarding the Atrocity 
arose almost immediately in response to reports of its occurrence, yet such a doctrine 
was challenged from the beginning. As Leslie Fiedler observes, early on "the full horror 
of the Holocaust was [...] being relentlessly documented in print, on stage and screen, 
radio and TV" (173), and thus, ironically, the "catastrophe that had been labeled in an
’ This is my version of the joke. It appears in slightly different form in Telushkin, 108. 
For a publication history of the joke, see Richard Raskin's "'Far From Where?' On the 
History and Meanings of a Classic Jewish Refugee's Joke." (American Tewish History 
85.2:143^ ).
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instant cliché 'unspeakable' was being not only spoken about everywhere, but 
packaged, hyped, and sold on the marketplace" (174). Spokespersons for each side of the 
issue quickly stepped forward. The philosopher Theodor Adorno uttered his famous 
condemnation of the "barbarism" of writing poetry after Auschwitz, while survivors 
such as Elie Wiesel started publishing poetic prose about it. An articulation of the debate 
soon issued from the scholarly quarter, prompting formal questions regarding the issue. 
By 1975, Lawrence L. Langer had published The Holocaust and the Literary 
Imagination, in which he tells of the experiences that led him to question "whether the 
artistic vision of the literary intelligence could ever devise a technique and form adequate 
to convey w hat the concentration camp experience implied for the contemporary mind" 
(xii, emphasis added).
By 1979, with the publication of Edward Alexander's The Resonance of Dust, the 
question of adequacy had become central and discussions of it more refined. Alexander, 
in his preface, quotes Lionel Trilling: "the great psychological fault of our time which we 
all observe with baffled wonder and shame is that there is no possible way of 
responding to Belsen and Buchenwald. The activity of mind fails before the 
incommunicability of m an's suffering" (xi). Alexander then explains that
w hat Trilling really meant to say was not that there is no possible, 
but that there is no adequate, way of responding to the spectacle, 
enacted in full view of much of the world, of a genocidal 
campaign that had engaged the hum an and material resources of 
the German people for over six years, (xii)
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For Alexander, then, underlying the debate over the appropriateness of dealing 
artistically with the Holocaust is this question of adequacy. Can a work of art deal 
adequately with the Holocaust? If so, what constitutes "adequacy." How is a work to be 
judged as adequate or inadequate? Moreover, if adequacy is impossible, can there be 
value in a work that is inadequate?
According to Alexander, the inadequacy of any artistic treatment of the 
Holocaust is an essential aspect of it:
When you wrestle with an angel, it is probably better to lose than 
to win; and this is more especially the case when you wrestle with 
the angel of death who visited the Jews of Europe. We are, in 
other words, dealing here with one of those problematic human 
enterprises in which some degree of failure or inadequacy is 
almost a precondition of success, (xiii)
Others, such as Aharon Appelfeld and George Steiner, seem to agree w ith this 
notion of inherent inadequacy. Appelfeld begins his essay "After the Holocaust" by 
agreeing with Adom o on the barbarism of poetry after Auschwitz:
We m ust agree [...] with all our being. A religious person will 
certainly argue in favor of silence, but what can we do? By his 
very nature and, if you will, because of his weakness, man has a 
kind of inner need for ritualization, not only of his joy, but also, 
and perhaps essentially, of his pain and grief. (83)
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The implication here is that, yes, poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric, but human 
beings by their nature are barbaric, and in their weakness and inadequacy they will 
attempt to deal with their grief because, after all, "what can we do?" And Steiner 
concurs; "It is by no means clear that there can be, or that there ought to be, any form, 
style, or code of [...] expression somehow adequate to the facts of the Shoah" (155). He 
concludes that, despite the possibility or probability of inadequacy, the "compulsion to 
articulacy [...] will persist" (170), especially if the Jews as a people are to persist— 
because "for a Jew to be silent about any determining part of his own history is self- 
mutilation" (155).
The problem with this idea of inherent, unavoidable inadequacy is that, despite 
its apparent dismissal of the debate over the possibility of adequacy, it doesn't actually 
resolve anything. If inadequacy is inherent and a given, then all works of Holocaust 
literature are inadequate in their representation of the Atrocity, and to label a work 
"inadequate" is meaningless (as the adjective fails to distinguish it from any other 
work). Moreover, we must acknowledge that some works are more appropriate or more 
successful in dealing with the Holocaust than others, and such an acknowledgment 
forces us, in determining the relative success or appropriateness of a work, to ask "How 
inadequate is too inadequate?" This, in turn, leads us to contrive some sense of 
"adequate inadequacy," and suddenly we're right back to where we started: Can a work 
of art deal adequately with the subject of the Holocaust?
Appelfeld's and Steiner's essays appear in Writing and the Holocaust (1988), 
edited by Berel Lang. Published nearly a decade after Alexander's study, this volume
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thoroughly and effectively articulates the views of, and the tangled nest of dilemmas 
facing, those who write and read about the Holocaust. Lang himself puts it succinctly in 
his introduction:
It is clear that the Holocaust is not a conventional or "normal" 
subject at all, that the evidence of its moral enormity could not fail 
to affect the act of writing and the process of its literary 
representation. The latter notion, in any event, constitutes the 
main premise on which the essays collected in this volume turn: 
that there is a significant relation between the moral implications 
of the Holocaust and the means of its literary expression. The 
essays included here [...] reflect a common set of questions: What 
constraints, whether in the use of fact or in the reach of the 
imagination, are imposed on authors or readers by the subject of 
the Holocaust? How does that subject shape the perspectives from 
which it is viewed —the stance, for example, of the 
"disinterested" scholar, or the assumption of aesthetic distance or 
"negative capability" in the poet or novelist? Is the enormity of 
the Holocaust at all capable of literary representation? And what 
would be the justification for attempting such representation even 
if it were possible? (1-2)
Most notable, from Lang's list of questions, is the materialization of a dilemma 
that appears to be increasingly more ethical than aesthetic. Lang writes of "moral
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implications/' of "constraints" and of "justification." He summarizes Adorno's 
conclusions this way: "Placed in the balance with the artifice that inevitably enters the 
work of even the most scrupulous author, what w arrant—moral or theoretical or 
aesthetic—is there for writing about the Holocaust at all?" (2). One might argue that a 
theoretical or aesthetic warrant for writing about the Holocaust has, like a moral 
warrant, an underlying ethical basis. For certainly a warrant, of whatever nature and for 
whatever act, exists within a system of values or ethics that provides the impetus for the 
justification of that act.
It would seem, then, that the primary question is not "Can art deal adequately 
with the Holocaust?" but rather "What value, if any, is there in the artistic treatment of 
the Holocaust?" If we answer this, we answer the question of adequacy: if there is 
potential value X in writing poetry about Auschwitz, then the poetry is adequate to the 
degree that it accomplishes X. It would seem that, for Adomo, there can be no value in 
writing about it—or, at least, the value of silence is far greater than any potential value 
the art may offer. Adorno's position is that art can never be adequate and the ethical 
choice is silence.
In 1980, one year after Alexander's The Resonance of Dust, Alvin H. Rosenfeld 
published A Double Dying: Reflections on Holocaust Literature. But Rosenfeld, 
surprisingly, does not pick up the question of adequacy—perhaps because he felt that 
Alexander had sufficiently dismissed it. Rosenfeld spends the first chapter examining 
the problem of defining "Holocaust literature," noting that it is not merely a "topical" 
literature like, for example, war literature—and in the introduction he does raise familiar
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and important questions; "Can Holocaust literature be 'literary' [...]? Can it afford not to 
be literary?" (5); but he takes a backdoor approach to the question of adequacy when he 
asks, "What is to be gained from reading Holocaust literature [...] or what is to be lost 
from avoiding it?" (6). These questions strike at the heart of that at which the question of 
adequacy is aimed. In other words, Rosenfeld's questions are ethical. Can good come 
from artistic treatment of the Holocaust? Furthermore, if good can come from it, and 
does, is this enough to deem the work "adequate," though it fails to represent the 
totality of the Event? And on the other hand, supposing it is possible to adequately 
represent the totality of the Event, but the work fails to do so, can good still come of it?
To further complicate the ethical dilemma facing the writers and readers of 
Holocaust literature, there is also the question of the appropriateness of using humor, or 
of working in the comic m ode—a debate that, though perhaps less widespread, is 
undoubtedly more potentially combustible than that which arises over Holocaust 
writing in general. And this only makes sense; after all, if there can be no more poetry, 
no more eloquence after Auschwitz, then how can there be humor? Lightheartedness? If 
breaking the silence is potentially irreverent, can there be a greater show of irreverence 
than cracking jokes? The idea seems to flirt with blasphemy.
Yet hum or and comedy have been present in reactions to the Holocaust from the 
beginning. There is a long tradition of gallows humor, that brand of humor used by 
victims to articulate and, in some small way, assuage the terror and anxiety inherent in 
their position as victims. Terrence Des Pres, in his essay "Holocaust Laughter?", notes 
some of the representations of this humor in survivor memoirs. But Des Pres' main line
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of inquiry is ultimately the same as mine: Is laughter possible in literary treatments of 
the Holocaust? It is one thing to conceive of the victims resorting to making light of 
death or depravity to temporarily relieve their burdens, or ridiculing their oppressors in 
a vain bu t somewhat gratifying grasp for a sense of superiority or power. But is it 
possible for the reader, the non-victim, to respond with humor to the Holocaust? And, in 
Des Pres' words,
if possible, is it permitted? Is the general absence of humor a 
function of the event itself, or the result of Holocaust etiquette—or 
both? Laughter may or may not be possible; but it is not too much 
to say that most of us take a dim view of jokes or playfulness in 
matters so painful. (218)
And why shouldn't we take this dim view? Joking and playfulness are thought 
by many to be by nature anarchic, subversive—in a word, they are irreverent. Yet Alan 
Dundes and Thomas Hauschild argue that "Nothing is so sacred, so taboo, or so 
disgusting that it cannot be the subject of humor. Quite the contrary—it is precisely 
those topics culturally defined as sacred, taboo or disgusting which more often than not 
provide the principal grist for humorous mills" (56). But Dundes and Hauschild's 
argument appears in the context of an essay on "Auschwitz Jokes" in which it is not the 
gallows humor of the victims that is examined or highlighted, but rather the sick and 
anti-Semitic "executioner's humor" of jokes such as the following: "[Q.] How many Jews 
will fit in a Volkswagen? [A.] 506, six in the seats and 500 in the ashtrays" (20). Surely, in 
the face of jokes such as this, the question of "etiquette," of w hat is "permissible" —
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surely the question of ethics and the use of humor with regard to the Holocaust—must 
be raised and answered. How can it not be?
Berys Gaut, in his essay "Just Joking: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Humor," 
argues effectively that humor, in fact, cannot be divorced from ethical considerations— 
which is to say that we cannot hold that hum or is essentially, solely, or merely anarchic 
(and thus not answerable to the ethical constraints of other modes of discourse). "What 
is funny is partly dependent on what is ethical" (67), writes Gaut, so that, while humor 
may indeed be anarchic or irreverent, we m ust ask whether our ethics will allow for that 
anarchy or irreverence—w hether we can condone or assimilate it. To find humor in 
something is to take steps toward the assimilation, at least temporarily, of the value 
system that is inherent in and conveyed by that humor. Otherwise the hum or could not 
be appreciated. In considering the ethics of humor, then, we must consider the value 
system that is being presented and the effects or consequences of its assimilation. Also, 
in considering the value of a literary representation of the Holocaust that makes use of 
hum or or is in the comic mode, we can assess the nature and function of that hum or as a 
means of determining what good might come of the work, and whether the work is then 
adequate in accomplishing that good.
And this brings us to Bellow. In the context of these debates and dilemmas, what 
are we to make of Bellow's slim novella. The Bellarosa Connection—a story full of 
humor, set against the backdrop of the Holocaust, about an assimilated American Jew 
and his fascination with Harry Fonstein, a Holocaust survivor? The narrator of the 
novella is scornful of Old World Jewishness and would recommend that Jews "go
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American" (29), and he would rather avoid the topic of the Holocaust altogether. Is such 
a novella of value? Is Bellow's humor ethical? Is his treatment of the Holocaust 
adequate? Or, to paraphrase Rosenfeld, What, if anything, is to be gained by reading 
The Bellarosa Connection? And what, if anything, is lost by not reading it—by, instead, 
simply maintaining the silence?
II. The Novella
The first significant statement that is made by the narrator of The Bellarosa 
Connection comes at the end of the novella's opening sentence:
As founder of the Mnemosyne Institute in Philadelphia, forty 
years in the trade, I trained many executives, politicians, and 
members of the defense establishment, and now that I am retired, 
with the Institute in the capable hands of my son, I would like to 
forget about remembering. (1-2)
But the narrator recognizes that this is impossible—that, "if you have worked m 
memory, which is life itself, there is no retirement except in death" (2). And, as though 
to congratulate himself for the lasting integrity of his memory, he tells us that, despite 
his millions, he forces himself
to remember that I was not bom  in a Philadelphia house with 
twenty-foot ceilings but began life as the child of Russian Jews 
from New Jersey. A walking memory file like me can't trash his 
beginnings or distort his early history. Sure, in the universal
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process of self-revision anybody can be carried away from the true 
facts. For instance, Europeanized Americans in Europe will 
assume a false English or French correctness and bring a 
disturbing edge of self-consciousness into their relations with 
their friends. I have observed this. It makes an unpleasant 
impression. So whenever I was tempted to fake it, I asked myself,
"And how are things out in New Jersey?" (2-3)
It is through these opening pages that we are initiated into Bellow's world of comic 
irony, and to the humor that is inherent in the narrator's situation. Here is a m an—an 
Americanized Eastem-European Jew—who claims that his infallible memory will not 
allow him to "distort his early history" (2). Yet, after criticizing Europeanized Americans 
for their falseness, he demonstrates his own falsity by suggesting, quite self-consciously, 
that New Jersey, rather than Russian Jewry, is the soilbed of his "beginnings," the source 
of his identity.
This is necessary, of course, to the movement of the narrative, which is from the 
narrator's self-ignorance toward enlightenment. As Lillian Kremer puts it, "The 
pervasive irony of the novella is that its narrator recognizes at the end of a long career 
devoted to the mechanics of memory retention, that he has been blind to the relevance of 
personal and collective memory" (50). It becomes clear, through this introduction and 
subsequent events and descriptions, that the narrator has, in Elaine Safer's words, 
divorced himself "from all that is personal: emotional involvement with others and a 
meaningful connection with his own family and his Jewish roots" (5). That is, the
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narrator of The Bellarosa Connection is, at the start of the narrative, in a state of 
disconnectedness.
This disconnectedness is demonstrated not only by the narrator's lack of self- 
awareness, but also by his attitude and sense of humor, which manifest themselves 
repeatedly throughout his narrative. According to Shiv Kumar, "Bellarosa makes it clear 
from the beginning that the attitude of [...] the narrator to all that Fonstein suffered in 
the Holocaust—death, brutality, evil, loss of family—is trivial" (33); and "the narrator's 
use of humor is [...] characterized by an attitude that regards everything with 
amusement, even such things as the tragic experiences of Fonstein" (34). To trivialize 
and to regard with amusement are, of course, products of a certain level of 
disconnectedness. And in our narrator's case, it is Fonstein and all that he represents— 
Jewish identity and Jewish history, and specifically the Holocaust—from which the 
narrator is disconnected. We get a taste of this trivializing, bemused attitude when the 
narrator describes Fonstein's wartime experiences;
Most of Fonstein's family were killed by the Germans. In 
Auschwitz he would have been gassed immediately, because of 
[his] orthopedic boot. Some Dr. Mengele would have pointed his 
swagger stick to the left, and Fonstein's boot might by now have 
been on view in the camp's exhibition hall—they have a hill of 
cripple boots there, and a hill of crutches and of back braces and 
one of hum an hair and one of eyeglasses. (4)
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This cursory reference to these horrible facts appears amidst a grotesque description of 
Fonstein ("The head itself was heavy enough to topple a less determined man" [4]) and 
condescending remarks about the narrator's father (who "had a passion for refugee 
stories" [5]), and is followed by a flippant pun on the concentration camp ovens as the 
narrator explains that although Fonstein escaped from Poland and reached Italy, "The 
heat was on Italian Jews too, since Mussolini had adopted the Nuremberg racial laws" 
(4). Clearly, such treatment can only come from one who is emotionally distanced from 
both the individual Fonstein and a larger sense of Jewish history and identity.
This is where the question of ethics enters into the discussion. Every joke arises 
within a value system that allows for a humorous response to the situation presented by 
that joke; so it seems necessary that we examine the values of a narrator who is so clearly 
responding humorously to Fonstein's—and, by extension, to European Jewry's—dire 
predicament.
Humor, by nature, functions simultaneously as a means of both assimilation and 
alienation. To participate in the humorous response is, of course, to participate in at least 
one aspect of the assimilating function of humor, which is that socializing function 
whereby humor brings people together, establishes and strengthens relationships, and 
forms and reinforces communities; whereas, to resist participation, or to fail in or be 
incapable of participating, is to situate oneself outside of that community and to be 
subject to at least one aspect of the alienating function of that humor. This is one aspect 
of the social function of hum or—which is the construction of group identities—but it is 
only one aspect; another, for example, has less to do with who is participating (or not
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participating) in the humor and more to do with the attitude of the hum or toward its 
object. And this latter aspect often exerts influence over the former.
For instance, our narrator's humorous response to European anti-Semitism stems 
from a system of values that allows for such a response to the given situation. And 
perhaps, in our narrator's case, the value of such a response is precisely the 
disconnectedness that it affords. In other words, the narrator—who would prefer to 
"forget remembering" and "go American"—finds value in disconnecting himself from 
his Jewish history and identity. Thus, his particular humorous response (characterized 
as trivializing amusement), which both requires and reinforces a degree of 
disconnectedness, is considered by him to be valuable. Moreover, the attitude of this 
humor, and the value system it represents, has an influence over who participates in it. 
To participate in any given incidence of humor, one must be capable of, and willing to, 
assimilate—at least momentarily—the value system that allows for the existence of that 
humor. In short, if I am unwilling (or incapable^) of assimilating the value system 
inherent in a given humorous response, then I will not (or cannot) participate in it. And I 
thereby situate myself in relation to the community within which that hum or is 
generated; that is, I either assimilate myself into that community, or I alienate myself 
from it.
2 Humor is an intellectual experience and consequently demands a level of intellectual 
comprehension if one is to participate in it. That is why we can say we "don 't get it," 
after hearing a joke that others find funny. As a result, there are m any instances of 
humor that we might be willing to participate in, but which we are incapable of 
participating in because we lack the understanding that makes participation possible.
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In assessing the value of a humorous literary treatment of the Holocaust, then, 
we m ust ask. Is the value system inherent in the work's use of hum or a value system 
that we w ish to assimilate? (Recognizing all the while, of course, that we make this 
judgment while already situated within a value system that influences our evaluation of 
value systems.)
If The Bellarosa Connection was comprised of humorous treatments of the 
Holocaust and its victims and survivors that were all of a similar, trivializing attitude as 
the one described above, it seems safe to say that we would reject the work as being 
distasteful, even reprehensible. Our value system, which reveres the Holocaust as the 
most horrific modem Atrocity in Jewish history, would be incapable of assimilating such 
a sustained trivialization of the Event and its victims. But our narrator's attitude toward 
the Holocaust and Jewish history is not so one-dimensional, and it is this conflicted, 
problematic nature of his response that makes possible our (albeit temporary) allowance 
for his occasionally undesirable treatments. Witness his reaction, for example, when 
Sorella, Fonstein's wife, who "proved quite a talker" (26), brings a conversation "back to 
Fonstein's rescue and the history of the Jews" (27):
What she occasionally talked about [...] was the black humor, the 
slapstick side of certain camp operations. Being a French teacher, 
she was familiar with Jarry and Ubu Roi, Pataphysics, Absurdism, 
Dadaism, Surrealism. Some camps were run in a burlesque style 
that forced you to make these connections. Prisoners were sent 
naked into a swamp and had to croak and hop like frogs. Children
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were hanged while starved, freezing slave laborers lined up on 
parade in front of the gallows and a prison band played Viennese 
light opera waltzes.
I didn 't want to hear this, and I said impatiently, "All 
right, Billy Rose wasn't the only one in show biz. So the Germans 
did it too. [...]."
[...] I was invited to meditate on themes like: Can Death Be 
Funny? or Who Gets the Last Laugh? I w ouldn't do it, though. [...]
It suffocated me to do this. [...] Such things are utterly beyond me, 
a pointless exercise. (28-29)
When presented with an opportunity to participate in the "black humor" of the camps— 
a hum or that, it would seem, requires a deep sense of disconnectedness from the reality 
of things, something our narrator at times appears to desire and to foster—he declines. 
And it isn't that he is incapable of seeing the potential for humor; it is that he is 
unwilling to join in on this humor. He doesn't even want to hear about it. It suffocates 
him.
The fact that the narrator refuses to participate in this humorous response is 
indicative of the complexity of his attitude, and his value system. He does not refuse 
every humorous response to the Holocaust—he only refuses Sorella's. For the narrator, 
humor is typically trivializing, and when he says, "All right, Billy Rose w asn't the only 
one in show biz. The Germans did it too," he is attempting to stifle the discussion and to 
distance himself from the topic—to respond, not w ith Sorella's sense of black humor, but
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with his own attitude of trivializing humor. He wants to make the Germans' deeds 
unreal—to trivialize them as mere "show biz" and thereby disconnect from them — 
rather than engage with them philosophically, as Sorella would have it.
Indeed, by pointing out the absurdities of the camps and drawing connections 
with Dadaism or Surrealism, Sorella's hum or becomes not one of trivialization, but one 
of philosophical examination. Humor arises from incongruities, and while the narrator's 
hum or downplays or deflects the significance of these incongruities, Sorella's hum or 
seizes them and probes them for whatever significance they might offer. Ultimately, 
Sorella's exploration is our own: she asks, "Can Death Be Funny," and she seeks some 
sense of adequacy, of value, in responses to Jewish history and the Holocaust.
Meanwhile, our narrator initially remains ignorant of his failure to connect with 
this Jewishness. It is immediately following this conversation with Sorella, after he 
claims that all of this is "utterly beyond me," that he says, "Also my advice to Fonstein— 
given mentally—was: Forget it. Go American" (29).
In effect, a prominent theme in the novella becomes these "two faces of 
contemporary Jewish-American response to Jewish identification and historic memory" 
(Kremer 51). Sorella, representing one of these faces, is steeped in Jewish identity and 
memory; she stands for Jewishness, and it is her desire to put other Jews into a position 
of remembrance. (Hence her desire to get Billy to acknowledge her husband.) Billy is the 
Americanized Jew: "Remember, forget—what's the difference to me?" he asks 
flippantly, when Sorella finally confronts him (53). He has no interest in Jewish history, 
Jewish memory, or Jewish identity, despite his major role in, and contributions to, them.
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The absurd, utterly humorous anecdote that is at the heart of this novella—the story of 
Fonstein, a European Jew, rescued from Hitler by Billy Rose, an Americanized Jew, who 
then refuses to acknowledge Fonstein or his gratitude—functions as a metaphor for 
Jewishness in the twentieth century. The fate of post-Holocaust Jewish identity lies 
largely in the hands of the Jews in America; but assimilationism threatens to finish what 
Hitler started. Sorella knows this. Speaking of Billy, she remarks, "if you w ant m y basic 
view, here it is: The Jews could survive everything that Europe threw at them. I mean 
the lucky remnant. But now comes the next test—America. Can they hold their ground, 
or will the U.S.A. be to much for them?" (65).
Throughout much of the story, the narrator aligns himself with Billy in his 
assimilationist attitude; but his movement is, so to speak, from Billy toward Sorella. 
Ultimately, this is what the novella is about: a movement toward Jewishness, toward 
collective memory, toward a sense of shared history. This movement manifests itself in 
conversations between the narrator and Sorella, such as when Sorella describes her 
confrontation with BiUy. Billy, of course, denies Sorella's request that he acknowledge 
his connection to Fonstein. Sorella tells the narrator that she lost her temper and threw 
the documents she had brought (hoping they would help to persuade Billy) "through 
the open window" (63). Then she says:
"I went to the door. I don't suppose I wanted to make a gesture, 
but I am a Newark girl at bottom. I said, 'You're the filth. I want 
no part of you.' And I made the Italian gesture people used to 
make in a street fight, the edge of the palm on the middle of my
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arm." Inconspicuously, and laughing as she did it, she made a 
small fist and drew the edge of her other hand across her biceps.
"A very American conclusion." [says our narrator] "Oh," she said,
"from start to finish it was a one-hundred-percent American 
event, of our own generation." (63-64)
The "event" is American because it pits the Old World against the New: Sorella, 
champion of Jewishness, versus Billy, the assimilationist. This confrontation epitomizes 
the American experience for European Jews. And the irony of the "American 
conclusion"—the Old World rejecting the New while employing a distinctly New World 
attitude and gesture—is thick, and telling. And humorous.
Most significantly, the humor therein is simultaneously assimilating and 
alienating. Though Sorella's act, at the time, is without humor, in recounting what 
happened to the narrator she laughs and enjoys the humor that arises from her account. 
The humor derives from a recognition of the ironies and incongruities of the situation, 
but it is also hostile toward Billy and all that he represents; thus the hum or is alienating. 
Particularly, it alienates the idea of Americanization, its value system, and w hat it 
produces (e.g. people like Billy). Sorella and the narrator's shared moment of hum or at 
Billy's expense functions to assimilate a value system that would shun or reject 
Americanization. As a result, Sorella and the narrator are, at least temporarily, 
assimilated to one another, joined in a community that devalues w hat Billy Rose 
represents.
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This is a key moment in the narrator's trajectory toward Sorella and Jewishness, 
but the final movement does not come until after the narrator has had his dream-vision, 
his revelation that he "had made a mistake, a lifelong mistake" (87) by becoming 
disconnected from the past. In the end, it is the narrator's phone conversation with a 
"young moron" (102) who informs the narrator that Fonstein and Sorella are dead, that 
sparks the narrator's final, narrative turn toward Jewishness. In an attempt to reconnect 
with the Fonsteins, our narrator tries to find them and instead finds a house-sitter. Prior 
to this conversation, he notes that he has "begun to place [his] hopes and needs on 
Sorella Fonstein" (91), and upon hearing of the Fonsteins' deaths he says, "Something 
essential in me caved in, broke down" (96). At this point, the young man on the other 
end of the phone starts giving our narrator "the business" (96), "taunting" him for his 
"Jewish sentiments" (101). In other words, in the end, the narrator himself becomes the 
object of humor, and we are told specifically that the youth's taunts are aimed at the 
narrator's Jewishness. The humor is that of ridicule, mockery stemming from a value 
system that has little esteem for this Jewishness, and our narrator's noteworthy response 
is to galvanize and to assert his Jewishness. He dismisses the boy's "low-grade cheap- 
shot nihilism" and reaffirms the value of memory and its ties to Jewishness by noting 
that "the Jews ask even God to remember, 'Yiskor Elohim"' (102).
Thus, our narrator's redemption is enacted; he overcomes his disconnectedness 
from Jewish identity and turns from Billy's Americanization, and he reconnects with all 
that Sorella represents. Moreover, having aligned ourselves w ith the narrator (who 
remains, significantly, unnamed), as readers we are equally alienated by the young
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moron's ridiculing hum or and we are therefore equally alienated from a value system 
that allows for the scorning of memory and Jewishness. In effect, we assimilate a 
converse value system, now represented in our narrator, which favors the assertion of 
Jewishness, and we naturally applaud our narrator's final decision "to record everything 
I could remember of the Bellarosa Connection, and set it all down with a Mnemosyne 
flourish" (102).
III. The Connection
The sentiment conveyed by the joke at the start of this essay (when the Holocaust 
survivor asks, "From what is it far?") is one of disconnectedness. Bereft of any sense of 
home and, most significantly, of any living familial relationships—which is to say, of any 
sense of belonging to a tight-knit community—there is nothing from which the Jew in 
the joke can feel "far." It is perhaps the ultimate sense of disconnectedness because there 
is no longer even anything from which one might feel disconnected.
As is made explicit in the joke, this condition is at least in part a result of the 
Holocaust. But implicit in the joke is the perception, held by the post-Holocaust Jew, that 
the Jewish community no longer exists. The Jew in the joke does not consider turning to 
his fellow Jews; he does not consider his removal to Australia to be "far" from anything, 
suggesting that even his fellow survivors (remaining in Europe or going to America) 
hold no more connection for him than anyone else would. Such an attitude, it might be 
argued, is not entirely dissimilar from the attitude of the assimilationist, who likewise 
determines that there is to be no more connection with Jews than w ith anybody else.
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And as Bellow intimates, through Sorella in The Bellarosa Connection, the American 
Jews' tu rn  to assimilationism has perhaps become itself what many have called the 
"Second Holocaust."
Ultimately, the narrator recognizes his complicity in and victimization by this 
Second Holocaust, and begins to reassert his Jewishness in the face of those forces which 
would ridicule, or even do away with, Jewishness. Thus it might be said that Bellow's 
narrator becomes, like Fonstein, a Survivior; but unlike the Survivor in the joke, who 
survives the camps but falls victim to the resulting sense of disconnectedness, our 
narrator is a Survivor because he recognizes and seeks to repair that disconnectedness.
Another interesting aspect of the joke about the refugee is relevant here; it, too, 
arises out of a recognition of disconnectedness—or, more specifically, out of a 
recognition of the incongruity of such disconnectedness. Yet, paradoxically, it functions 
to bring Jews together. In other words, the hum or plays on a shared sense of 
disconnectedness—those who participate in the hum or must be willing to, and capable 
of, recognizing the disconnectedness—but they m ust also be willing to, and capable of, 
recognizing the incongruity of this disconnectedness. They m ust recognize that/or a 
surviving Jew to feel disconnected from other surviving Jews is incongruous. Thus, while the 
Jew in the joke is blinded by his disconnectedness, the Jew who laughs at the joke is able 
to connect with other Jews through that shared sense of disconnectedness; and by 
recognizing the disconnectedness, it is both undermined and, in some small way, at least 
temporarily, surmounted.
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This, potentially, is the connective power of humor. And it is this function of
hum or that Bellow relies upon in The Bellarosa Connection. After all, it is through our 
narrator's eventual recognition of Billy Rose's, and ultimately his own, disconnectedness 
that he manages to overcome it, and to make his (re-)tum toward Jewishness. And Billy 
Rose, then, becomes metaphorically the catalyst for the salvation of the Jews from both 
Holocausts, by saving not only Fonstein from the Nazis, but also our narrator from 
American assimilationism.
Billy Rose, then, is the necessary, the saving "connection"—but only if we see 
him through Old World eyes. So long as the narrator sees him only as Americans see 
him (Billy Rose: "full-fledged American" [23] and New York celebrity), the 
disconnectedness goes unnoticed and thus remains, to do its damage. But once 
Fonstein's story is told, and we begin to see Billy through the eyes of European Jewry— 
as "Bellarosa," a Jew who makes possible the salvation of other Jews, but who is 
ultimately despicable for his Americanization—then we are empowered with a 
recognition of this disconnectedness and the harm that it does. Only then, through this 
recognition of disconnectedness, are we able to take advantage of the Bellarosa 
Connection. And ultimately, this is the value of Bellow's humorous or comedic response 
to the Holocaust: its potential for fostering Jewish connections, for contributing to the 
reconstruction of a sense of Jewish history and identity in the wake of two Holocausts. 
Presumably, the survival of Jewishness and the overcoming of widespread 
disconnectedness are things that we value; and in this sense, from within this system of 
values, we must conclude that The Bellarosa Connection, as a work of Holocaust
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literature, does have value, that it is more than "appropriate" or "adequate"—that, like
the telling of a good joke, it is much better than silence.
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CHAPTER 4
BERNARD MALAMUD'S GOD'S GRACE
When you tell a joke to a Frenchman he 
laughs three times: once when you tell it 
to him, the second time when you explain 
it, and the third time when he under­
stands i t—for the Frenchman loves to 
laugh....
When you tell a joke to a Jew—before 
you've had a chance to finish, he inter­
rupts you impatiently. First of all, he has 
heard it before! Secondly, what business 
have you telling a joke when you don't 
know how? In the end, he decides to tell 
you the story himself, but in a much better 
version than yours.
—Sanford Pinsker^
Relatively little has been written on Bernard M alamud's last completed novel, 
God's Grace (1982), but nearly all those who have written on it have noted the novel's 
retelling of the story of Abraham and Isaac, and commented on the significance of 
Malamud's reversal of the Old Testament version. At the end of the novel, Calvin Cohn 
(the Abraham-figure) is taken up the mountain to be slain by Buz (a chimpanzee, and 
the Isaac-figure), and not only are the father and son roles reversed, but in Malamud's
Pinsker, 3.
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version there is no divine intervention: the sacrifice is carried out and Cohn is slain, 
making the reversal complete.
This theme of reversal runs throughout the novel, and in fact penetrates the 
novel so thoroughly as to become its very nature—so that the novel itself is a reversal of 
the reader's expectations. Just as the expectations of the reader who is familiar w ith the 
Abraham-Isaac story are thwarted by the reversal of that story in the novel, so the 
expectations of the reader who is familiar with M alamud's previous novels are thwarted 
by the nature of God's Grace. For though Malamud's short stories are at times 
fantastical, full of angels and talking animals, the reader expecting a realistic novel in 
tune with The Assistant. A New Life, or The Tenants, is bound to perceive God's Grace 
as a reversal of expectations that even the most fantastical stories fail to foretell.
With this in mind, we might, then, begin to see the novel as a kind of joke—for 
jokes often rely on a reversal of expectation in order to accomplish their effect. In fact, 
reversal is often the very nature of the joke (not merely something upon which the joke 
relies), as the joke and its effects often would not exist without the reversal: essentially, 
the reversal is the joke, the joke the reversal. Likewise, we might say that Malamud's 
novel would not exist (i.e. would not be what it is) w ithout the reversals that it enacts 
and upon which it relies. And recognizing the novel as a kind of joke proves useful to 
our understanding of it.
Malamud has said that his "premise is that we will not destroy each other," that 
he is "for humanism — and against nihilism" (Wershba 7). Reconciling this stance with 
God's Grace—a work laden w ith absurd humor and in which every attempt to restore
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order and to rebuild civilization fails miserably, and which ends in chaos and the death 
of the last man on earth—is a difficult task. Several readers attempt to put a positive spin 
on the novel's ending,^ but Elaine B. Safer concedes that "we appreciate the frustration 
of M alam ud's desire to affirm hope" (115), and she would apparently agree w ith Irving
H. Buchen when he says: "For all the comic flourishes and occasional buffoonery, this is 
M alamud's darkest book....The concluding tone...is that of an elegy" (33). As Safer puts 
it, the novel is "the most violent and bleak expression of black humor anywhere in 
M alamud's fiction" (104).
Concerning this use of humor. Safer continues:
Cohn's continual yearning for meaning and purpose comes into 
confrontation with failure and frustration. This sets up an absurd 
perspective. It is absurd by Camus's definition which is based upon a 
"divorce between the mind that desires and the world that 
disappoints"....
Often in absurdist literature, the conflict between the quest for 
meaning and the upset at finding none creates an emerging tone in which 
distress and joke, horror and farce collide. (104-105)
Safer is correct to identify the perspective of the novel as absurd; indeed, absurdism 
itself is another form of reversal—traditionally one expects to find meaning and 
purpose, or order, in life, and absurdism thwarts these expectations. However, most 
absurd humor is linked with black or dark hum or (all of these terms are sometimes used
 ^See Cronin, Helterman, and Richman.
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synonymously), and tends toward nihilism. One might suggest that Malamud's use of
absurd humor, then, is yet another reversal—this time of his premise for humanism. But 
I believe that to carry the theme of reversal so far as to reverse M alamud's very ideology 
is, itself, a bit absurd. Rather, as I intend to show, it is in fact the expectations 
surrounding absurdism (the absurdist novel enjoying, at the time of Malamud's writing, 
a wide popularity) that are reversed.
M alamud's humanism is his prem ise—"that we will not destroy each other." But 
that God's Grace plays (yet again) on a reversal of this is made clear on the novel's 
opening page:
At the end, after the thermonuclear war between the Djanks and 
Druzhkies, in consequence of which they had destroyed themselves, and, 
madly, all other inhabitants of the earth, God spoke through a glowing 
crack in a bulbous black cloud to Calvin Cohn, the paleologist, who of all 
men had miraculously survived in a battered oceanography vessel. (3)
In other words, at the start of God's Grace, humanity has already destroyed itself. 
M alamud's premise against nihilism is seemingly reversed. This reversal continues in 
the dialogue between Cohn and God (who always speaks through double-quotation 
marks), as God explains:
" "I regret to say it was through a minuscule error that you 
escaped destruction. Though mine, it was not a serious one; a serious 
mistake might have jammed the universe. The cosmos is so conceived
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that I myself don't know what goes on everywhere. It is not perfection 
although I, of course, am perfect. That's how I arranged my mind.
" "And that you, Mr. Cohn, happen to exist when no one else 
does, though embarrassing to Me, has nothing to do with your once 
having studied for the rabbinate, or for that matter, having given it up....
" "I have no wish to torment you, only once more affirm cause 
and effect. It is no more than a system within a system, yet I depend on it 
to maintain a certain order." " (3-4)
That God is capable of error—"minuscule" or, by implication, even "serious" — certainly 
runs counter to expectation, as does the notion that God doesn't know "what goes on 
everywhere," or that He is capable of embarrassment. But the most crucial reversal 
presented in the passage above concerns cause and effect, God's "system within a 
system," on which He depends to "maintain a certain order." Calvin Cohn (whose very 
name is a sort of reversal), as lone survivor, exists outside of this order—God is careful 
to note that Cohn's survival is not the result (effect) of past actions (cause)—and 
therefore Cohn represents the deconstruction of the system; or, in other words, Cohn is 
the reversal of cause and effect personified.
God's wish to "once more affirm cause and effect," His desire to reestablish 
order to the universe, demands the destruction of Calvin Cohn, and Cohn's nature is 
further evidenced by his pleas for clemency. Concerning his survival of the "present 
Devastation" (the thermonuclear w ar followed by a Second Flood), Cohn says, "It 
wasn't as though I had a choice," and begs, "Since I am still alive it would only be fair if
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You let me Hve. A new fact is a new condition" (5). If Cohn respected God's system of
order, he would recognize the need for his destruction; but Cohn is disorder incarnate, 
and therefore fights the system of order, begging God to spare him. That Cohn himself 
does not recognize God's order, or his own nature, is made clear by the illogic of his 
pleas; he cites his having no choice in the matter as an excuse for his survival and reason 
for its continuance, when obviously personal choice was not an immediate factor in the 
world's destruction; and he appeals to God's sense of fairness in an effort to preserve 
himself, when fairness clearly demands Cohn's demise along with the others'.
From this point on, Cohn's nature and his lack of self-awareness provide the 
main thrust of the novel, as well as its primary source of humor, as Cohn continuously 
strives to (re)construct a sense of order in the world and—because he is himself the 
reversal of order—fails miserably. Without explanation, God allows Cohn to live, at least 
for the moment, and Cohn floats at sea for days wondering when his doom will come. 
He discovers a feUow-survivor in the chimpanzee, whom he renames Buz, and the two 
reach an island and attempt to (re)establish civilization under Cohn's direction. Buz, by 
the aid of a device implanted in his throat by another scientist, is able to speak, and he 
finds other chimps on the island whom he teaches to speak, and these, again under 
Cohn's direction, form a community, on the periphery of which is the gorilla named 
George (who does not speak English, but "loves cantorial music and occasionally wears 
a skullcap" [Buchen 24]).
Cohn's attempts at (re)constructing order include farming, harvesting, and 
rationing the island's food resources; the creation of a school where he can teach the
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chimps history and theology and philosophy, and ethics (each of which is, itself, a 
constructed 'order'); the posting and implementation of a code of conduct, which Cohn 
calls "the Seven Admonitions" (171); and, in his most warped and absurd attempt at 
(re)constructing order, the re-procreation of the hum an race by mating with the only 
available female on the island, a chimpanzee named Mary Madelyn7
All of these attempts to impose order—because they are enacted by Cohn, who is 
outside of order and the very presence of, and therefore cause of, disorder—result in 
utter chaos and confusion. One example is the Seder Cohn organizes in honor of the 
chimps, after they leam  English. As Safer notes, "Cohn's Seder inverts the traditional 
progression from chaos to order, from darkness to light," and "ends in confusion:
George the gorilla...upsets the table...as the participants race away...'in every direction'" 
(112-113). The disparity between the chaos of Cohn's Seder and the serious order of 
traditional ones is yet another reversal in the novel, and more evidence of Cohn as 
disorder personified. This is likewise evidenced by his creation of the school and his 
implementation of the "Admonitions." Cohn celebrates the chimps' ability to speak 
English, and lectures to them on various subjects, and admonishes them to behave 
civilly, not realizing that all of this is outside order, outside natural process: it is not a 
part of God's natural order for apes to speak, or to attend school, or to obey man-made 
rules, and so on. Hence, as Cohn's efforts increase, they result in increasing confusion.
At the end of the novel, the chimps break into Cohn's cave and destroy all that is 
representative of his attempts at civilization (217-218).
3 There is Hattie, the other female chimp, but she is old and of no interest to the males.
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The precursor to this last manifestation of disorder and chaos is Cohn's most 
unnatural attempt at restoring natural order: his copulation with and impregnation of 
Mary Madelyn, the female chimp. Mary Madelyn is the source of conflict, throughout 
the novel, between the two candidates for "Alpha ape," Buz and Esau, and the apes 
recognize the disorder extant in the union between Cohn and Mary Madelyn, and are 
outraged by it (it in fact becomes the issue which severs Cohn's special relationship with 
Buz, whom Cohn considers his "son"). Cohn's relationship with Mary Madelyn is an 
attempt to (re)construct order by re-procreating the hum an race—he even wishes to 
name the child that is bom  out of the union Rachel, after the Biblical mother of Judah, 
from whom the Jews are descended. For Cohn, hum anity equals Jewishness. Though not 
religiously observant prior to the Flood, and supposedly opposed to proselytizing, Cohn 
(in yet another reversal) insists on indoctrinating the chimps in matters of rather strict 
Judaism, which is a way, along with teaching them English, of humanizing them. Cohn 
also does not like Buz's original name, Gottlob, for its Christian overtones, and instead 
renames the chimp after a distant cousin of Abraham, the Patriarch of the Jews 
(suggesting, despite his desire to humanize, that Cohn considers the chimp merely a 
distant cousin to humanity). The desire to name the baby Rachel suggests a desire to 
assert the proper lineage for a new Jewish (read "human") race.
The name that the child actually receives is Rebekah—the Biblical grandmother 
to Judah. Significantly, this is also the name of the ship that saves Cohn's life from the 
Second Flood, suggesting that Cohn hopes the child will be likewise the vehicle for
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preserving humanity. But tensions in the community mount, things fall apart 
(apparently), and soon the apes steal the baby away and dash her body against a stone.
Cohn, of course, sees the actions of the apes as manifestations of chaos and 
disorder; he continues to fail to recognize the true or natural order of things, or his own 
nature and tendency toward disorder. The act of killing the human-ape baby, seen by 
Cohn as an act against the preservation of order, is (again, as a reversal of expectation) in 
fact an attem pt to restore order. Cohn responds to his offspring's death by trying to 
punish Esau and Buz, but both attempts (again) result in reversals of Cohn's 
expectations. Cohn's attempts to punish are attempts to enforce God's system of cause 
and effect, action and consequence. But in attempting to punish Esau, Cohn accidentally 
kills an albino ape who appears briefly on the island (his attempt at order thus failing, 
resulting in destruction).
To punish Buz for his role in the baby's death, Cohn takes away Buz's ability to 
speak by disconnecting the wires of the device in his throat. Cohn sees this as a 
regrettable move away from the order he is trying to (re)construct—Jeffrey Helterman 
calls it "the most savage [act] in the book since it denies Buz's humanity" (122)—but in 
fact it is yet another manifestation of the theme of reversal, for though the act might 
appear "savage," in reality it is a restoration of natural order. And it is perhaps the only 
act Cohn commits that, albeit unwittingly, contributes to this restoration. Following 
Buz's lead, the other chimps quickly lose their ability to speak also, and they grow 
increasingly wild in their behavior. Cohn—still acting out of a complete lack of 
awareness—perceives this as a further decline into confusion and disorder, when in fact
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the reverse is true: it is an affirmation of God's natural system. According to the world 
presented in the novel, apes will be apes, according to God's plan.
Cohn's lack of self-awareness is revealed in almost everything he does. As 
Helterman puts it, Cohn is constantly forgetting "that he is the last man instead of the 
first" (111). But Cohn's lack of self-awareness is epitomized by a statement that Cohn 
himself makes early on, during the Seder, which introduces the question of the nature of 
God's grace in the novel. During the Seder, Cohn requires, according to tradition, 
several of the participants to answer four questions. Mary Madelyn, who has a speech 
impediment, is one of the participants, and answers question number three ("Do you 
know where you were bom? What were your experiences during the Second Flood? 
How did you save yourself from the rising water?") as follows:
"First there was the Fwood and then came the awfuw nights of 
rain.... After the Fwood sank...I weft and wandered on, miserabwy awone 
untiw I met Mr. Mewchior and the twins [other chimps].
"When Esau joined our group he said he was our weader.... Soon 
we came to this w and of fruit trees and decided to stay. Buz found us and 
taught us your wanguage. He towd us his dod was a white chimpanzee, 
and no one bewieved it untiw  we met you."
"God's grace," said Cohn. (120-121)
Here, Cohn's declaration of God's grace can be read also as an apositive: not only is he 
naming God's grace as the cause or source of these events, but he is also identifying 
himself as God's grace—and indeed this is exactly Cohn's misconception: that he, as the
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lone surviving human, is God's grace on the earth, whose calling it is to reestablish order 
and civilization. The truth is, of course, that this declaration is a manifestation of Cohn's 
profound lack of self-awareness.
The nature of God's grace, which is brought into question by Cohn's declaration 
of it, and which is discussed by critics usually with special regard to the novel's ending, 
is perhaps the most debated, most variously understood aspect of the novel. Helterman 
suggests that the title of the novel is—"on the face of it," at least—"merely ironic" (123); 
and Safer seems to agree when she claims that "Malamud's God...does not renounce or 
repent the punishment of Calvin Cohn, which is death. He offers no hope for mankind's 
survival. He does not show 'p ity '—sometimes translated as 'grace '—for mankind in this 
book titled God's Grace" (109). These assessments, more precisely, question the presence 
of grace more than its nature. But to read the novel's title as ironic does not seem strong 
enough. True, irony plays on reversal, but to suggest an ironic reading of the title is to 
fall short of acknowledging the novel's very nature as that of reversal. The ironic 
reading holds that the title asserts a presence of grace when in fact there is none; but the 
theme of reversal m this novel is too potent, too ubiquitous and permeating to be 
hindered by such a simple assessment. I agree with those who argue that the reversal of 
expectations relevant to the novel's title does not concern merely the presence of grace 
(i.e. we expect it to be there but it isn't), but its nature and the manner in which it is 
manifested (i.e. we expect it to be there of a certain kind or in a certain way, but it isn't).
Gloria Cronin, for example, takes up the question of the nature of grace and 
suggests that Cohn "finally penetrates the mystery of grace" (128) just before Buz slits
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his throat, when he realizes that the nature of grace itself (and not just the use of the 
term m the title) is ironic: God's grace, being the gift of life, can result only in "suffering 
and sacrifice" (121). Helterman, on the other hand, suggests that "Perhaps it is God's 
grace not to let man contaminate earth any longer. Perhaps it is God's grace to let Cohn 
live long enough to see that though man no longer exists, God does" (123). Helterman's 
first musing suggests that the nature of grace has to do not with hum an life (as Cronin 
would have it), but with specifically the end of it—the end of all hum anity—while the 
second suggests that grace has nothing to do with life at all, per se, but with a kind of 
knowledge or revelation. Sidney Richman seems to suggest something similar (but 
different, nonetheless), seeing the novel as "a tribute to a spiritually evolving universe 
calling forth a theocentric rather than an anthropocentric impulse" (218), and he claims 
that the "harrowing conclusion" of the novel contains "an unconditional mark of God's 
own mercy" (205). Finally, Buchen suggests that God's grace is perhaps a form of 
leniency, or allowance: "God's grace is self-conferred. He who makes the rules is free to 
disobey them," and, should God see fit. He might, "with the help of His grace, adjust 
endings so that [man] would not have to die.... In other words, God's grace makes 
possible Cohn's presumption" (26-27). That is to say, because of the presence of God's 
grace, or the possibility of a change in the plan (a pardoning of Cohn's death sentence), 
Cohn is able to act, to make an attempt at proving himself worthy of hfe.
Combine all of this w ith Cohn's own ideas on the nature of grace—his notion 
that grace is God's intervention, which brings him and the chimps together after the 
Flood, or that grace is in fact incarnated in Cohn himself, that Cohn's very existence is
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not only the result of, but is, God's grace—and it would appear the reader is faced with 
an unanswerable question; What is the true nature of God's grace, according to 
Malamud and to his novel which bears this title?
Of course, I believe the key to answering this question is, at the long-past risk of 
redundancy, in the recognition of the novel's nature as reversal. But first we must 
discuss the novel's ending.
As mentioned, after Cohn strips Buz of his ability to speak, the others lose their 
ability also and what appears to Cohn as chaos and disorder abounds. (It is, of course, 
not chaos and disorder that abound; rather, it is a return to natural process, a restoration 
of God's order.) Finally, one night as Cohn is "stuffing his gear into duffel bags, a gang 
of chimps rammed down his protective wall w ith a huge log they carried, and poured 
into the cave" (217). The chimps destroy Cohn's home and all the remnants of his 
attempts at (re)constructing order—his bookshelves, writing instruments, canned foods, 
his clothing, his cantorial music records and the portable phonograph. Then "the apes 
apprehended Cohn, binding his arms with a metal chain...[and] they laughed, screamed, 
barked, hooted, filling the echoing cave with impossible noise" (218). What follows is the 
novel's final, three-page chapter in which Cohn is taken up the mountain and sacrificed 
in a reversal of the Old Testament story of Abraham and Isaac. After his throat is cut, he 
lays on the floor of the cave, "waiting to be lifted into the flames" as the burnt offering: 
"Merciful God," he said, "I am an old man. The Lord has let me 
live my life out."
He wept at the thought. Maybe tomorrow the
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world to come?
In a tall tree in the valley below, George the gorilla, wearing a 
mud-stained white yarmulke he had one day found in the woods, 
chanted, "Sh'ma, Yisroel, the Lord our God is one."
In his throaty, gruff voice he began a long Kaddish for Calvin 
Cohn. (223)
That this Biblical story is an important analog to God's Grace is made clear from 
the beginning. A part of the father-son relationship between Cohn and Buz is Cohn's 
reading of Bible stories to the chimp, and Buz is constantly requesting "'the one about 
the Dod who cut his little boy's throat'" (71). (At one point Cohn warns Buz that the 
story one hears the most is probably the one he will live out [85], foreshadowing the 
duo's reenactment of Buz's favorite tale.) It is significant that Buz's pronunciation results 
in "Dod," which can be translated (from the German) as either dad or God (Cronin 124), 
because in the end Cohn's God is in fact the one who slays him, his blood "spurt[ing] 
forth an instant before [Buz's] knife touched Cohn's flesh" (223). The reversal of the 
father-son roles—Isaac (Buz) preparing to slay Abraham (Cohn), instead of the other 
way around—is compounded by another reversal of expectation, for as Cohn rightly 
insists, in the Bible God prevents the slaying from actually taking place, whereas in the 
novel it is God who sees it through.
After Cohn explains to Buz that Abraham does not kill Isaac, and that in fact 
"their suffering was limited more or less to intense worry, and had no discernible 
traumatic effect after the incident when they had confirmed the hard way that they all
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loved each other/' Buz, who likes happy endings, responds by saying, "God is love"
(73). But the Christian overtones of this make Cohn uncomfortable, so he quickly moves 
on to discuss the meaning of the story. Cohn states that it was a test of Abraham's love 
for God (73), and Helterman notes that;
For Cohn, the Abraham and Isaac story goes only one way. Abraham 
proves he loves God, not vice versa. Though he will not admit it...this is 
what has been troubling him from Hitler's Holocaust (Does God love or 
even care about the Jews?) to the atomic holocaust (Does God love or 
even care about mankind?). (121)
This seems to be a fair assessment of Cohn's attitude; when he posts his Seven 
Admonitions, he goes out of his way to proclaim, in Admonition number two, that "God 
is not love, God is God" (171). But Cohn fails to realize that God makes it clear, in His 
very first appearance (strictly aural) to Cohn, that he does care, and that the holocaust 
atrocities are entirely human-made:
" "The present Devastation, ending in smoke and dust, comes as a 
consequence of m an's self-betrayal. From the beginning, when I gave 
them the gift of life, they were perversely greedy for death....
" "They have destroyed my handiwork.... They tore apart my 
ozone, carbonized my oxygen, acidified my refreshing rain. Now they 
affront my cosmos. How much shall the Lord endure?
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" "I made man to be free, but his freedom, badly used, destroyed 
him.... The Second Flood, this that now subsides on the broken earth, they 
brought on themselves. They had not lived according to the Covenant.
" "Therefore I let them do away with 
themselves." " (5)
Clearly, God cares—He's upset about the situation—but He does not interfere 
with it. In fact, though he wishes to affirm cause and effect and to reassert His system of 
order. He continues to refrain from interfering with Cohn's life even though Cohn's 
survival is an error and the only way for God's order to be reestablished is for that error 
to be corrected. When God does finally interfere with things, it is at the very end of the 
novel, when He enacts Cohn's demise before Buz's blade can do the trick.
Helterman also comments on Cohn's attempt to use Kierkegaard's interpretation 
in explaining the Abraham and Isaac story to Buz. As Helterman notes, Cohn "wrongly 
equates Kierkegaard's view with Freud's [that Abraham wanted to kill his son as a 
possible rival]. In fact, Kierkegaard puts the test in terms that Cohn would not 
understand. Kierkegaard argues that the sacrifice was a true test of faith because it was 
absurd" (120-121). The fact that Cohn "would not understand" the absurdist 
interpretation is more evidence of his lack of awareness, for all around him he is 
surrounded by the absurd—his very predicament is absurd—and this immersion in the 
absurd serves to heighten the potency of the reversal nature of the novel: the absurd is 
itself a reversal of expectations (expecting to find meaning and order and not finding it). 
Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, the presence of the absurd creates
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expectations of confusion and meaninglessness, even nihilism, in the astute reader, 
when the novel is in fact working against these, in affirmation of God's system of order.
And this brings us back to the nature of God's grace and its manifestation in the 
novel. Cronin suggests that it is at the moment of death that Cohn "penetrates the 
mystery of grace," which is to say he has an epiphany and recognizes grace's ironic 
nature, grace being life and life resulting inevitably in suffering and death. But at the 
moment of death, Cohn acknowledges that God has let him live out his life, then he 
weeps as though to mourn the fact. And his supposition—"Maybe tomorrow the world 
to come?"—suggests the possible realization that it is only through his death that "the 
world" (God's order) can be restored. Norma Rosen says that "For Jewish writers (those, 
that is, who care about this sort of thing in the first place), illumination followed by 
death is no good. Jewish life, like Torah, is on earth" (37). In other words, the sort of 
epiphany Cronin refers to would be, for Malamud and for Cohn, "no good." However, 
in a novel of reversal, for Cohn to realize—after having begged for his life, and having 
worked so hard to (re)construct the system of order that he believed it was his duty and 
calling, as God's grace incarnate, to (re)construct—that it is in fact his death that is 
required for the (re)construction of that order, and that the nature of God's grace is 
something else entirely, is the perfect reversal of Cohn's own personal expectations, 
providing cause to mourn.
The nature of God's grace, then, becomes His system of order—or perhaps more 
precisely. His (re)affirmation of that system. Grace is the (re)affirmation of cause and 
effect, all things in their proper o rder—the good are properly rewarded, the bad are
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properly punished—so that, in this way, God's grace is inextricably related to His 
justness. Helterman comes near this when he suggests that God's grace is perhaps His 
not allowing man to continue on earth (they get what they properly deserve); but this 
assessment, on its own, is too nihilistic, not implying or acknowledging a future for 
humanity, and in the end it is this future that Malamud is after. This is made clear in an 
interview M alamud grants to Joel Salzberg: when asked about the meaning of God's 
Grace, M alamud replied, "I had to find a way for man to have a possible future" (qtd. in 
Safer, 116). Presumably, this future is possible through evolution—apparently the 
'natural process' that is restored when the last man is removed from the environment 
and the apes are left to themselves. God's grace is in favor of man's existence, then. Just 
not yet.
To provide this possible future, God must restore His system (enter grace), and 
to do this He intervenes in the commotion on Cohn's Island. This intervention is a 
reversal of expectations because God intervenes not to save Cohn's life, as Cohn might 
expect or as the Biblical analog might dictate, but to take it. This act of God, besides 
astonishing everyone (223), is a revelation to Cohn that his death is not at the hands of 
chaos and disorder—which have, for Cohn, come to be represented by the chimps—but 
at the hand of God. The reversal becomes profound as we realize that, where before 
God's interference was expected but not received (as humanity executed its self- 
destruction), or not expected but received (as Abraham went up to sacrifice Isaac), now 
His interference is both expected and received, only it comes in the unexpected form of 
present further destruction (in order to enable future salvation).
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In the end, the ultimate reversal of expectation is that what appears on the 
surface to be "Malamud's darkest book," the "most violent and bleak expression of 
black hum or anywhere in Malamud's fiction," is in fact a substantiation, after all, of 
M alamud's premise for humanism. Humanity will be restored now that God's system of 
order is reinstated. "The great contribution...[of] Malamud's work is...the work of 
repair," Rosen tells us. "The theme of Malamud's fiction has been nothing less than the 
restoration of the fallen world" (38). The fact that the hum an element—w hat is left of it 
as we know i t—is disorder incarnate, whose existence results in disorder and who must 
be eliminated before "restoration" can be complete, is a fundamental component of this 
ultimate reversal of expectation. And though this elimination elicits mourning from 
Cohn and George—and lest Cohn's final realizations or George's Kaddish persuade us 
that the novel is mournful in its tone or nihilistic in its movement, we m ust heed Rosen's 
warning that "we who are accustomed to think 'prayer for the dead' [when we think of 
Kaddish] should remind ourselves of the contents of that prayer; nothing but praise for 
the redemptive powers of God" (39). Thus, the Kaddish itself performs a reversal of 
expectation and becomes, as Malamud so succinctly puts it, "a vehicle for God's grace" 
(qtd. in Safer, 115).
The novel, then, though it appears to be fraught with chaos and absurdity, 
becomes a tremendous affirmation of order and meaning. And if we allow that the 
Abraham and Isaac story is the story of a sort of joke, played by God on humanity (I can 
hear the angel now, just as he stops Abraham's wrist, saying, "Psych!"), then perhaps 
God's Grace might be the retelling of a very old joke. After all, jokes are often based on
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incongruity—a reversal of expectations, so to speak. And Malamud's version might be 
said to be better than the Old Testament's if for no other reason than that it is updated, 
made contemporary. Malamud uses the popular mode of his day, the absurdist novel, 
and turns it on its head, using it to affirm what the antiquated (and perhaps unpopular) 
version of the joke already affirms; that there is order and meaning to life, even if that 
order and meaning are God's and exist outside, or without, the existence (and perhaps 
the understanding) of humanity.
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CHAPTERS
WOODY ALLEN AND PHILIP ROTH
My one regret in life is that I am not 
someone else.
—Woody Allen
I. YekTs Children
For the Jews, anxiety over one's Jewishness is nothing new. To be Jewish under 
Roman rule was never comfortable; to be a Jew in Europe was never any better—and 
was often much worse. And while some might argue that Jews in America have had it 
comparatively easy, we m ustn't forget that, until after World War II, the classified ads 
for employment regularly stated "Christians only need apply," and stores were still 
posting signs in their windows saying "No Dogs or Jews Allowed." After World War II, 
Jews were regularly targeted in Communist witch-hunts, simply because they were 
Jews. And some scholars have acknowledged that the U.S.'s immigration policies 
leading up to and during World War II were complicit in, or contributed to, the severity 
of the Nazi Holocaust.
As a natural product of all this, there has always been a tension between 
alienation and assimilation for the Jews—between the desire to maintain a delineated 
sense of identity and the desire to blend in, to avoid or at least to downplay that
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delineation. And persecution has often been a primary motivation for that tension. But 
in America, the motivation and the tension itself have been somewhat different.
As mentioned, it is true that persecution still existed in America, and Jewish 
anxieties over Jewish identity were nonetheless existent, and often prominent. But 
America threatened no pogroms, no gas chambers. The bigotry that existed was often 
diffused, shared, and spread out over a variety of racial and ethnic-immigrant groups, 
so that the Jews were not singled out so readily—so singly—as they had been elsewhere. 
And the ideal of America, at least, promised freedom and equality. Indeed, w hat was 
perhaps the most distinguishing aspect of the American experience, and what possibly 
contributed more to one's anxiety over one's Jewishness than persecution, was the fact 
that a sense of American identity was desirable—m ore  desirable than other national 
identities had been (e.g. Russian, Polish, etc.), and perhaps even as desirable as Jewish 
identity was itself.
However, there were certain "American" identity traits (e.g., Christianity or 
secularism) that were "not Jewish," and certain "Jewish" identity traits (e.g., Judaism or 
Judeo-ethnocentrism) that were "not American."^ The problem that arose, then, was 
whether or not one's sense of identity would allow for the coexistence of both the 
"Jewish" and the "American" identities (both of which were desirable—or at least 
desired) without the adoption or assimilation of one resulting in the alienation of the
11 am speaking historically here; ideally or theoretically (and, so we like to think, 
presently), one's "American" identity is not incongruous with any ethnic or religious 
identity. But historically it has been.
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other. This tension, this potential loss of some desired aspect of one's sense of identity, 
has always been the source of anxiety that one feels over issues of assimilation and 
alienation. But in America, because the American experience has been different, the 
anxieties, too, have been different. These differences—this new, American Jewish 
experience—was the subject of Abraham Cahan's novella Yekl, the first major work of 
American Jewish fiction. Jake Podkovnik, the protagonist in Yekl, is emblematic of these 
tensions, as a Jewish immigrant to America in the late 1800s who struggles over his 
Jewishness and his desire to become "Americanized."
But there are things that further differentiate Jake's American experience from 
those of the next generation—the experiences of Yekl's children, so to speak.^ The 
"second generation" of American Jews, as a loosely defined group not strictly tied to 
formal genealogy, is usually temporally located in the middle part of the twentieth 
century and spilling over into the post-World War II era.^ In literature, this generation is 
represented by authors such as Saul Bellow and Bernard Malamud. And, by way of 
differentiating it from the generation represented by Cahan, never in history did a 
generation of Jews experience such a widespread abandonment of Judaism. Part of what 
made the American experience different from other experiences in the diaspora was the 
promise that America presented to its Jewish immigrants. Whereas in Roman-ruled 
Judea or tzarist Russia or Nazi Germany, Jews were motivated to assimilate primarily by
2 Jake and Yekl are the same person, "Jake" being Yekl's Americanized name.
3 Genealogically speaking, of course, a second-generation Jew is anyone whose parents 
were immigrants, meaning a second-generation Jew might exist in 1793 as well as 2003.
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the fear of persecution, in America the motivation for assimilation was primarily the 
aspiration for the American Dream. In other historical experiences, Judaism represented 
the source of hope and promise for the salvation of the Jews and was a unifying force in 
the face of persecutions; but in America, though persecutions did continue, the hope and 
promise of the American Dream supplanted Judaism as the perceived source of 
salvation.
The result was a generation—the "second generation" of American Jews—that 
grew up in Americanized, secularized households, but that still had parents (or 
grandparents) whose identities were marked with a distinctive, seem ingly foreign 
Jewishness. The tensions between alienation and assimilation, then, for this generation 
in America differed from those of the previous generation (much as the tensions for the 
previous generation in America had differed from those of the generations in Europe). 
For the second generation of American Jews, the conflict between Judaism and 
Christianity was lessened; their Jewishness was more ethnic than religious. And whereas 
previously the tensions had always been predominantly between the Jew and the non- 
Jewish community, now these tensions were shifting, arising more and more between 
the Jew and the Jewish community—religiously, between believing Jews and secularized 
Jews; and generationally, between the young assimilated Jews and their seemingly 
parochial parents and grandparents.
But I am referring to a construct of literary history, which labels authors of the World 
War II generation as "second-generation. "
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These new tensions gave rise to a new version of Jewish-American anxiety, a 
new kind of Jewish-American humor, and a newly constructed sense of Jewish- 
American identity. The common core ingredient of all three, at least in literature, was a 
pronounced Jewish neuroticism: the new anxieties manifested themselves as 
neuroticisms, the new hum or exposed and exploited these neuroticisms, and 
consequently a new identity was constructed—that of the Jew-as-neurotic. And one of 
the things that the neurotic Jew is neurotic about is, of course, his or her own Jewishness. 
Arguably, the two most influential figures in the creation—or at least in the 
propagation—of this identity of the Jew-as-neurotic are the writers Woody Allen and 
Philip Roth.
II. Allen's Hostage Crisis 
Woody Allen's portrayals of the neurotic Jew and his manifestations of anxiety 
about Jewishness appear often in his early prose and films. Many of his New Yorker 
pieces, for example, take up  the Jew-as-neurotic explicitly and quite humorously. And a 
piece such as "The Scroll" demonstrates Allen's subversive bent toward Jewishness. In it 
he questions the authenticity of Jewish identity by metonymically questioning the 
authenticity of a collection of ancient scrolls (suggesting that "the w ord 'Oldsmobile' 
appears several times in the text" [33]), by parodying biblical language, and by making 
light of two of the most fundamentally Jewish stories from the Torah—the story of Job 
and the story of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac. (As though to emphasize the place of 
hum or in Allen's sense of Jewish identity, Allen portrays God as chastising Abraham for
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rushing off to sacrifice Isaac: "1 jokingly suggest thou sacrifice Isaac and thou 
immediately runs out to do it." Abraham then replies, "See, I never know when you're 
kidding," and God complains, "No sense of humor. I can't believe it" [36].) This story 
and many others are representative of Allen's struggle w ith Jewish identity, via humor, 
but for a focused look at Allen's treatment of Jewish anxiety, Jewish humor, and Jewish 
identity, let us examine what is perhaps Allen's most well known film: Annie Hall 
(1977).
In Annie Hall, Alvie Singer (Allen), a stand-up comedian, opens the mock- 
umentary with two jokes. Just after the credits (which roll without any soundtrack), we 
see Singer standing and addressing the camera/audience:^
There's an old joke: Two elderly women are at a Catskill Mountain resort, 
and one of 'em says, "Boy, the food at this place is really terrible." And 
the other one says, "Yeah, I know. And such small portions."®
Alvie then explains how this joke applies to his life—how life is full of misery and 
horror, yet it's all over much too quickly. Then he tells the second joke:
The other important joke for me is one th a f s usually attributed to 
Groucho Marx, but I think it appears originally in Freud's "Wit and Its 
Relation to the Unconscious." It goes, and I'm  paraphrasing, I would
 ^The absence of the lively jazz music that usually accompanies Allen's credit sequences 
creates a sense of gravity at the start of the film. This is reiterated by Alvie's demeanor as 
he tells the jokes—he tells them as though in the hopes that we, the audience, will 
understand him thoroughly. It seems clear that the purpose of the telling of the jokes is 
not to evoke laughter, but to communicate something serious that Alvie, as a comedian, 
perhaps cannot communicate in any other way.
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never want to belong to any club that would have someone like me for a 
member.
Alvie then applies this joke specifically to his relationships with women, unsure as to 
whether he wants to be involved with a woman who would have someone like him  for a 
lover.
Both of these jokes express anxieties concerning the nature of existence and 
identity, anxieties that Alvie wrestles with throughout the film—particularly, identity in 
a relational context, w ith regard to the individual's place among others or within a 
group. The second joke, of course, is more explicit in its approach to this issue, but the 
first joke is also relevant. The women in the first joke are at a resort—participating, as 
individuals, within a defined community or group. Their complaints are, in effect, aimed 
at what the community has to offer to the individual (metaphorically represented by 
food), and together the complaints articulate a tension that exists in the relationship 
between the individual and the group.
Alvie offers his own interpretations of the jokes and applies them to his life in 
deliberate ways, but there is another anxiety that grips Alvie throughout the film and to 
which each of these jokes is likewise applicable, though Alvie never explicitly draws the 
connection. A characteristic that the jokes share is their "Jewishness." That is to say, each 
joke has a certain distinguishable Jewish context from which it is created, or in which it 
exists. The first joke is set at a resort in the Catskills (a vacation spot traditionally 
associated with the Jewish community) and it involves two women who complain to the
® All transcriptions of dialogue from the film are my own.
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point of contradiction, a trait that has been likewise stereotypically associated with 
Jewishness. The second joke is attributed first to Groucho Marx and then to Freud, two 
famous Jews, and its intent or effect is self-deprecation, a trait stereotypically associated 
with Jewish humor. The other of Alvie's anxieties to which I refer, then, concerns Alvie's 
own Jewishness, or his identity as an individual within a group identified as "Jewish." 
Alvie expresses this anxiety explicitly and continually, chiefly through his sense of 
humor and his paranoid perception of a nearly ubiquitous anti-Semitism.
In his conversations w ith his friend. Max, for example, Alvie claims that an 
"Aryan"-looking man in a music store looked at him knowingly and then mentioned a 
sale on Wagner. (Alvie insists that he recognizes the racist subtext that the salesperson is 
intending—Wagner being associated with Hitler.) Later, after Annie speaks of the gifts 
her Grammy gave her, Alvie says, "My Grammy never gave gifts. She was too busy 
getting raped by Cossacks." And when the two of them are on Annie's balcony a 
moment later, Annie says, "You're what Grammy Hall would call a real Jew," to which 
Alvie responds somewhat uncomfortably, saying "Thank you" (what else can he say?), 
just before Annie says, "Yeah, well, you know. She hates Jews." The result of this 
exchange is that later, at the Halls' home, Alvie compliments the "dynamite ham" only 
to feel as though Grammy is eyeing him suspiciously, seeing him with a beard and 
ringlets, wearing a black hat and tijfillin.
Being aware and even wary of anti-Semitism is, in itself, not necessarily 
expressive of a significant anxiety over one's Jewishness. What begins to reveal this 
anxiety in Alvie is his attempts to distance himself from his Jewishness, his acts of
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resistance toward the traditional group identity of Jewishness, which might be 
interpreted as assertions of individual identity at the expense of an association with a 
particular group identity.
For instance, in another conversation with Max, Alvie complains of anti- 
Semitism again, claiming that the world's negative view of New York is itself anti- 
Semitic; then he admits that he sometimes shares this view. Max uses this as an 
opportunity to encourage Alvie to move to California (perhaps metaphorically 
encouraging an escape from Jewishness), and Max offers the sun as an ostensible reason 
for the move, suggesting more sun might be good for Alvie. But Alvie says, "Everything 
our parents said was good for us is bad: sun, milk, red meat, college." The joke is created 
out of incongruity: parents are supposed to be benevolent authority figures giving out 
reliable and helpful direction, and this is juxtaposed w ith the idea that their direction is 
instead faulty and damaging; the hum or hits a high note when Alvie tosses in "college" 
for good measure. The effect of the joke, though, is to undermine the authority of the 
parental figure or of authority figures in general. Such a stance effectively places Alvie in 
opposition to his Jewish parents and to the Jewish (or at least Judaic) precept of 
honoring one's parents and respecting authority. Moreover, within the Jewish 
community, Jewishness itself is another thing that one's parents "said was good."
Perhaps Alvie, who can include even college in his rejection of "everything our parents 
said was good," is in fact rejecting Jewishness, too, as "bad."
This animosity, or at least ambivalence, toward Jewishness, because it manifests 
itself almost wholly via Alvie's humor, is complicated. That is, there are no diatribes, no
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polemics against Jewishness; there is no explicit rejection of it. Rather, Alvie's humor 
reveals a complexity in his response to Jewish identity that perhaps hints at the nature of 
Jewish identity itself. After all, his anxiety-ridden jokes about Jewish identity are 
themselves identifiable as Jewish. One way of looking at it is to say that one's anxiety over 
one's Jewishness becomes a marker of one's Jewishness; to say, "I am not sure I am, or 
w ant to be, a Jew," paradoxically asserts or reinforces one's Jewishness. In effect, the 
identity becomes inescapable.
And, for Alvie, th is—in a vicious cycle that is fully appropriate to Allen's sense 
of farcical hum or—in turn becomes a source of additional, increased anxiety. For Alvie, 
his Jewishness holds him hostage, and this identity as "hostage" is one that he both 
craves and despises, one that he pursues but cannot escape.
Alvie's hum or is on one level a coping mechanism, a way for Alvie to deal with 
his anxiety over this "hostage crisis" by diffusing it. (Freud's assessment of the function 
of hum or is, of course, applicable here.) But his humor is also a means of creating this 
hostage-identity; and, in fact, one joke that Alvie tells early on does so explicitly. Alvie 
does not directly refer to Jewishness in the joke, but its relevance to Alvie's Jewishness is 
irrefutable.
At one point we are shown a clip of a talk show on which Alvie is a guest. As the 
show's discussion turns to the topic of the draft, Alvie declares that he has been 
classified as "4-P." Ffe then explains that this means that, in the event of a war, he has 
been designated "a hostage." Alvie's humor here again arises out of incongruity: the 
common idea that one is designated for a particular purpose by one's draft status is
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juxtaposed with the decidedly uncommon idea that one might be designated for such a 
purpose as that of hostage. But why does Alvie, as the creator of the joke, choose to 
make himself a hostage? Why does he choose for himself this particular identity?
Wartime is traditionally and typically a time when members of a community 
band together and unite under the auspices of a shared group identity. In nationalistic 
terms, patriotism flourishes. But here Alvie separates himself from the community by 
asserting a uniquely individual identity—a draft status of "4-P," which he shares with 
no one else, and a status, moreover, that prevents him from playing an active role within 
the community when war is declared. As hostage, he cannot participate in the 
community as a soldier, as a supporter of the war, or as a protester of the war. His 
unique draft status, which is to say his (duly asserted) individual identity, in fact, 
removes him completely from the community by placing him in another country where 
he will be held hostage. Yet, paradoxically, it must be noted that his "hostage-ness," his 
identity, continues to be reliant on his previous association w ith the group from which 
he has distanced himself. In other words, Alvie's hostage identity, while a removal/rom 
the group, is also the result of his association with the group. In effect, he is held hostage 
by his group identity, despite his efforts to shed it. And this "hostage-ness" is in fact an 
identity he chooses.
While this joke does not explicitly refer to Alvie's Jewishness, its self-deprecating 
nature might allow us to suggest its Jewishness, and its relevance to the second- 
generation Jew's predicament is clear. It seems reasonable to say that the hostage joke is 
applicable to and indicative of Alvie's anxiety—his hostage crisis, his identity crisis —
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regarding his Jewishness. Or, perhaps it is indicative of an anxiety over his Americanness 
(after all, only one who perceives himself as not fully American would eschew the 
American identity options of soldier, supporter, or protester in favor of the ambiguous 
and ambivalent identity of hostage)—in which case it is still an anxiety over Jewishness, 
just an indirect anxiety, for it is Alvie's Jewishness that complicates his identity as an 
American.
Allen's manifest anxiety over Jewishness continues through his later films, 
though often less explicitly. That is, there are fewer open conversations about Jewish 
identity in Allen's films of the 1980s and 1990s. Zelig (1983) is a notable exception, as a 
film that deals entirely with a Jew's obsessive need to assimilate whatever identity he 
happens to come into contact w ith—and it is worth mentioning that Zelig even feels the 
need to assimilate Jewishness: when in the company of obese men, he grows in girth; 
when in the company of black men, his skin darkens; and when in the company of 
orthodox Jews, he grows ringlets and a beard. The suggestion is that the assimilating 
Jew is without an identifiable identity, and yet, paradoxically, this slippery, 
unidentifiable identity is the American Jew's identity.
Throughout almost all of Allen's films—even when Jewishness is not directly or 
explicitly treated—the Allen persona is present, and is almost always at least nominally 
Jewish if not fully the Jew-as-neurotic. Indeed, the Allen persona has become essentially 
synonymous with the identity of the Jew-as-neurotic, or the Jew who is anxious about 
his Jewishness, so that almost every Allen film is a reconstruction and reassertion of that 
identity. This includes his recent work. Mary P. Nichols, in her discussion of Mighty
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Aphrodite (1995), for example, notes Lenny Weinrib's (i.e. the Allen persona's) anxiety 
over and desire to distance himself from his Jewish identity, when she mentions the 
trouble Lenny and his wife have when they try to come up w ith a name for their child. 
Lenny avoids names that sound Jewish, moving to "other possibilities" when Amanda 
suggests "Ben"—and Nichols also notes that Lenny's parents (i.e. representatives of his 
Jewish roots) are conspicuously absent from the movie (197-98).
Even those films from which Allen himself is absent, such as Bullets Over 
Broadway (1994) or Celebrity (1998), still manage to succeed in reconstructing and 
reasserting this Jew-as-neurotic identity via the performances of other actors who simply 
recreate the Allen persona (John Cusack and Kenneth Branagh, respectively).
III. Roth's Subversion of the Jews 
Philip Roth's work has much in common with Allen's, in its manifestations and 
explorations of (Jewish) anxieties. Perhaps the most obvious similarity is in their bitter 
portrayals of the stereotypically domineering and anxiety-instilling Jewish mother- 
figure. Allen's short film, Oedipus Wrecks, for example, is a sort of companion text to 
Roth's Portnoy's Complaint in that regard. Roth, even more so than Allen, is an author 
obsessed with identity, as works such as The Counterlife and Operation Shylock make 
excessively clear. This obsession is also situated squarely within a Jewish context; that is 
to say, the identity with which Roth seems particularly obsessed is a Jewish one—or 
might be, might not be, ought to be, could be, shouldn't be. This complexity and 
undecideability is part of the obsession and a primary source of anxiety. And Roth's, like
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Allen's, is "a hum or at once grounded in yet hostile to ethnicity" (Workman 16). Nathan 
Zuckerman, Roth's alter-identity, for example, declares himself, on the final page of The 
Counterlife, as "a Jew among Gentiles and a Gentile among Jews." He is
a Jew without Jews, w ithout Judaism, without Zionism, without 
Jewishness, without a temple or an army or even a pistol, a Jew clearly 
without a home, just the object itself, hke a glass or an apple. (324)
Clearly, Zuckerman struggles w ith the tensions of assimilation and alienation; 
this mini-speech is an articulation of these anxieties over his Jewishness. He is, as Alan 
Cooper puts it, "suspended in a state of fictive uncertainty about his own identity: about 
how much he is the American, how much the Jew" (3). He says he is a Jew, 
acknowledges that he is a Jew, but what makes him a "Jew" if he lacks all the traditional 
markers of "Jewishness"? To say he is a "Jew without Jewishness" is to make of himself 
an object for study, for inquisition. It is to say an apple is an "apple" —but w hat marks 
its "appleness"?
And when he says he is "a Jew among Gentiles and a Gentile among Jews," he 
articulates the shift that has taken place for the second generation, as tensions have 
spread from Jew vs. non-Jew, to Jew vs. Jew—perhaps even from Self vs. Other, to Self 
vs. Self. For Zuckerman, his Self is the ultimate O ther—Other to Gentiles, Other to Jews, 
even Other to his Self. (Talk about an identity crisis!)
Another Roth creation, and the quintessential construction of Jew-as-neurotic, 
Alexander Portnoy, voices this division between his Jewish Self and his fellow Jews, and 
the anxiety it produces, when referring to his parents he says, "These people are
97
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
incredible! These people are unbelievable! These two are the outstanding producers and 
packagers of guilt in our time!" (Portnoy 39). Like Alvie, Portnoy uses a food metaphor 
to express his ambivalence toward, even an outright rejection of, the Jewish community 
and the Jewishness that that community has to offer. "I don 't want the food from [my 
mother's] mouth," he says. "I don't even want the food from my plate—that's the point" 
(16). Portnoy "seeks relentlessly to be liberated from, rather than integrated with, his 
community" (Workman 24), and he even notes his entrapment in a hostage situation 
similar to Alvie's: "We are not a family," he says, "that takes defection lightly" (64).
That hum or is central to Portnoy's (and Zuckerman's) anxiety-ridden struggle 
with Jewishness hardly needs mentioning; the most telling discussion of that humor in 
Portnoy's Complaint comes when an Israeli woman tells Portnoy, "'there is something 
very wrong with you.'" She observes that Portnoy is the most unhappy person she's 
ever known, then she says,
"You seem to take some special pleasure, some pride, in making yourself 
the butt of your own peculiar sense of humor.... Everything you say is 
somehow twisted, some way or another, to come out 'funny.' All day 
long the same thing. In some little way or other, everything is ironical, or 
self-depreciating. Self-depreciating?"
"Self-deprecating. Self-mocking." (298-99)
Portnoy's clarification of the woman's English is also a confirmation. He knows this is 
his humor, and he defends it saying, "'Self-deprecation is, after all, a classic form of 
Jewish humor.'" But the woman replies, '"N ot Jewish humor! No! Ghetto humor"' (299).
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And she closes their conversation with this condemnation: "'Mr. Portnoy/ she said, 
raising her knapsack from the floor, 'you are nothing but a self-hating Jew/"
Portnoy's response? "'Ah, but Naomi, maybe that's the best kind'" (300).
The fact that Portnoy does in fact make himself the butt of his own jokes is 
indicative of the complications and the conflictedness that he, like Alvie, feels over his 
own Jewishness. Strictly speaking, "self-deprecating" hum or can be a sign of modesty 
and humility, an acknowledgment of the individual's inability to measure up to the 
ideal. These are traits that, within the Judaic system of values, are praiseworthy; indeed, 
this is in part why self-deprecating humor is a "classic form" of Jewish humor. But 
Naomi is right the first time, when she calls Portnoy's hum or "selt-depreciating," because 
his hum or is not a manifestation of modesty or humility; it is not merely self- 
deprecating. It is, quite clearly, full of self-ridicule; it is (as Portnoy admits) "self- 
mocking," and in effect it devalues, it depreciates the Self—specifically the Jewish Self, as 
it is his Jewishness that Portnoy holds responsible for his suffering.^
The ghettoization of the Jews in Eastern Europe and in Germany was, historically 
and politically, an attempt to subvert Jewish identity, an attempt to undermine the 
strength and power of the Jewish community. When Naomi accuses Portnoy of "Ghetto 
humor," then, it is an accusation of subversion—an accusation of, as she makes clear, 
Jewish self-hatred. In other words, Portnoy's hum or alienates him from the Jewish 
community, "and neither he nor it benefits as a result" (Workman 24).
See Portnoy, 40.
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Naomi's accusations are against Portnoy, but they are nothing new to Roth; they 
began long before he 'd  written Portnoy, or The Counterlife, or Operation Shylock. By 
1975, the accusations against Roth of Jewish self-hatred had become so common that 
Sanford Pinsker was taking them as matters of fact, noting "a correspondence between 
the public dimensions of Roth's scathing satire and the private realm of his self- 
abasement. Like D. H. Lawrence," writes Pinsker, Roth "is a writer out to 'shed his 
sickness' in the discipline and pattern-making of art" (3). Roth responds himself to these 
accusations in essays such as "Writing About the Jews,"^ and Portnoy responds to 
Naomi by saying that perhaps the self-hating Jew is the "best kind." The response itself 
is, like Roth's humorous treatments of Jews and Jewishness, highly subversive. But is it 
subverting the Jews because it affirms Jewish self-hatred, agrees that self-hatred is 
anathema to Jewishness, and then asserts the self-hatred forcefully in order to alienate 
that Jewishness? Or is it subverting the Jews who accuse Roth of self-hatred, constructing 
and affirming instead a new, complex and complicated Jewishness that is not alienated 
by, but incorporates or embodies its own self-hatred? (Remember the notion put 
forward above in the discussion of Annie Hall, that anxiety over, even rejection of, one's 
Jewishness might in fact signify and substantiate one's Jewishness?)
The accusations of Jewish self-hatred originated following the publication of 
Roth's Goodbye, Columbus (1959). In fact, preceding his lengthy, novelistic 
examinations of Jewishness and the Jewish Self is a microcosmic, representative
 ^See Reading Myself and Others, 149-69.
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examination in the first story Roth ever wrote, "The Conversion of the Jews."® 
"Conversion" is worth a closer look because, as Roth's first story, it represents his first 
attempt to deal with the tensions facing the second-generation Jew, and he deals w ith 
those tensions explicitly. Ozzie Freedman is the Jewish boy already struggling w ith his 
Jewish identity, who may just grow up to be the full-blown (and fully blown) Jew-as- 
neurotic, Alexander Portnoy. The hum or that is present in the story reveals these 
anxieties, as well as an ambivalence toward Jewishness and a distinct subversion of it.
That Ozzie is a "pint-sized subversive" (Pinsker 13) is made clear in the opening 
paragraphs of the story; however, it is interesting to note that Ozzie is not unique in his 
subversiveness. AH the kids at the Flebrew school are this way, it would seem. Ozzie's 
best friend, Itzie, for example, though he favors "closed-mouthedness," is nevertheless a 
practitioner of "behind-the-back subtleties such as gestures, faces, snarls and other less 
delicate barnyard noises" ("Conversion" 139). And the other kids are ready and willing 
to participate in any subversive activity, be it Ozzie's or otherwise, as we see by their 
behavior at the end of the story. Itzie's subversive behavior is clearly intentional and 
humorous in its means, but Ozzie's, by contrast, is sincere and unintentional. Ozzie 
causes problems by asking questions—questions that he genuinely desires an answer to, 
but that slice at the heart of Judaic beliefs and values. And it is perhaps because of this 
sincerity that Ozzie's form of subversion is so much funnier than Itzie's.
® Roth mentions in an interview that "Conversion" was the first story he wrote. See 
Searles, 7-8.
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Significantly, the first question that gets Ozzie Freedman into trouble has to do 
with "how Rabbi Binder could call the Jews 'The Chosen People' if the Declaration of 
Independence claimed all men to be created equal" (141). The hum or in the question 
arises from the juxtaposition of the sacred and the secular, the two seemingly conflicting 
ideals of what Binder calls "spiritual legitimacy" and "political equality" (141). The 
question articulates one of the conflicts faced by the second-generation Jew (represented 
by Ozzie) who no longer privileges the Jewish identity over the American, and the 
question is the source of no small anxiety, for how can the two desired identities be 
reconciled? Moreover, the question is subversive of Jewish identity precisely because it 
no longer privileges that Jewish identity. By raising the Declaration of Independence to a 
status equal to scripture, Ozzie elevates Americanness—to the diminishment of 
Jewishness.
Ozzie's second question then regards his mother's lamentation over a plane 
crash in which fifty-eight people were killed, eight of whom were Jews. Flis mother calls 
the crash a tragedy because of the eight Jews, and Ozzie wants to know why the 
inclusion of eight Jews makes the crash more tragic than it otherwise may have been. 
When Binder's response (having to do w ith "cultural unity" [142]) is unsatisfactory, 
Ozzie declares that "he wished all fifty-eight were Jews" (142). This question is less 
humorous than the first, but no less concerned with Jewish identity and more indicative 
of Ozzie's ambivalence, even resentment toward Jewishness. The death wish, in fact, is 
the first sign of a budding sense of self-hatred.
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But the most significant question that Ozzie asks is his third, and the one upon 
which the plot of the story hangs. The question has to do with Jesus—that king of all 
subversive Jews—and Ozzie wants to know "'How if [God] could create the heaven and 
earth in six days, and make all the animals and the fish and the light in six days ... why 
couldn't He let a woman have a baby without having intercourse?"' (140-41). Unlike the 
first question, which inheres a certain humor for its juxtaposition of sacred and secular, 
this question is not in itself necessarily funny; it is a valid theological question that might 
be treated in all seriousness. And unlike the second question, which articulates explicitly 
a certain anxiety over Jewish identity, this question ostensibly has nothing to do with 
Jewishness; whether or not God could "let a woman have a baby without having 
intercourse" has little to do with Judaism or Jewishness. Thus, it is as a result of Binder's 
(and his mother's) reaction to this third question that it takes on its hum or and its 
relevance to Jewish identity. In other words, it is because Binder (and Ozzie's mother) 
sees the question as threatening—as potentially subversive—that it becomes subversive, 
and humorously so.
Binder's reaction, of course, is anger. After Ozzie's mother reacts by hitting Ozzie 
across the face when he tells her about the question at home. Binder also tries to slap 
Ozzie later, at school, w hen he raises it a second time. Ozzie bleeds when Binder's palm 
catches him in the nose, and he runs out and up the stairs to the rooftop.
At this point, the shedding of blood, the nature of the question, and the title of 
the story combine to construct some parallels. Ozzie, clearly, is being comically 
constructed as a kind of Christ figure. Like Jesus, he has no earthly father; like Jesus, he
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is twelve (or thirteen) and astonishing (or at least confounding) the rabbis with his 
learning and understanding of theological matters; like Jesus, he is a Jew no longer 
willing to buy into the traditions of Judaism. In effect, Jesus becomes a symbol of the 
second-generation Jew. Like Zuckerman, Jesus is “a Jew among Gentiles and a Gentile 
among Jews," and thus he becomes the perfect vehicle for Roth, via Ozzie, to explore 
and articulate this identity crisis.
That Ozzie is, in fact, involved in an identity crisis is revealed in the question that 
"[shoots] through his brain" as he finds himself on the rooftop: "'Can this be me?'" he 
thinks (147).
Louder and louder the question came to h im —"Is it me? Is it me?"—until 
he discovered himself no longer kneeling, but racing crazily towards the 
edge of the roof, his eyes crying, his throat screaming, and his arms flying 
everywhichway as though not his own.
"Is it me? Is it me Me ME ME ME! It has to be m e—but is it!" (148) 
The question comes with such force, and runs so deep, that it suggests a kind of 
revelatory moment for Ozzie. It reaches beyond him, to an identity larger than "Ozzie 
Freedman." Indeed, it is this moment that seems to mark the advent of Ozzie-as- 
Messiah. Ozzie isn 't wondering if he is Ozzie, if what he is doing coincides with the 
identity of Ozzie Freedman; he's wondering "Is it me?" while thinking messianically, 
wondering if the identity of Ozzie Freedman coincides with the identity of the messiah. 
This is confirmed in the paragraph that follows Ozzie's query:
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It is the question a thief must ask himself the night he jimmies open his 
first window, and it is said to be the question with which bridegrooms 
quiz themselves before the altar. (148)
It is written, of course, that the Messiah will come as a thief in the night; and He is 
likened often to a bridegroom.
Ozzie's elevation to the status of Messiah, then, connotes salvation. And the final 
scene plays out like a mass conversion, as he demands that everyone kneel and confess 
that God could, indeed, let a woman have a baby without having intercourse. The scene 
is thoroughly comic, and the effect is ultimately subversive. Ozzie undermines all that 
Rabbi Binder, Ozzie's mother, and Yakov Blotnik represent—namely, Judaism and 
Jewishness—by insisting that they capitulate to his theology and by demonstrating a 
willingness to die for this cause. In effect, Roth says that the only way the Jews can be 
saved is if they are converted.
But the conversion here is not, as others have suggested, a conversion to 
American identity.® And it certainly is not a conversion to Christianity. Rather, it is 
Ozzie's coercion of the Jews toward a new Jewish identity. The "conversion" is the 
subversion of traditional Jewish identity and the forced acknowledgment, not of Jesus as 
the Christ, but of Jesus as the king of the Jews, or more precisely the epitome of 
Jewishness. Jesus is not the messiah; Ozzie is, come to save his people by revealing to 
them their true and thoroughly messed up, problematized and problematic identity.
® See Baumgarten and Gottfried, Understanding Philip Roth (U South Carolina P, 1990), 
p. 46.
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Because it is only by making a space for this kind of anxiety-ridden, self-hating Jew that 
Jewishness can survive in the postmodern world.
And this brings us back to Portnoy's response to Naomi's accusations, w hen he 
says that maybe the self-hating Jew is the "best kind." Roth, via this response, via "The 
Conversion of the Jews," via Portnoy and Zuckerman and all his examinations of Jewish 
identity, works to (de-/re-)construct a new Jewishness that incorporates self-hatred. That 
is, he is working to make a space for the second-generation Jew, the Jew who is "a Jew 
without Jewishness," the Jew who is a Jew though he or she lacks all the traditional 
markers of Jewish identity. And to do this, to save the second-generation Jew, he m ust 
subvert the traditional notions of Jewishness.
This is, in effect, what second-generation Jewish-American writers like Allen and 
Roth accomplish: the articulation, the (de-/re-)construction of a Jewishness that is even 
more complicated and more complex, more conflicted, than it has been previously. Like 
Allen, Roth continues in his later work to struggle with Jewishness—Zuckerman, for 
example, in I Married a Communist (1998), continues in his ambivalence toward his 
Jewish identity, claiming he "didn 't care to partake of the Jewish character," that he 
"didn 't even know, clearly, what it was" and "didn 't much want to" (39), and discussing 
with his friend Murray the "taxonomy" of Jews and their multiple identities (163-64).
But this struggle with Jewishness is less violent in the later work than it necessarily must 
be in the earlier, because it is the earlier work that clears a space for what is to come. It is 
the earlier work that works hardest to (de-/re-)construct this new sense of Jewishness.
106
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
And the primary means for this accomplishment is humor, which is so often a complex 
and complicating, anarchic, (de-/re-)constructive force.
In effect, Roth and Allen, as second-generation Jews, face a different conflict than 
that faced by first-generation Jews like Yekl. Experiencing these new and different 
anxieties over their Jewishness, Roth and Allen (and others)—"Yekl’s children"—make 
for themselves, primarily through humor, an identity that both expresses and embodies 
those anxieties. They negotiate a space wherein the conflict of identities of Jew and 
American is no longer destructive; the conflict becomes constructive, in that it fosters a 
new Jewish-American identity, rife w ith undecideability—and it is hum or that allows or 
provides for the assimilation of this paradox. Jewish self-hatred, then, becomes no 
longer anathema to the Jewish Self, and the subversion of the Jews becomes an 
affirmation—even an assertion—ot one's Jewishness.
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CHAPTER 6
THE COEN BROTHERS 
I. Jewish?
If the filmmaking brothers Ethan and Joel happened to be marked with a less 
ethnically recognizable surname, such as Miller or Green, there would be little 
motivation for a scholar interested in American Jewish literature to explore the subject of 
Jewish identity in their films and fiction. After all, there is little that is readily 
identifiable as "Jewish" about the works of Ethan and Joel Coen beyond the fact that the 
creators' surname marks them as descendants of the kohanim—the  Hebrew priests who 
conducted services and sacrifices in Jewish temples. Yet the scholar who notes the 
surname and decides to poke around for manifestations of Jewishness will find that 
Ethan has written two short stories that confront Jewishness head-on; in addition, there 
is John Goodman's character in The Big Lebowski—a film that has much to do with 
issues of identity, beginning with the confusion surrounding the two characters named 
Lebowski.^ Goodman's character is a convert to Judaism, a result of his marriage to a
 ^Some might argue that Barton Fink is the Coens' most notable treatment of Jewish 
identity, and indeed Fink is the only Jewish protagonist in the Coens' film oeuvre. 
However, Fink seems to me to be little more than incidentally Jewish. In Fink the Coens 
play on stereotypes of the struggling socialist writer and of the demographics of 
Hollywood, and there is something to be said about their treatment of Jewishness (i.e., 
the anti-Semitism) in the film. But ultimately the presence of Jews and Jewishness is not
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Jewish woman, and he continues to claim he is shomer shabbos (a Sabbath observer), 
which is to say that he continues to struggle with a sense of Jewish identity despite the 
fact that his marriage has ended and his Jewishness was an adopted identity to begin 
with. In each of these cases (the two stories and the film), Jewish identity is constructed 
and confronted, and in each case hum or plays a prominent role as a means of 
construction and confrontation. What is interesting, when combined with the glaring 
absence of Jewishness from most of the Coens' work, is the fact that the Coens' hum or is 
usually discomforting, anarchic, subversive, and ridiculous (i.e., pertaining to ridicule). 
In other words, one wonders whether the general absence of Jewishness has anything to 
do with the brand of hum or in operation. This gives rise to an interesting line of inquiry: 
When Jewishness is present, what is the effect of this mode of humor on the work's 
constructed notions of Jewish identity? How does this humor act on these notions (e.g., 
how does the ridicule of Jewishness affect our notions of Jewishness)? How does it fit 
within these notions (e.g., does "Coen" humor qualify as "Jewish" humor)? And, 
ultimately, what role do notions of Jewishness and our understanding of the functions of 
humor play in our understanding of the Coens' oeuvre?
essential to the film —which is really about the life of the m ind versus the life of the 
body—and the offhand anti-Semitism that manifests itself (primarily through the 
repeated use of the w ord kike) is much less noteworthy than the scene I refer to from The
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n. Appearances
The Coens' fellow filmmaker Woody Allen is an artist whose work has played a 
major role in the construction of general American notions of Jewish identity; the Allen 
persona that so often appears in his films has been, for better or worse, closely identified 
with w hat it means to be Jewish in America. Even a younger generation, in pointing to 
the Jerry Seinfeld persona^ as representative of popular notions of Jewishness and 
Jewish humor, suggests notions that have their roots in Allen's films and in popular 
novels such as Philip Roth's Portnoy's Complaint. The Seinfeld persona, though not as 
cowering and bumbling nor as fixated on his own Jewishness as Alex Portnoy or the 
Woody Allen persona, is certainly as neurotic and as hung up on sex as they are—two 
common aspects of the popular conception of Jewish identity that are common sources 
for, and objects of, the brand of self-deprecating humor that is typically identified as 
"Jewish."® In fact, the identification of these traits as "Jewish" has become so widely 
accepted and imbedded in American society, perhaps as the result of constructions via 
Woody Allen et al., that a persona such as Seinfeld's need never make mention of his
Big Lebowski in which Jewish identity is discussed and treated directly within the 
context of a film to which questions of identity are essential.
 ^When speaking of figures such as Woody Allen or Jerry Seinfeld, one m ust distinguish 
between the person and the persona. The person is never really in the public eye; we see 
only the persona, as it is created (i.e. written) and recreated (i.e. rewritten) within and by 
the various contexts in which it appears. Thus the persona becomes the text that we 
interpret as readers. My source for thinking this way about person/persona is Frank 
Krutnik's Inventing Terry Lewis (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 2000).
® Neuroticism and a preoccupation with sex are both so commonly associated with 
Jewish-American identity that the Jewish-American author Melvin Jules Bukiet recently 
edited a collection of writings published by W. W. Norton called "Neurotica: Jewish
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Jewishness at all—he need only exhibit these traits (and perhaps carry an ethnically 
identifiable surname) for us to identify the persona as Jewish.
But in watching the Coen brothers' films, one gets no sense of this Jewishness. 
None of the Coens' characters even remotely resembles the Woody Allen persona, or 
Portnoy, or even the more contemporary (and less exaggerated) Seinfeld persona. And 
the style of hum or that characterizes Allen's, Roth's, and Seinfeld's work, and which can 
be traced back to Jewish influences such as the Marx brothers and the comics and 
comedians of the Borscht Belt, is almost entirely absent from the works of the Coen 
brothers.
Almost entirely absent, that is—but not entirely. There are moments of humor, 
however brief and rare, that seem to echo quite loudly the hum or of the Coens' more 
identifiably Jewish forerunners and peers. Take the following passage from Woody 
Allen's short prose piece "Examining Psychic Phenomena" as a point of comparison: 
There is no question that there is an unseen world. The problem is, how 
far is it from midtown and how late is it open? Unexplainable events 
occur constantly. One man will see spirits. Another will hear voices. A 
third will wake up and find himself running in the Preakness. .. .What is 
behind these experiences? Or in front of them, for that matter? Is it true 
that some men can foresee the future or communicate with ghosts? And 
after death is it still possible to take showers? (Complete Prose 15)
Writers on Sex." The volume, incidentally, contains selections from the writings of both 
Woody Allen and Philip Roth.
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This passage displays Allen's typical play with language and his use of what we might
call quasi sequiturs. Because Allen's is such a prominent persona and has been so strongly 
identified as "Jewish," and because the Marx brothers (who are also strongly identified 
as "Jewish") are a notable twentieth-century source for this kind of humor, it may be 
that this particular play with language is itself identifiable as "Jewish." Now compare 
the Allen passage to an excerpt from the Coens' preface to the published screenplay of 
Blood Simple. Here, they are writing about the process of writing and revision:
In fact ...in an early draft of the climactic scene the heroine, after impaling 
the private detective's hand on the window siU, saws off his captive 
fingers and pops them through the holes that he has shot into the wall 
that separates them. An even earlier draft had her first pull the nails off 
the disembodied fingers with a grimping hook, but we were advised that 
this might frighten small children.
So finally, by trimming the script instead of the digits of our 
hapless private snoop, we arrived at the paradigm of restraint that is now 
the climax of the movie. "Sellout!" some people will say. But one m ust 
remember that Art and Commerce are uneasy bedfellows 'neath 
picturedom's sheets, nor may they even shake hands without spraining 
something. ("Preface")
The glaring difference between the two passages is, of course, the presence of graphic 
violence in the latter. Also, the quasi sequiturs are not as numerous in the Coen passage 
as they are in Allen's writing. But the echo of Allen in the last sentence of the Coen
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passage is undeniable. That echo reverberates as the Coens—much like Allen and his 
playful treatment of philosophers such as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche—toy with 
Shakespeare, assigning him his own struggles with rewriting by suggesting that an early 
version of Macbeth contained the following version of its famous passage reflecting on 
life:
It is a tale told by an idiot
Full of sound and fury
And all manner of things. ("Preface")
Before oh Bill got it right, according to the Coens, another revision contained the line, "It 
is a tale told by an egret."
Subversive hum or in general—the bringing low of those of high status, or the 
undermining of established systems of order—is common among minority groups who 
may be posited as inferior to those they seek to bring low, or who are oppressed by the 
systems they seek to undermine. Jokes that mocked Hitler and the Nazis, for example, 
were widespread within German concentration camps.^ Thus it is possible to place the 
Coens' humor (or at least the hum or that is found in this "Preface") within a tradition of 
subversive ethnic hum or that manifests itself in the Marx brothers, Allen, and Roth. But 
because the subversiveness of this humor, or its use of quasi sequiturs, is not enough, 
alone, to identify it as decidedly "Jewish"—after all, other ethnic humors can be 
subversive, and comics and comedians of all races and ethnicities rely on the
* See Terrence Des Pres, "Holocaust Laughter?" (Writing and the Holocaust, Berel Lang, 
ed. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988).
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incongruities of quasi sequiturs for producing laughs—we must look for more. In other 
words, the apparent occasional echoing of Allen's hum or is not enough to go on. The 
question remains: Are there Coen works that are themselves identifiable as "Jewish" 
(beyond the fact that they were written by someone named Coen)? And if so, how  is this 
Jewishness constructed and what is the attitude toward it? Is there a level of acceptance, 
an owned sense of the Jewish Self? Or is there a resistance to it, a positing of the Jewish 
as decidedly Other?
The answer to the latter, after reading the two most thorough treatments of 
Jewish identity in the Coen oeuvre—Ethan's short stories "The Old Country" and "I 
Killed Phil Shapiro"—would appear to be that there is, in fact, a profound sense of 
resistance to Jewish identity. But a curious aspect of our conception of Jewish identity is 
that Jewishness seems to include or to make room for a certain struggle with itself. In 
other words, it seems that part of being Jewish in America is to be preoccupied with, 
anxious about, or even at odds with one's Jewishness. The paradoxical result is that 
one's resistance to, or anxiety over, one's Jewishness may in fact reinforce or substantiate 
it.
We can see this by again turning to the works of Woody Allen, where the 
portrayal of anxiety over Jewishness is expertly pronounced in Annie Hall (1977). In this 
movie, the Allen persona—here named Alvie Singer—expresses paranoia over anti- 
Semitism (he explains to his friend that "Tom Christie said, 'No, didchoo?' Not, did you, 
didchoo eat? Jew? No, not did you eat, but jew eat? Jew. You get it?" [Four Films 10]1 
and reveals his self-consciousness about his Jewishness when he imagines himself
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dressed in orthodox garb, with hill beard and ringlets, as he sits at Annie's parents'
dinner table somewhere in the Midwest (55). However, it is in part because of—and  not 
despite—these anxieties that Alvie is strongly and squarely identified as Jewish. These 
paranoias and manifestations of self-consciousness are marked as components of Alvie's 
Jewishness. That is, though Allen perhaps subverts our sense of Jewishness by 
constructing a version of Jewishness that may even be considered by some to be anti- 
Semitic and laced with self-hatred, one cannot claim that the Allen persona has rejected 
or abandoned his Jewish identity. Rather, he has complicated it, reconstructed and 
reasserted it via his subversion of it. Jewishness is still the impetus for his actions, 
though (and because) his actions are conflicted about that Jewishness; thus we identify 
most of Allen's films and most of his prose as "Jewish."
This provides a means for answering the first question asked above, regarding 
whether there are Coen works that can be, themselves, identified as "Jewish." The 
notion that Jewishness-as-impetus is the primary, even the sole, criterion for classifying 
a work as "Jewish-American" may be taken as the standard.® If this standard holds, then 
from Ethan's collection entitled Gates of Eden, only the two stories previously
® At the 2002 ALA conference on Holocaust and Jewish-American literature in Boca 
Raton, Florida, Ben Siegel asserted (and I believe he said he joined Jules Chametzky in 
this conclusion) that the only requirement for identifying a work as "Jewish" is that 
Jewishness be, somehow, a motivating factor. Others at the conference seemed to be in 
general agreement. I interpret this as meaning that Jewishness, or some aspect of it, must 
be a motivation behind the protagonist's actions, or perhaps that some aspect of 
Jewishness must motivate the questions the narrative attempts to answer, etc. If we 
accept this definition, then the implication is that a piece of "Jewish" writing need not be 
written by a Jew, and that a work written by a Jew need not be a piece of "Jewish"
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mentioned can be considered works of Jewish-American fiction; none of the Coen 
brothers' films can be categorized as Jewish-American films.
This is interesting, even compelling, especially after a closer look at "The Old 
Country," a story about a young boy's experiences in Hebrew school. The story is told in 
first person from the perspective of the boy, whose name we never learn, and at one 
point we are told that it is "a true story" (47). Information about Ethan's life is hard to 
find—especially if one is interested in his upbringing prior to the creation of Blood 
Simple (1984)—but the common, almost traditional ties between an author's early fiction 
and autobiography tempt one to speculate that perhaps Ethan himself attended Hebrew 
school as a boy in Minnesota, and that perhaps the older sister mentioned in the story is 
a fictional replacement for his real-life older brother, Joel. Even if this isn't the case, the 
treatment of the Jews in the story begs further examination, and one must ask why the 
author would be so hostile toward a system that he was never subjected to. If the story 
is, indeed, rooted in autobiography, then one cannot help but ask why someone who 
may have had such a thoroughly Jewish childhood does not more frequently address 
issues and themes influenced by this Jewishness.
III. The Old Country
In "The Old Country," the narrator begins with a description of Michael Simkin, 
who at ten years old is "a Hammer of God, defying not Rome or the crown, but the
writing. A text, in other words, has an identity quite its ow n—even a racial or ethnic 
identity that may in fact be at odds w ith the racial or ethnic identity of the author.
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Hebrew school principal" (31). Michael has "no program unless it were anarchy" (31), as 
even his physical description attests: "He had a large birthmark just below one 
cheekbone, advertising disorder" (32-33). The first third of the story catalogs Michael's 
actions, starting with his sexual finger-gestures directed at the backs of his Hebrew 
school teachers (who could never catch him at it) and at fellow students—namely Laurie 
Sellaway, who is "unaware perhaps that the sign represented sexual intercourse but 
nevertheless undone by its powerful vibe" (31). In response to Laurie's reaction, it is 
Michael's habit to "adopt the dreamy manner of a monocled Gruppenfuhrer with a 
pluming cigarette: 'Bawlink, Tsellavaaaay?' he would m urm ur as she sobbed" (32).
In addition to the lewd finger-gestures, Michael sings jingles, "lampooning the 
anthem of the local chapter of the American Zionists Association"—or, "along more 
biblical lines," singing about "five constipated patriarchs" from the Torah (33):
There were five, yes five,
Constipated men in the Bible,
Oh in the Bible.
The first, yes the first.
Constipated man was Cain:
He wasn't able. (33)
Finally, we are told of Michael's habit of throwing things into the ceiling of the 
Hebrew school after having pushed aside a piece of acoustical tile with a broom handle.
It starts with other students' cookies, but he soon takes to "tossing copies of Shiarim 
H atorah—'Gates of the Torah,' our Hebrew school text—into the ceiling as well" (35).
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Clearly the humor that is created by this character and these situations is 
anarchic and subversive in nature—Coen spells this out for us in his early descriptions 
of Michael Simkin. But what stands out is the stance that this humor takes toward 
Jewishness. That each of Michael's actions targets individuals who are Jewish is obvious; 
that each targets Jewish identity, or Jewishness, is less obvious but no less discernible.
The Torah and the patriarchs—both metonymic for the religion of Judaism—are, of 
course, key elements of Jewish identity; thus, Michael's subversion of the respect held 
for these things, when he sings about constipation for instance, is a show of disrespect 
toward the identity they represent. His lampooning of the AZA's anthem is likewise 
such a subversion, as the Zionist movement is a major component, not only of Judaism, 
but also of secular Jewish culture. When he disrupts the classroom with his finger- 
gestures, it is a Hebrew school classroom—his disrespect for the teachers is a disrespect 
for identifiably Jewish role models and Jewish authority figures. And it is significant that 
Michael adopts the manner of the Gruppenfuhrer w ith Laurie Sellaway, effectively taking 
a German—that is, an identifiably anti-Semitic—stance towards his weak and explicitly 
Jewish victim.
The tossing of Hebrew textbooks into the ceiling is yet another component of 
Michael Simkin's attack on Jewishness, and one that is somewhat akin to the disrespect 
he shows toward the Torah and his teachers. But w hat makes this instance w orthy of 
particular attention is the narrator's apparent complicity in the mockery. The narrator 
tells us of the tossing of the textbooks—actions for which Michael Simkin is 
responsible—but it is the narrator himself who is responsible for the commentary;
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[Michael] once threw another student's shoe up [into the ceiling], and the 
teacher who climbed onto a stool to retrieve it also found, mysteriously to 
him, several copies of Shiarim H atorah—an apparent miracle which, had 
it happened in Maccabean times, would have been the basis for a Jewish 
holiday. (35)
This crack about Jewish holidays—clearly intended to be hum orous—is also clearly 
intended as ridicule. The joke not only makes light of the magnitude of the miracles that 
are actually celebrated by religious holidays, it also challenges the very nature of those 
miracles as miracles, by suggesting that they too might be as readily explained as the 
discovery of the books in the ceiling. Moreover, it mocks those (Jewish) persons who 
were supposedly foolish enough to have "misjudged" the events as miraculous in the 
first place. The fact that it is the narrator who employs this sort of ridiculing hum or is 
significant because of the community-forming nature of hum or in general.
To understand what is meant by this "community-forming nature of humor," we 
could turn to what scholars and theorists have said about it,^ but turning to personal 
experience and observation should be sufficient. Quite simply, we feel a bond with 
others when we share a similar sense of hum or with them, and shared laughter is an 
important part of what forms our friendships, our romantic
relationships, and other alliances. Indeed, a sure way to gain a profound understanding 
of another group or culture is to gain an understanding of their humor, for to
® John Morreall, for instance, writes extensively about the community-building nature of 
humor in Taking Laughter Seriously (Albany: SUNY Press, 1983).
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understand another's sense of hum or is to understand how they see the world, and to 
see things that way too, if only momentarily.
We see this occurring in the story when the narrator and the other kids laugh at 
Michael Simkin's antics. As they do so, they align themselves with him, effectively 
assuming the same subversive stance, though individuals may vary in their commitment 
to it. Each of the instances described—the finger gestures, the jingles, the book tossing, 
and the verbal ridicule—is an instance wherein humor is used as the primary means by 
which the act of subversion is performed. Presumably many of the children act as 
interlopers in Michael's world, understanding and participating in his hum or—and thus 
in his rebellion—though perhaps only temporarily. In the first two cases, the hum or has 
its source in Michael's actions, which provoke a humorous response primarily in the 
other students who are present (the reader's humorous response is secondary, as a 
witness to the events); in other words, the hum or of these instances is created in the 
story. The alliances that are formed, if only temporarily, are formed among the 
students—including, clearly, the narrator—who admire and appreciate Michael's 
humor.
But the instance wherein Michael tosses the books into the ceiling is, for the other 
students, less humorous than the other instances; that is to say, the hum or in the story is 
minimal. In this case, it is the hum or created by the story—by the narrator in the telling 
of the story—that is most prominent, as the narrator makes the crack about miracles and 
Jewish holidays. The humorous response that is provoked here is now primarily in the 
reader. But though the source and context for the humor are different, the function of the
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hum or remains the same: as we understand and appreciate the humor, and participate 
in it, w e—at least temporarily—align ourselves with the stance that it takes. In this story, 
the hum or's stance is always in resistance to, or an attack on, Jewish identity, via 
mockery or ridicule or subversion. In other words, when we laugh at the narrator's joke, 
we are complicit in his derogation of Jewishness.
Putting off questions of ethics and the reader's complicity and sticking to the 
issues at hand, what stands out most in this last example of hum or is not only its 
revelation of the narratoPs complicity in  the attack on Jewishness but the revelation that 
his commitment to this stance is more than temporary.^ No longer does the narrator 
merely relate and appreciate Michael's brand of humor; he becomes an instigator of it.
This reading of the narrator's stance as antagonistic is substantiated, 
interestingly, by the fact that the story lacks any sense of plo t—if by "plot" we mean an 
ordered series of actions that are connected causally and build toward a climactic 
moment. As if to underscore the narrator's (and possibly the author's) admiration for 
Michael's anarchic, subversive nature, we are presented with not an orchestrated sense 
of plot but a catalog, a description of events and memories that form a collage-like image 
of the narrator's childhood. Significantly, most of these memories are not only
 ^The ethical questions surrounding the notion of complicity are compelling: Is racial or 
ethnic humor good because it allows for a release of tension through the temporary 
assumption of an antagonistic stance? Or is racial or ethnic hum or bad because it 
promotes or reinforces the assumption of an antagonistic stance that might already be, 
or can too easily become, long-standing? And to w hat extent m ust the reader/hearer of a 
joke be complicit in the joke's stance for the reader/hearer to appreciate and/or 
participate in its humor? And where do antagonistic jokes about an ethnic group's
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unconnected causally but are distinctly negative, and often this negativity is directed 
toward Jewishness.
For example, we are told about Slim, the "goy who patrolled the hallways" (36). 
The character of Slim serves no function in the traditional sense of constructing a plot or 
moving it forward; rather, it seems we are made aware of Slim only so that we can be 
made aware of the Jews' treatment of him. "Slim's position," we are told, "was the 
dehumanized one of useful outsider" (36); he was "called upon to make such minor 
physical repairs as Jews could not be expected to know how to perform" (37), and so on. 
The memory of Slim seems conveyed only to convey a negative image of the Jews who 
were so dehumanizing and condescending. Most of the memories of the narrator's home 
life that are conveyed seem to serve the same purpose. We are told, for instance, that the 
story of the narrator's family "was composed of two eras: that in which we did not have 
a finished basement; that in which we did. The first era was marked by planning for and 
anticipation of the second" (40). Here there is a hint of mockery directed at the Jews' 
sense of Jewish history and its division into eras—the finishing of the basement being 
likened perhaps to the building of the temple in Jerusalem, or to the eventual coming of 
the Messiah. In any case, the narrator's way of telling the memory conveys a negative 
attitude held by the narrator toward his parents—or, metaphorically, toward his Jewish 
ancestry, his sense of his own Jewish past.
characteristics, told by and within the ethnic group itself, in the spirit of playful self­
mockery, fit within any such discussion of ethics and/or complicity?
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The middle part of the story is composed of these memories and concludes with 
a description of a TV show that the narrator had long anticipated watching. The show is 
called "Seven in Darkness" and is about a group of blind men who survive a plane crash 
in the wilderness and m ust make it back to civilization—a case of the blind leading the 
blind. The narrator tells how he "was deeply moved" by the show. "For m e/' he says, 
"the dark was connected to the turmoil of sleep," when, "as 1 started to drift off, 1 felt 
myself floating back to the formless fears of early childhood," and "the door's slanting 
shadow excited in me a dread that 1 could not name; it reached back to a time when 1 
knew no names." The narrator then says, "1 describe all of this because of what 
happened to Michael Simkin" (44).
The last third of the story, then, is a return to memories of Michael—specifically 
to what may be the closest thing to a climax that the story has to offer, which occurs 
during the all-school assembly held "at the outbreak of the 1967 Six-Day War (though it 
was not called that at the time of the assembly—who knew?)" (44). According to the 
narrator, this is the only all-school assembly to have occurred at the school, and the 
students "were called together so that the faculty could tell [them] about Israel's 
performance and prospects in the fighting." The assembly's main speaker is Rabbi 
Jacobson, "an earnest teacher," who sits and tells of the m any fronts and assures the 
students that Israel is doing well. The narrator then relates the following:
In the middle of the talk Michael Simkin, perhaps discombobulated by 
the fact that a classlike gathering was being held in the free zone of the 
snack bar, perhaps on a sugar high from having consumed that day's
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cookies instead of having heaved them into the ceiling, .. .but at any rate 
unable to contain himself, leapt to his feet and made the trilling sexual 
intercourse sign right at Rabbi Jacobson's face. (45)
As a result of this, Michael Simkin is ushered out of the room and disappears 
from school for about a week, and when he returns it is "immediately clear that 
something [is] wrong" (46). Michael no longer is the anarchic, subversive rabble- 
rouser—instead he is quiet and studious and subdued, even m the face of the other 
students' efforts to "get a rise out of him" (46). Eventually the other students give up 
and Michael continues as "a model student" for several months, until his family finally 
moves to California (47).
The narrator's description of Michael's actions is preceded by a list of possible 
excuses for them. From this the narrator's sympathies are clear. It is likewise noteworthy 
that the narrator describes the reaction to Michael's act of supreme disrespect in a single 
sentence: "There was stunned silence" (45). For a moment, nobody moves. The 
significance here is that there is an utter absence of hum or in this response. Part of 
hum or's function as a community-builder is as a means of assimilation; it is as though 
Michael, in this last act, comes to represent a chaos that is inadmissible—his stance 
cannot be assimilated and appreciated by those around him, not even temporarily and 
not even by those who previously had aligned themselves with him all the way. The 
narrator—who admits that, in the swift reprimanding and reformation of Michael 
Simkin he "saw no tragedy" (47) —goes on to reveal that "Of course it now strikes [him] 
as terrible that a ten-year-old boy was destroyed by parents who were tired of managing
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him" (47). Here the narrator makes known the depth and extent to which his 
commitment to the subversive stance represented by Michael Simkin runs. Rather than 
assuming the stance that is held by the other adults, such as the rabbis at the school, 
Michael's (and presumably the other children's) parents—namely, the Jews—a stance 
that perceives Michael's actions as disrespectful, irreverent, and an affront to Jewish 
identity, the narrator instead (and again) sides w ith Michael. He sees Michael as having 
been "destroyed" rather than reformed.
By way of explanation, the narrator offers a description of what he believes is 
every child's experience and the reason that none of the children sees what happens to 
Michael, at the time, as a tragedy. According to the narrator, all children are "acquainted 
with a terror deeper even than that which Michael's parents had visited upon him 
through beating or some other form of w hat we would now call abuse"—a terror that 
manifested itself at one's bedtime. We are told that "it was in bed, waiting for sleep" — 
and not during the day, at school—"that [the narrator] confronted the world directly" 
(47), and this seems to suggest that, though Michael may have achieved the kind of 
chaos that was, for a moment, too terrible for anyone to assimilate, there was still a 
chaos more terrible and real. The last three pages of the story mark a return to the 
images of dark and sleep—recalling the description of the effect that the TV show about 
the blind men had on the narrator. In effect, these last pages enact a kind of reverence 
for "the tohu vavohu of Genesis" (48),® for "the pressure of silence, silence, the world's
® The "tohu vavohu of Genesis" refers to the initial state of the physical universe, prior to 
its organization into a "created" universe. In biblical Hebrew, the word that most
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w orth of silence" and for "that darkness, and the silence, and the chaos inside" (49), all 
of which are confronted by the child at bedtime. Ultimately, the narrator seems to be 
saying that maturity represents the loss of these things—and, significantly, he seems to 
equate Jewishness with maturity. It is significant that he sees Michael as having been 
"destroyed" and not merely reformed, because in choosing to see it this way the narrator 
expressly rejects the Jewish way of seeing it. For the Jew, chaos—the tohu vavohu—is, 
quite literally, reformed (or transformed) into creation; it is not destroyed. But the 
narrator rejects this view and instead asserts the need for chaos in the face of order (the 
former represented by Michael Simkin, the latter by Jewishness) and claims that,
"despite what Scripture says, it will never be banished, for w ithout it there would be no 
horror, no misery, and no childhood" (49).
The effect of all this, it would seem, is a condemnation of Jewishness that, in the 
end, is unmitigated, conveyed without any sense of humor. For the narrator, the "old 
country" referred to in the title of the story—that for which there are strong feelings of 
nostalgia and remembrance and, especially, reverence—is not the Jewish immigrant's 
homeland. Rather, he uses this title ironically, to reject the Jewish identity that is 
typically associated with the idea of "the old country" and to assert his desires for the 
primordial state, that state of chaos prior to cosmos, the tohu vavohu that is experienced 
most immediately, exhibited most genuinely, and represented most effectively by
commonly refers to "creation" refers primarily to the transformation or organization of 
something into something e lse —not to the making of something from nothing (i.e., ex 
nihilo, which is a Christian concept that has its sources in Greek philosophy, not Hebraic 
scripture).
127
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
childhood, and which the narrative of Jewishness destroys. Michael Simkin is a chief 
and true representative of this chaotic state—or matter, or force—and so it is with the so- 
called destruction of Michael Simkin that the narrator expresses his feelings of reverence 
and loss, as well as his feelings of animosity. This destruction occurs at the hands of the 
Jews—both on the microcosmic level, in the case of Michael Simkin, and on the 
macrocosmic level, in the case of Jewish Scripture wherein the tohu vavohu is "banished" 
as it is transformed into the known physical universe. For the narrator, Jewishness 
represents that ordering force that is in conflict with chaos, and his alignment with 
Michael Simkin is an alliance not merely with chaos but also, expressly, against 
Jewishness. Michael's and the narrator's use of humor manifests this stance, but in the 
end the humorous attack is not strong enough and is abandoned. It is replaced with 
condescending and condemning images of Jewish adults (representative of Jewish 
history and authority) and a direct refutation of Jewish Scripture.
IV. Disappearances 
Following this reading of "The Old Country," an extensive reading of Ethan 
Coen's other Jewish story, "1 Killed Phil Shapiro," is unnecessary; suffice it to say that it 
is a story about a man who kills his father—a father from whom he has distanced 
himself so extensively that he calls him  by his first name rather than by any familial 
nickname. It is a m urder that seems to be the culmination of frustrations resulting from, 
and targeted at, a myriad of explicitly Jewish situations. The phrase "1 killed Phil 
Shapiro" is repeated like a refrain throughout the narrative, and the following scene is
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offered by way of example. In it, the man's family argues about blintzes and what to eat 
for breakfast, and whether or not Savemart will be open late enough to pick up 
Wheatena on the way home. The conversation is marked with Yiddishims and other 
manifestations of Jewishness, and it ends this way:
"Savemart is open till eight. Nightly."
"So we should finish by eight? We should bolt our pot roast like 
savage Indians?"
"Blintzes, nu?"
"Well then, he can have some of my Grape-Nuts."
"Danny doesn't have your stomach made of sheet metal." 
"Grape-Nuts are extremely digestible."
"For some they are digestible. Barely."
"W ell"—Danny's father shrugged—"he could skip breakfast one
day."
Mimsy gasped. "A lunatic, this one."
Mother said, "1 don't have to make him eggs. 1 could make him 
something else."
Mimsy said, "Danny, go to the kitchen and make yourself a 
peanut butter sandwich." She turned to my mother. "May we?" 
"TBmake."
"Lots of peanut butter, not much jelly."
"Blintzes, nu?"
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I killed Phil Shapiro. (176)
This story, like "The Old Country," is narrated in the first-person, by a character 
who holds an explicitly anti-Jewish stance—in this case, the narrator is the killer. Here, 
as in other scenes, the refrain follows the scene, concludes it, as though to suggest that 
the narrator's act of murder was the result of these scenes and the madness that they 
instill in him.
Also similar to "The Old Country" are the direct and humorous stabs at 
Jewishness, as in the narrator's comparison of a fellow Hebrew schoolmate's farts to 
"t’keyah g'dolahs, proud shofar blasts" (178). The shofar is the ram 's horn that is blown in 
the synagogue during the high holidays of Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. Clearly, 
the likening of farts to shofar blasts is a show of disrespect, another subversion of Jewish 
identity. Because the overall tone of the story is less nostalgic and more violent, this 
stance is more pronounced, more anti-Jewish than that of "The Old Country." It is at 
least more explicit in its anti-Jewishness: at one point the narrator refers to the many 
Jewish experiences his mother encourages him to pursue as "never-ending torments" 
(187).
There are two moments in "1 Killed PhU Shapiro" that are of particular 
significance, especially as they pertain to our understanding of the role that Jewishness 
(or the absence of it) plays in the Coen oeuvre. The first of these comes near the end of 
the story, when the narrator is speaking of his alienation as a Jew. Here, he mentions 
these "never-ending torments" and proceeds to list many other forms of "finely 
calibrated torture," claiming that "In every meal and Hebrew school class and doctor's
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waiting room  I felt the pinprick of my differentness—from the goyim .... Our Passover 
H aggadah admonished me to act as if I personally, and not just my tribe, had been led 
out of Egypt. Perhaps this was Egypt" (187-188, emphasis mine). Again, hum or is 
absented; whereas previously the narration provided humor created both in and by the 
story, here the pain of alienation and the resentment that is felt toward Jewishness is too 
overwhelming. The narrator's resistance to, or anxiety over, his Jewish identity begins to 
transform itself into outright rejection. The line "perhaps this was Egypt" refers to 
Jewishness itself; in other words, the narrator suggests that perhaps Jewishness is the 
captivity, the slavery, the misery from which he must make his exodus.
This moment is then followed by a reversal of the story of Abraham and Isaac, as 
the narrator imagines a Sphinx-like creature speaking to him:
Boychik, it says.
Hinayni, I say.
Takest thou thy father, thine only father, even Philip, whom thou 
lovest not, and make of him an offering. (189)
The imagined scenario extends the suggestion that the narrator must escape from his 
Jewishness. The sacrificing of animals was a religious ritual, a demonstration of 
obedience and loyalty to God, a manifestation of religious identity. When Abraham was 
commanded to sacrifice Isaac, it was a test of that obedience and loyalty—a testing of his 
identity. Through his willingness to sacrifice his son, he demonstrated his commitment 
to his Jewishness. The narrator's reversal of this prominent biblical narrative of 
Jewishness is, in effect, an ironic rejection of his own Jewishness—a rejection that is,
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again, underscored by the metaphor of killing his father, representative of destroying 
the link to his Jewish heritage.
Continuing in this dreamlike scenario, the narrator then tells of a journey 
recalling the exodus out of Egypt and back to Israel—a journey initiated w ith the killing 
of his father. Soon he encounters a staggering figure in the desert. "It is PhU," we are 
to ld—"or given the fluid identity which dreams neglect to fix, it may be myself" (190). 
Here the narrator makes clear that the killing of Phil Shapiro is tantamount to the killing 
of the narrator's Self; it is the identity that the father represents that the narrator wants 
to escape or to destroy, but it is that (Jewish) identity of the narrator's Self, not the actual 
personage of the father, of which he wants to be rid. On encountering this father-figure, 
the narrator asks:
W hat connects me to him? Is the figure I now see the rear guard of a 
parade of ghosts, successive yet simultaneous, each generation melting 
into the next? What was passed down from father to son, even to the 
generation of Phil Shapiro, even unto our own day? What mysteries have 
been preserved, w hat lost, and w hat transformed in our migrations from 
Canaan to Eastern Europe to New York City and finally this far-flung 
garden suburb?
With vacant eyes the figure passes. The wind starts to fill the 
shuffling footprints he leaves behind even as he ascends the dune, stands 
swaying for a moment, and then lurches on, rippling, to disappear 
beyond the crest. (190)
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And so the story ends, with this personification of Jewishness "disappearing 
beyond the crest," the question of "What connects me to him?" still hanging in the 
desert air, presumably to be answered with little more than a shrug. With this final 
image, the narrator effectively narrates his Jewish identity out of himself, away from 
himself—narrates Jewishness up and over the dune, to disappear beyond the crest. This 
is the power the narrator has: to tell the story of his own identity—an identity that, for 
this narrator, is what it is in part for its rejection of Jewishness.
V. Living in the Past 
It is in this outright rejection of Jewishness that the Coen brothers persona differs 
from others such as the Woody Allen persona—or the personas of Mel Brooks, Charlie 
Chaplin, Jerry Seinfeld, the Three Stooges, or the Marx Brothers. For these others, certain 
societal pressures may have led to the suppression of Jewishness at times, and certain 
anxieties over this Jewishness are present and manifest themselves. But these tensions 
between alienation and assimilation, between assertions of the Jewish Self and 
suppressions of—even resistances to —the Jewish Self are ultimately incorporated into 
our very notions of Jewishness. For most Jews in America, being conflicted over one's 
Jewishness is a part of being Jewish. And, indeed, for most non-Jews in America this 
remains a part of the general notion of what it means to be Jewish. Hence, for example, 
the strong association of self-deprecating hum or with what we call "Jewish humor."
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In "Jewish humor," however, there is little real and actual rancor directed at 
Jewishness. Anti-Semitic jokes exist, but they are not a part of what we call "Jewish 
humor." They are outside this sense of Jewish identity.
Returning to questions raised previously, then: What is the effect of the Coen 
brothers' brand of hum or on constructed notions of Jewish identity? It would seem, 
from the readings of these two stories, that the effect is rancorous—that their humor 
does not qualify as self-deprecating "Jewish humor," but instead appears to be anti- 
Jewish in its bent, emanating not from a discomfort or anxiety over Jewish identity but 
from an intense criticism and rejection of it.
As mentioned, direct treatments of Jewish identity are, for the most part, absent 
from the film works of the Coen brothers—but Jewishness is briefly confronted in The 
Big Lebowski. In this film, John Coodman plays Walter, a m an who, at a moment of 
crisis when the Dude (Jeff Bridges) needs his help, insists that he can't do anything to 
break the Sabbath. The Dude tries to enlist his help and this exchange follows:
"Okay, but how does all this add up to emergency?"
"Huh?"
"I'm  saying, 1 see what you're getting at. Dude: he kept the 
money. My point is, here we are, it's Shabbes—"
"Shabbes?"
" —the Sabbath, which I'm allowed to break only if it's a matter of 
life or death."
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'Will you come off it, Walter, you're not even fucking Jewish,
man.
"What the fuck are you talking about?"
"You're fucking Polish Catholic."
"What the fuck are you talking about? I converted when I married 
Cynthia—c'mon. D ude—"
"Yeah, yeah -"
" —you know this."
" —yeah, and five fucking years ago you were divorced."
"So what are you saying? You get divorced, you turn  in your 
library card, you get a new license—you stop being Jewish?"
[mumbles] "This is the drama."
[mumbles] "I'm as Jewish as fucking Tevya."
"Man, you know, it's all part of your sick Cynthia thing, man. 
Taking care of her fucking dog, going to her fucking synagogue—you're 
living in the fucking past."
"Three thousand years of beautiful tradition, from Moses to Sandy 
Koufax—you're Goddamn right I'm  living in the fucking past! I'm —
And at this point the conversation is interrupted.
The above passage represents the most extended, most explicit discussion of 
Jewish identity to appear in any of the Coen brothers films, and it is almost the only
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reference to Jewishness in this film—despite Walter's apparent commitment to his 
religion. Moreover, as in the two stories by Ethan, in this exchange the feeling of 
antagonism toward Jewishness is apparent. Walter is an absurd character, worthy of 
ridicule, and the audience cannot be expected to admire his commitment to a Jewish 
identity that is at best adopted out of a sense of love and loyalty to his wife (but 
nevertheless adopted) and at worst clung to in a desperate attempt to cling to the past, 
to something that is no longer his—much in the same way that he clings to the memories 
of his service in the Vietnam war.
This latter notion—of clinging to something that is no longer one's own, and of 
being worthy of ridicule for doing so—fits in well with the attitude toward Jewishness 
that is manifested in the stories. The sentiment conveyed is that one should abandon 
these things. "You're living in the fucking past," says the D ude—and we, as the 
audience, cannot help but agree. This complicity in the Dude's conviction of Walter 
follows, in part, from the humor of the situation. We laugh at the rigidity of Walter's 
position—at the ridiculousness of it—and thus we align ourselves with the Dude's 
assessment of it. Even Walter himself undermines his Jewishness when he speaks of a 
tradition running "from Moses to Sandy Koufax." How can we take seriously an identity 
rooted in religion and the great prophet and author of the Torah that has fallen into the 
secular hands of a Dodger southpaw? Walter convicts himself when he says, "You're 
Goddamn right I'm  living in the fucking past!" It would seem to be no accident that the 
conversation is interrupted at this point, with the self-proclaimed (but essentially
 ^This is my transcription of the film's dialogue.
136
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
counterfeit) Jew admitting to the foolishness of his position. Nowhere does this sort of 
outright rejection of Jewish identity, as manifested in these stories and in this scene from 
The Big Lebowski, take place in even those works that are, purportedly, the most anti- 
Semitic works of Woody Allen or Philip Roth.
But before we solidify this assessment of the Coens, we must consider whether 
this stance may be a part of the postmodern frame through which they are viewing the 
w orld—a frame that they then impose upon their audience, as we read their fiction or 
watch their movies. This postmodern shift, the making of new realities and new 
identities and the recognition of the contradictions and inconsistencies between and 
resulting from them, may in fact be a part of the brilliance of their work. As Joseph 
Natoli puts it.
The ludic quality of a Coen brothers' film comes out of their 
fascination with the sheer variety of ways in which their characters know, 
identify, and produce reality and the expected and unexpected ways 
these characters run into each other. Anticipating clashes of reality frames 
is part of our audience enjoyment. (90)
Natoli goes on to say that this ludic quality "leads us to a defensiveness as we distance 
our lives from those on the screen, and an offensiveness as we muster up a critique of a 
filmic reality that lacks coherence, continuity, and closure" (91). In other words, perhaps 
the defensiveness one feels in the face of such an anti-Jewish stance, and the 
offensiveness one might muster in an essay condemning the Coens for their anti-
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Semitism, are a part of the postmodern complication that the Coens' work endeavors to
convey.
And perhaps, in the end, this is where we find ourselves w ith regard to the 
Coens' oeuvre and Jewish identity—in a state of defensiveness and offensiveness. We 
cannot help but admire the autonomy of a postmodern view that allows for the 
construction of one's identity against history and society, yet we cannot help but desire 
to distance ourselves from the anti-Jewish stance that is assumed by characters and 
narrators—and even, presumably, by the Coens themselves. We cannot help but muster 
up a critique of a Coen reality that challenges the coherence and continuity inherent in 
notions of Jewish identity—a coherence and continuity that is challenged by the Coen 
brothers' persona itself. For the Coen brothers' persona is marked by an identifiably 
Jewish surname, yet it offers little else for marking it as Jewish. Instead and to the 
contrary, it manufactures a reality in which clashes between realities occur, and in which 
Jewishness itself is narrated out of the picture. For the Coen brothers, it would seem, 
Jewishness is an identity condemned to eventual abandonment—condemned to its own 
disappearance, so to speak, beyond the crest.
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CHAPTER?
ALLEGRA GOODMAN AND NATHAN ENGLANDER
To introduce and to contextualize this discussion of these two authors and their 
accomplishment, we must begin with the following quotation from an essay by Allegra 
Goodman that appears in Daughters of Valor: Contemporary Tewish American Women 
Writers, edited by Jay Halio and Ben Siegel. Goodman writes:
Jewish American fiction has a complex and troubling position in the 
United States. The Jewish writers of my generation are the inheritors of 
two traditions of Jewish fiction. One is the tradition of writers such as 
Chaim Grade, Sholom Aleichem, and LB. Singer.... These are writers 
whose aesthetic qualities and achievements are rarely isolated from their 
subject matter. Always they are the recorders of a lost culture and a lost 
language.... These writers' books are marginalized as artifacts rather than 
read consistently as art works.
The other tradition that comes down to us is that of Jewish 
American writers such as Roth and Bellow, who develop and project their 
self-consciousness, ambivalence, and guilt about the Jewish tradition into 
mainstream American fiction. If the translated Yiddish writers are 
marginalized as parochial, the great Jewish American writers are read as
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institutional...and in a sense their fame makes it hard to hear them as 
ethnic voices. ("Writing" 269-70)
The tension Goodman describes between these two traditions is essentially the 
tension between alienation and assimilation. The Yiddish writers she describes are 
forever alienated —"parochial"—and consequently marginalized, while the "great 
Jewish American writers" have become largely assimilated. To underscore this latter 
point, Goodman observes that a particular Norton anthology, in its introductions to 
Roth and Bellow, fails to make any mention of either writer's Jewishness.
Goodman's objective in identifying these two traditions in Jewish writing is to 
differentiate them from what she hopes to accomplish in her own writing. Goodman is 
not concerned w ith alienation or assimilation—or, perhaps more precisely, she is not 
anxious about them. She is not self-conscious nor is she ambivalent about her 
Jewishness. She is a postassimilationist writer who wishes, in Gloria Cronin's words, "to 
be a part of a Jewish literature that in the postassimilationist era can recapture the 
spiritual and religious dimension of Judaism" (248). Says Goodman, "1 practice...a fiction 
that is unapologetic and energetically ethnic" ("Writing" 271). In other words, Goodman 
is a part of a new generation of Jewish-American writers whose principle distinction 
from previous generations might just be their willingness to embrace the label "Jewish- 
American writer."
Illustrating this distinction, Goodman writes of a conversation she had with 
Cynthia Ozick at a dinner in Ozick's honor at Stanford University, where Goodman was 
a Ph.D. student. Goodman describes the conversation this way;
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We began to talk about the term Jewish American writer, and she told me 
how much she resented the label. It is derogatory, she said, it is simplistic 
and reductive. It reduces art and ideas to ethnic commodities. The very 
word ethnic, she said, is a hateful term; it is really a slur, a term of 
alienation, with its root word ethnos connoting foreign and heathen. To 
label fiction as Jewish American, to think of it as ethnic, is not merely to 
categorize it but to attack it. Then she leaned over and asked, "What do 
you think?" ("Writing" 268)
It is interesting to note that Goodman sets up this situation to make it humorous: 
she highlights the irony inherent in the juxtaposition of Ozick's rant with her seemingly 
sincere inquiry. In this way, hum or becomes, for Goodman, a means of—or, at least, it 
opens the door to —negotiating Jewish identity, and particularly how it has been 
constructed by Ozick. What Goodman thinks, in fact, is that "a writer cannot have 
enough labels if they are keys to new audiences" ("Writing" 269). She feels that her 
"most intimate and immediate audience comes from the American Jewish community" 
("Writing" 268). Such a difference in opinion might seem merely th a t—a difference of 
opinion—but in reality it speaks volumes on Jewish-American literature and identity, 
and on the ways in which these have changed from generation to generation.
Jewish-American immigrants came to the United States and, as a largely and 
highly literate group, entered quickly into the literary scene with novels about 
immigration and the struggle to overcome alienation. As generations of Jews were bom  
in the United States, they continued to write about their alienation as children of
142
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
immigrant Jews—an alienation both from mainstream American society and from the 
history and culture from which their parents had come—and the tension was between 
the tug of the old world and the pull of the new, the tug and pull of alienation and 
assimilation (the latter being often referred to as "Americanization"). This tension has 
long been a part of Jewish-American fiction, and thus by extension has long been a part 
of our constructed sense of Jewish-American identity, and the post-World War II, so- 
called "mainstream" writers (e.g. Bellow, Malamud, Roth) have not dispensed w ith this 
tension. To the contrary, they have exhibited great anxiety over it, and have frequently 
responded with great ambivalence. But with the advent of writers such as Goodman and 
Nathan Englander there seems to have been a shift—or a de-/reconstruction of that 
identity. This new Jewishness, so to speak, is, as Goodman puts it, "unapologetic and 
energetically ethnic," and no longer is it so anxious or ambivalent about its identity.
The proof is in the prose. Goodman and Englander both have made their literary 
names (at least initially) as short story writers, and both exhibit this postassimilationist 
posture in their early stories. Moreover, each may be considered a comic or humorous 
writer, and each employs that hum or in significant ways w ith regard to Jewish identity. 
In fact, it may even be said that it is primarily their particular uses of humor that work to 
construct this new, postassimilationist Jewish identity—just as it is primarily the hum or 
of writers such as Philip Roth or Woody Allen that constructs an identity of anxiousness 
and/or ambivalence toward Jewishness.
Goodman's "And Also Much Cattle" is a good place to start, in examining this 
postassimilationist shift, because it is, significantly, the first story Goodman ever
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wrote—and because the story revolves around Yom Kippur services. Yom Kippur is a
time of deep thought and great hope, a time to turn  away from past sin, to forgive others 
and to be forgiven, and the beginning of a new year. All of this, of course, is appropriate 
to a work that is, at least for Goodman, inaugurating the reconstruction of a new Jewish 
identity. In the story, Gail and B.J. Schick are holding Yom Kippur services in their home 
in Honolulu, Hawaii. The story opens with the arrival of the Sugarmans and continues 
with the arrivals of more guests and with the comic-chaotic attempts to perform the 
religious rituals of the holiday.
Before going on, however, we should note that this story appears in Goodman's 
first book, entitled Total Immersion (1989), and this too is significant and w orthy of 
consideration. Cronin describes the predicament of "total immersion" as being "stuck in 
a hum an space that prohibits the transcendental leap beyond ... engulfed in the hilarious 
great earthbound suck of the mortal self" (249). And Sanford Pinsker likewise notes that 
"'Immersion' operates as the charged w ord here," because "the possibility of being 
swam ped—of a total immersion into the unfamiliar—always looms as a possibility"
(193). Building on both Cronin's and Pinsker's observations, we might add that the 
metaphor of immersion also has much to do w ith the postassimilationist perspective: for 
when an object is immersed, it is completely surrounded by and involved in that in 
which it is immersed, yet it retains its integrity as an individual object; it is not alienated 
as something outside of that in which it is immersed, nor is it assimilated into that in 
which it is immersed, as with something that is absorbed or dissolved. And while 
Goodman does write about humans who are immersed in mortality and the unfamiliar.
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she also writes specifically about Jews who are immersed, not only in the society and 
culture of the United States, but in their own Jewishness and Judaism. And the 
incongruities that result from this predicament, from these immersions, are 
unapologetically hilarious.
For the postassimilationist writer this hilarity poses a potential dilemma, 
however, because the function of hum or is the alienation or assimilation of 
incongruities. How, then, does a writer such as Goodman—who wishes to be 
unapologetic and to avoid the self-conscious anxiety and ambivalence about Jewishness 
that are so often associated with the hum or of "mainstreamed" Jewish-American 
w riters—use hum or without constructing Jewishness as an incongruity that m ust be 
either alienated or assimilated? In other words, how do we joke about Jews without The 
Jew and Jewishness somehow suffering as the butt of the joke?
The answer to this is inhered in the postassimilationist shift in perspective, which 
removes Jews and Jewishness from the role of spectacle. Humor, it is generally 
acknowledged, is the result of some incongruity—the juxtaposition of two things that do 
not fit together. Often, this incongruity manifests itself as a conflict between the ideal 
and the real. An example from "And Also M uch Cattle" is the scene in which Gail 
Schick's sons are cussing and fighting in front of the Torah in the middle of services 
(179). Another is Arnold Bogner's claim that he always goes for the intellectual girls, 
juxtaposed w ith the glimpse we get of Pearl's to-do list in her bedroom (Pearl is the girl 
that Arnold is infatuated with): her list reads, "1. Wash hair" and "2. Paint nails" (183-
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84). In both instances, the incongruity between ideal or expectation and reality is
humorous, but it has nothing to do with Jewishness per se.
By contrast, in the tradition of Jewish-American fiction via Bellow and Roth, 
one's Jewishness itself is a source of incongruity. In other words, in these works 
Jewishness, w hen juxtaposed with Americanness, doesn't quite fit—because Jewishness 
is implicitly not a part of the supposed ideal of "Americanness." Thus Jewishness, as 
incongruity, often becomes a focal point, a source of anxiety and thus a source of humor 
and the subject of laughter. That laughter, then, is often directed at the incongruity and 
functions to either alienate or assimilate it. That is, we either laugh acceptingly at the 
difference, making room for i t—or, as is often the case, our laughter is full of discomfort 
and even ridicule, or deprecation, thereby alienating the difference or annihilating it by 
coercing it into assimilation. It is precisely because of this function of hum or that writers 
like Roth and Allen have at times been accused of self-hatred or anti-Semitism.
Goodman, however, is not an author creating characters who are self-conscious, 
guilt-ridden, and/or ambivalent toward their Jewishness, whose Jewishness contributes 
to their sense of their own state of incongruity; rather, she is an "unapologetic and 
energetically ethnic" author whose characters are immersed in their own Jewishness. 
The resultant incongruities, then, have more to do with their hum anness—the Schick 
brothers' immaturity and irreverence, or Arnold's lack of self-awareness, for example— 
than with their ethnicity. Jewishness, instead of being constructed as the real which 
comes into conflict with the ideal of Americanness, is constructed as an ideal in and of
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itself. The effect is that the humor's alienating/assimilating force is directed not at
Jewishness or Judaism as a (or the) source of incongruity, but at human folly.
This is the essence of the postassimilationist shift; a move away from the 
perception of Jewishness as Other, or as incongruous. This perception of Jewishness-as- 
Other can really only be held from outside Jewishness and is thus predominantly the 
alienator's (i.e. the anti-Semite's) perception—or, if one is Jewish yet one holds this 
perception of Jewishness-as-Other, then it becomes the assimilationisf s perception (as 
one strives to suppress or disavow one's Jewishness/Othemess by assimilating). By 
contrast, the posf-assimilationist's perspective is a move toward the assertion of the 
Jewish Self. In other words, it is the total immersion of the Jew into his or her 
Jewishness, so that the incongruities that arise are not the result of being Jewish but are 
often, instead, the result of being not Jewish enough.
In "And Also Much Cattle," we (as readers) are immersed along with 
Goodman's characters into a context of Jewishness, wherein Judaism operates as an 
ideal instead of an incongruity, and from within that context it is the reality of the 
characters' humanness (e.g. immaturity, pride, self-ignorance) that runs incongruous 
with the ideal that Judaism presents. Thus, it is human imperfection and not Jewishness 
at which we are laughing, and it is the alienation or assimilation of humanness that we 
must negotiate as laughers. Depending on our stance, we either make room for human 
folly and accept it (which is perhaps our response to what we call the comic), or we 
ridicule it out of an urge to change or correct it (which is perhaps our response to what 
we call the satiric). Either way, the postassimilationist's perspective is accomplished, as
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we are no longer concerned with the alienation or assimilation of Jews or Jewishness per
se.
Goodman continues this pursuit of postassimilationism in other stories, and 
most recently in her latest novel. Paradise Park (2001). The novel follows the odyssey of 
Sharon Speigelman, a woman in search of God and identity. On her perception of her 
own Jewishness she is clear, early on: "1 came from a background of staunch 
secularism," she tells us. "Nominally my family was Jewish, but we didn't belong to 
anything, or do anything" (48). In this way, Goodman establishes Sharon as another 
Jewish-but-less-than-Jewish character; and her status as Other is emphasized in various 
ways, including the way she is treated by her housemates in Hawaii. They are "aU local 
and loved to tease [her], since [she] was w hat they called a 'haole,' which was an 
affectionate way of saying intruder and outsider and interloper" (46). Sharon 
unwittingly reiterates her outsider status when she then admits that, "Actually, I d idn 't 
understand a lot of w hat these guys said, because they liked to talk in pidgin English" 
(46).
By establishing that Sharon does not consider herself Jewish, other than 
nominally, and that she is an interloper, an outsider, Goodman implicitly constructs 
Jewishness as one more identity to which Sharon is Other. Her strained relationship with 
her parents works metaphorically to underscore this: though her parents are staunch 
secularists, as her parents they function symbolically as Sharon's ethnic heredity. Her 
distanced relationship w ith them is emblematic of her distance from her own 
Jewishness—and their secularism increases this distance. If Bellow and Roth characters
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are generally second-generation Jews, still caught up in tensions over alienation and 
assimilation, Sharon is a third-generation (at least), assimilated Jew. But about halfway 
through the narrative, Sharon encounters Rabbi Everett Siegel, who recognizes this 
distance. And Sharon, who is constantly in search of a god or a spiritual identity that she 
can adopt, is at first spellbound by Siegel's spirituality. The spell wears off when Siegel 
comments on the behavior of contemporary Jews. In response to this, Sharon says:
"I just wanted to say that personally I was a little bit offended 
when you spoke about people of Jewish backgrounds running way [sic]. 
Because I am not and I have never been a person who is running away 
from anything."
"I see," he said.
"I happen to be a comparative religion major at UH," I said. "I 
happen to be a person running toward spiritualism."
He looked at me with his melancholy eyes. "The question," he 
said, "is whether your spiritualism, as you call it, has anything to do with 
your religion."
"My what?"
"With Judaism."
"I never said Judaism was my religion."
"The irony is," Rabbi Siegel told me in his rolling tones, "we are a 
people w ho have survived by our memories. And now we are plagued 
with amnesia." (149)
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The rabbi's statement is, of course, a statement against assimilation. And in the 
process of trying to respond indignantly to the rabbi's assertion that she is "an 
amnesiac," Sharon ironically asserts her Jewishness. In this way, humor (via irony) again 
becomes the primary vehicle for the construction of a Jewish identity that is not Other, to 
be alienated from or assimilated into American identity, but is instead a Self in and of 
itself, an identity which Sharon suddenly wishes to assert. After telling us previously 
that she is only nominally Jewish, and emphasizing her staunch secularist background, 
she now tells the rabbi, "I come from a Jewish home, and my stepmother was also 
Jewish. It's not like I could run away from Judaism if I tried!" And this comic assertion 
of Jewishness is then heightened (and perhaps validated) by Sharon's claim that "at that 
moment the bashert happened! The Jewish fate Gary had referred to" (149). The moment 
becomes a turning point—a very Jewish turning point—as Sharon (re-)enters a/the 
Jewish community as the result of an identifiably Jewish phenomenon (i.e. bashert) and 
steps onto a path leading to the end of her odyssey, which is ultimately the fulfillment or 
realization of her Jewishness.
For, in the end, Sharon assumes and asserts a Jewish identity that is, like that of 
the characters from "And Also Much Cattle," fully immersed in, but not assimilated 
into, her Americanness. In other words, rather than being objectified as something to be 
assimilated or alienated, Jewishness—and Judaism, more particularly—becomes 
idealized as that toward which Sharon is striving and of which she falls short. Her 
assertion of her Jewish Self is unmistakable; she becomes an orthodox Jew, marries an 
immigrant orthodox Jew named Mikhail, and they have a son that Sharon names Zohar.
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(The name means "radiance, splendor, and light" [351] and is a deliberate attem pt on 
Sharon's part to declare that she has finally found the identity she has been looking for.)
That humor has played a consistent and prominent role in the assertion of this 
postassimilationist Jewish identity is likewise unmistakable: during a conversation with 
her mother, for instance, at the hospital following the birth of Zohar, Sharon tries to 
convince her mother that she no longer blames her for past behaviors, to convince her 
that she has found "'a more enlightened place'" now; and in response her mother says, 
"'You are. No question you are. Enlightened, and everything else. Jewish! Who would 
have thought?"' (343-344). An explication of the comic irony in this remark is hardly 
necessary, but certainly it is noteworthy that the remark comes from Sharon's m other— 
that emblem of her ethnic heredity. And the irony is only heightened with the 
recognition that Sharon's newfound Jewishness might actually increase the distance 
between herself and her parents, w ho remain assimilated Jews. In the end, it is clear that 
Sharon will continue to assert her Jewishness while continuing to fall short of the ideal 
that it represents, so as readers we laugh heartily—but we're laughing at Sharon the 
hum an being, not at Sharon the Jew.
Nathan Englander
There is no explicit indication as to whether or not Nathan Englander became 
familiar with Goodman's writing prior to or during the composition of his own stories, 
but certainly Englander's fiction produces an effect similar to Goodman's. Englander 
exploded onto the literary scene w ith his debut story collection. For the Relief of 
Unbearable Urges (1999), and though Englander has not articulated his place in relation
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to Jewish-American literary tradition as Goodman has, he certainly is conscious of a 
similar objective. In an interview that appears on his publisher's web site, Englander 
explains it this way;
It's no shock that people focus on the Jewish themes in the collection.
They are not exactly hidden. But for me they have more to do with setting 
and with providing the rules, the logic, by which the worlds presented 
function. ("Interview")
In other words, for Englander Jewishness is context, not subject or object; in Englander's 
stories, as in Goodman's, the same postassimilationist shift manifests itself. Like 
Goodman, Englander refuses to construct Jewishness as an incongruity in the context of 
Americanness, instead using Jewishness (combined with Americanness) as a context into 
which individual human beings are immersed.
In his story "The Wig," for example, Ruchama, the main character, is a victim of 
vanity. She is an orthodox Jew who longs for the head of hair she once had, before she 
was married (and was, according to her orthodoxy, required to shave it off), and who 
lies and swindles others in the pursuit of something like it—in the form of a wig made 
from the heavenly locks of a fruit-tree delivery boy. It is an admirable feat and a 
testament to his postassimilationist perspective that Englander manages to portray this 
story with great humor throughout, while preventing Ruchama's ethnic Jewishness or 
her extremely orthodox Judaism from becoming, even once, the direct source or target of 
that humor. Instead, it is Ruchama's hum anness—her hum an flaws, principally her 
vanity—that is exposed and exploited.
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Moreover, it is interesting to note that a portion of Ruchama's humanness—a 
portion of her vanity—feeds off of recognition from, and the influences of, the non- 
Jewish community. For example, she is motivated in part by the images of a woman in a 
fashion magazine, which is considered narishkeit (i.e. contraband), and which she 
peruses in secret during her trips to the city. In this way, by reinforcing her weakness via 
non-Jewish sources, Englander emphasizes that it is not her Jewishness nor her Judaism 
that makes Ruchama a comic figure; it is human folly—her shortcomings as an orthodox 
Jew who is tempted and influenced by the Gentile w orld—which generates our 
laughter. Englander does not point us to the incongruity of a Jew in America (which, of 
course, suggests that Jews are incongruous with "America"); rather, he points us to the 
incongruity of a hum an being with hum an weaknesses immersed in a religion and 
culture of lofty ideals (suggesting that orthodox Jews are, in fact, very much a part of 
"America" and a lot like their fellow Americans, though they may not be 
"Americanized").
Something similar to this occurs in other Englander stories. In "The Gilgul of 
Park Avenue," a Gentile, Charles Luger, comes to the realization that he is "the bearer of 
a Jewish soul." While riding in a taxi, he suddenly "knew, as he knew anything at all, 
that there was a Yiddishe neshama functioning inside" of him (109). This realization is 
immediately followed by Luger's assertion of his new Jewish Self, when out of a desire 
to share his revelation he knocks on the Plexiglass divider in the cab: "'Jewish,' Charles 
said. 'Jewish, here in the back'" (109). The cab driver responds that the meter ticks the 
same for all creeds, and thus hum or again becomes the principal means whereby this
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postassimilationist Jewish identity is constructed. Luger's assertion is humorous for at 
least two reasons. First, for the incongruity of the presentation, as such a profound 
realization about identity is delivered in the understated manner of "Jewish, here in the 
back." And second, for the incongruity of the content, as it is a non-Jew who is declaring 
sudden Jewishness. But note that it is not the Jewishness per se that is incongruous here; 
rather, it is the absence of "real" Jewishness that presents the incongruity. As a result, our 
laughter focuses on the alienation or assimilation not of Jewishness, but of Luger's lack 
thereof, so that we are either accepting (via congenial laughter) or rejecting (via scornful 
laughter) the idea that a non-Jew could claim Jewishness. In other words, Jewishness 
again becomes context rather than subject or object. The cab driver's response reinforces 
this, as it is, in Luger's words, a "benign" response (109), leaving aside the alienation or 
assimilation of Jewishness.
As it is for characters in Goodman's fiction—most prominently Sharon, in 
Paradise Park—Jewishness is for Luger an ideal to which he aspires. And the principal 
comic irony in the story, at least at first, lies in Luger's unhesitating assertion of his 
Jewishness when he knows almost nothing about what that Jewishness entails. When he 
sits down to dinner w ith his wife, for example, he is afraid to tell her of his new identity 
because he isn 't sure how she'll react—but he seems, in fact, to be just as troubled by the 
food that sits before him;
Half an hour Jewish and already he felt obliged. He knew there were 
dietary laws, milk and meat forbidden to touch, but he didn't dare ask 
Sue and chance a confrontation, not until he 'd  formulated a plan. H e'd
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call Dr. Birnbaum, his psychologist, in the morning. Or maybe he 'd  find a 
rabbi. Who better to guide him in such matters? (I ll)
In effect, then, Jewishness becomes—as it is for the other characters we've 
exam ined—the context into which Luger is suddenly immersed, and we laugh at this 
predicament wherein the human being, with all his or her faults and failures, falls short 
of the ideal. This immersion is iterated in "Gilgul" when Luger seeks guidance at the 
Royal Hills Mystical Jewish Reclamation Center (the R-HMJRC). There, "standing in the 
middle of the marble floor," Luger feels "the cold space, the only thing familiar being his 
unfamiliar self" (112). In other words, Luger's new Self—his Jewishness—is at once his 
own and not his own. He is, himself. Other to his Jewishness. And from this 
postassimilationist perspective, it is his Otherness as non-Jew (not his Jewishness) that 
requires alienation or assimilation. This is reiterated when he meets Rabbi Zalman 
Meintz of the R-HMJRC, who looks "like a real Jew" (113); Luger, by contrast, does not, 
and the context is such that Luger, as aspiring Jew, is constructed as Other to Meintz, the 
"real Jew."
As mentioned, much of the hum or in the story resides in the incongruity of 
Luger's reality (i.e. as hum an being) w ith his ideal (i.e. orthodox Judaism). This hum or is 
perhaps at its best and most exemplary during the incident involving the mezuzah.
After telling his wife about his new identity, Luger continues his transformation amid a 
barrage of spousal protests. On a Sunday afternoon, his wife. Sue, drags him from his 
reading.
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"I could kill you," she said. And though smaller, she had already 
pulled him to his feet. Charles followed her to the foyer.
"What is this?" she yelled, slamming open the door.
"A mezuzah," he said. "If you mean that." He pointed at the small 
metal casing nailed to the doorpost. "I need it," he said. "I have to kiss it."
"Oh my God," she said, slamming the door closed, giving the 
neighbors no more than a taste. "My God!" She steadied herself, put a 
hand against the wall. "Well where did it come from? It's got blue paint 
on it. Where does one buy a used mezuzah?"
"I don't know where to get one. I pried it off eleven-D with a letter 
opener. They don't even use it. Steve Freiman had me in to see their 
Christmas tree last year. Their daughter is dating a black man." (126-127) 
The hum or created by this episode is evident, and arises from an understanding—the 
same understanding that gives rise to the hum or in the story about Ruchama and the 
wig: namely, the understanding that orthodox Jews are not supposed to behave in this 
way, to covet curly locks or to lift mezuzahs using letter openers. In other words, we 
laugh not at Judaism, nor at Luger's Jewishness, but distinctly at his not being Jewish 
enough. We laugh at his humanness.
What is unique about "The Gilgul of Park Avenue," though, is that it hints more 
strongly at a direct contrasting of the postassimilationist's perspective with the 
assimilationist's, chiefly by constructing a sort of rivalry between Rabbi Meintz and 
Luger's psychologist. Dr. Bimbaum. Meintz, the one who looks "like a real Jew" and the
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one who provides Luger with guidance during his transformation, comes to represent 
the postassimilationist assertion of the Jewish Self. Bimbaum, on the other hand, is a 
secular, assimilated Jew, apparently ambivalent about his own Jewishness, who 
encourages Luger to consider other options to orthodox Judaism such as "gardening or 
meditation" (133). Underlying all of this, and illustrating the role of hum or in these 
identity constructions, is the great irony that Meintz is, apparently, a former-Gentile 
"gilgul" like Luger, while Bimbaum is (in traditional terms) the "real" Jew. Englander 
seems to be suggesting that, in the postassimilationist shift, "real" Jewishness is in the 
construction and assertion of a Jewish Self, not in the traditional trappings of heredity, 
which have been victimized by the trap of assimilationism. Meintz, in fact, asserts as 
much when he tells Luger earlier that the body (i.e. heredity) doesn't matter. '"Jew, non- 
Jew, doesn't matter. The body doesn't matter,"' he says. "'It is the soul itself that is 
Jewish'" (115).
At the end of the story, Luger and his wife, Bimbaum, and Meintz have dinner 
together, to negotiate Luger's new identity. But despite his wife's protests, and 
Bimbaum's soft cajoling, Luger (with Meintz at his side) stands firm. In fact,
Bimbaum—that representative of assimilation—slowly recedes from the heated 
discussion between Luger and Sue, seemingly signifying the trium ph of Luger's 
postassimilationist assertions by "backing away with quiet steps" (135). Meintz leaves 
too, of course, but he is unable to slip away as the doctor does, because Luger wants to 
walk him to the door. There, Meintz reaffirms Luger's Jewishness in the process of 
w am ing him about hardships ahead. ("'I tell you this from one Jew to another. There is
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no hope for the pious"' [136].) Luger then returns to his wife and stands before her, in 
the full assertion of his new Self, wanting "to be wholly seen" by his wife—wanting her 
to acknowledge and accept his new identity, rather than alienate or assimilate it. Or, as 
Englander puts it, "wanting her to love him changed" (137).
Through all of this, then—in "The Gilgul of Park Avenue" and in "The Wig," as 
in other stories—Englander does what Goodman does: he constructs Judaism and 
Jewishness as that into which his characters are immersed; as an ideal compatriot to 
Americanness, rather than incongruous with it; and as an identity of the Self rather than 
of the Other. This is not to say that Englander's (or Goodman's) characters do not 
function as Others, for indeed much of the humor in these stories arises from this 
Otherness. But unlike the Otherness of characters from many of the Jewish-American 
works that are a part of the two previous traditions to which Goodman refers, Luger's— 
and Sharon's, and Ruchama's, and the Schick brothers'—Otherness is not derived from 
his (or their) Jewishness. Rather, they are Other in relation to that Jewishness, as 
Jewishness becomes not that which must be alienated or assimilated, but that to which 
the characters aspire to assimilate themselves.
Speculations
It is too early to say right now, of course, but it is possible to speculate that 
perhaps this will be Goodman's and Englander's great accomplishment. Stepping out of 
the two previous traditions in Jewish-American literature, these writers do not portray 
an alienated, parochial Jewish experience, nor do they promote or exhibit assimilationist 
tendencies by expressing guilt over, or self-consciousness about, or ambivalence toward
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Jewishness, or by portraying it scornfully or apologetically; rather, they immerse the 
reader into worlds where Jewishness and Judaism are, along with generalized 
"Americanness," a part of that in which the reader and the characters are immersed, or 
an ideal toward which they might strive. By preventing and/or refusing the construction 
of Jewishness as the Other, Goodman and Englander prevent it from becoming the butt 
of their humor. In this way, Goodman and Englander move beyond the traditional 
issues o f—and preoccupations w ith—Jewish alienation and assimilation, to laugh 
instead at, in Cronin's words, the "human conditions that have always blocked 
individual consciousness and formed the stuff of hum an comedy" (266). With this shift 
into the postassimilationist perspective, and by owning and pursuing their ethnicity 
enthusiastically, Goodman and Englander do much to assert the Jewish Self and to bring 
a renewed sense of integrity to Jewish identity. And with a great and pleasing irony, 
they at the same time, in fact, push their humor and their narratives into a real, more 
substantial universality.
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CHAPTERS
EPILOGUE
The purpose of this study was never to provide an overarching narrative of 
Jewish-American humor and identity in the 20* century; yet it is worth noting that such 
a narrative does seem to emerge as we move from the immigrant hum or of Cahan's 
Yekl, which tends to focus primarily on first-generation anxieties of alienation, through 
the works of Roth and Allen, which tend to focus on second-generation anxieties of 
assimilation, to the works of the Coen brothers and those of Goodman and Englander, 
which posit two possible third-generation responses to these anxieties—each of which, it 
may be added, could be referred to as postassimilationist. Elaving noted this emergent 
overarching narrative, however, my impulse is to back away from such a reductive, 
overly simplistic portrayal of Jewish-American identity, which certainly has not evolved 
in any singular direction, let alone one so easily traceable and encapsulated. The real 
intent and value of this study is, I believe, not the suggestion of an overarching narrative 
but the presentation of a plurality of narratives, a plurality of approaches to Jewish- 
American hum or and identity.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this study is comprised of individual essays 
and not true chapters; they do not cohere around a centralized thesis, but gather under 
the general topic of the relationship between Jewish-American hum or and Jewish-
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American identity. As David E. E. Sloane says, in his introduction to New Directions in 
American Humor, "It is the divergent components of American hum or that make 
monolithic analysis a problematic undertaking at best" (4), and the very same can be 
said of Jewish humor. My hope here has been the same as Sloane's is for his audience: 
"Readers of this book," he says, "...should be able to start at nearly any point and 
discover...ways of viewing humor that lead to further inquiries" (3). The Malamud 
essay, for example, should raise interesting questions about Malamud's humanism and 
the possibility of postmodern readings of his novels—something that has not been 
explored much, to the detriment of M alamud's standing in academia. Likewise, the 
Bellow essay should point to an array of questions surrounding the relationship between 
hum or and the Holocaust, as well as to questions of ethics and humor. And the last 
essay, on Goodman and Englander, might raise questions about the direction of 
postmodern thought in general: Is Goodman's turn toward Orthodox Judaism, for 
instance, indicative of a reactionary response to postmodernism's notions of relational, 
constructed identities, and in effect a re-turn to notions of essence in/of/and identity?
In other words, a goal of this study is to open up the discussion of Jewish humor 
and identity by suggesting further inquiries, rather than to close it by offering decisive 
answers. Because questions about the construction of identity are so central to these 
essays, the essays should lead readers, again in Sloane's words, "to the broadest issues 
of philosophical belief, national versus international cultural identity, and self­
definition" (3). And always at the forefront (of this study at least, if not of future 
inquiries) is the steady recognition of the inextricable relevance of hum or to these
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issues—the constant realization that, with regard to questions of ethics, philosophy, and 
identity, ultimately humor matters, and there can be no such thing as "just joking."
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